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JAZZ IMPROVISATION, THEATRE GAMES AND CURRICULUM
by
BARRY KRAKOVSKY
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ABSTRACT
This work is an attempt to analyze some of the conditions and activities that
surround improvisation. I will argue that the process of improvisation and even the
attempt at improvisation can offer the curriculum scholar an important pedagogical
model. Importantly, this model will offer no direct solutions which might improve one’s
pedagogical stance. Instead, these models are best interpreted as a provocation, or an
invitation to think of a better relationship, for example, of teacher and student. I
interrogate jazz improvisation, theatrical improvisation, and popular culture. I also
examine a version of performativity that could provide a degree of agency to those who
wish to challenge the status quo or the taken for granted.
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curriculum
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“…If I knew where good songs came from, I’d go there more often…” (Cohen, Burger,
2014, p. 251).
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In John Dewey’s landmark work, Art As Experience, (2005) he successfully
makes the case for the importance of the arts in human development. Dewey deftly
describes the impact and necessity of art, in its broadest sense, when he writes, “…works
of art are the only media of complete and unhindered communication between man and
man that can occur in a world full of gulfs and walls that limit community of experience”
(p. 109). This transformational impact is felt by the creator of art and the person who
participates in this esthetic experience as an observer, however, what is problematic is
that these observations lean more towards the observer as spectator instead of the more
fruitful role of participant and equal. The philosopher Jacques Rancière (2009) in his
book, The Emancipated Spectator, challenged me to reconsider my definition of the term
spectator while he also calls for a new way of conceiving of the relationship between
audience and performance. With regards to the spectator, and audiences in general,
Rancière challenges us to re-think our positions as he proposes one of his central themes:
“equality of intelligence.” Indeed, he writes,
Being a spectator is not some passive condition that we should transform into
activity. It is our normal situation. We also learn and teach, act and know, as
spectators who all the time link what we see to what we have seen and said, done
and dreamed. There is no more a privileged form than there is a privileged
starting point. Everywhere there are starting points, intersections and junctions
that enable us to learn something new if we refuse, firstly, radical distance,
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secondly the distribution of roles, and thirdly the boundaries between territories.
(p. 17)
In this work I wrestle with the relationship between spectator and performer since
it serves as a way for me to examine similar relationships, such as teacher and students.
Rancière’s remarks regarding “distance,” “roles,” and “boundaries” in some ways
bolsters one of the themes- a refutation of administration from the top down- I propose in
my original play in chapter 5. But since I am also interested in the artist and her
relationship to her audience, I also look to John Dewey (2005). As Dewey analyzes the
various artists as they create and perfect their work he perhaps, unintentionally, promotes
a method of creation and re-creation that is decidedly linear in its approach. “Writer,
composer of music, sculptor, or painter can retrace, during the process of production,
what they have previously done. When it is not satisfactory in the undergoing or
perceptual phase of experience, they can to some degree start afresh. This retracing is not
readily accomplished in the case of architecture-which is perhaps one reason why there
are so many ugly buildings…” (p. 53), Dewey writes to describe the process of creative
production: linear, re-imagined, and revised. I do not wish to denigrate this method of
artistic production. I do not wish to malign the way so many people work as they attempt
to create something of value and beauty. Indeed, the seemingly solitary act of creation
and revision is vital to the continued growth and development of the arts and by
association the development of humankind. And, in what will eventually become clear as
ironic and perhaps hypocritical, it is the way in which the work you see in front of you is
being created. And yet it is not the only way to work. My mention of Dewey in this
introduction is not meant to foreground his philosophy as emblematic of my own, nor is it
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meant to be central to an understanding of the words that follow. To be sure a discussion
that is in many ways an arts based inquiry must mention Dewey (1960, 2001, 2005). But
my interests are non-linear and for that I must turn to Derrida (1982, 1997) in his words
and J. Hillis Miller’s words (2007, 2009). Indeed, so much of Derrida’s task of
“deconstruction” seems to mirror that of the jazz and theatrical improviser, not in their
products, per se, but rather in the tensionalities that comprise the improvisational process,
which paradoxically could never be a process. Perhaps this is why Walter Benjamin
appears in the preface to Miller’s (2009) book, For Derrida. Briefly yet brilliantly,
Benjamin says, “Method ist Umweg [Method is detour]” (p. xv). Improvisation and
“deconstruction” in all their complexity embody risk as they search for the school to
come, justice to come, democracy to come, or something wonderful to come, for
example, as one (individual or informal collective) responds to a “wholly other.” In
remarking on a lifetime of friendship and scholarship with Derrida, Miller (2009) writes,
“…It is a wager that his works will continue to function in the future, but in ways that are
impossible to predict, except that he can be sure that they are perhaps destined to errance,
to erring and to wandering…” (p. 47). Non-linear methods of creation and iteration, like
improvisation, tend to be pushed to the margins for reasons that are argued as practical as
well as pedagogical. A performative culture which praises top down control, and a strict
production quota hasn’t the time to allow people to “wander.” I would like to change this
arrangement. I do not desire, nor am I arguing, to replace the linear process of creation,
revision and recreation and its variants. Instead, I would like to see improvisation demarginalized. I would like to give it a seat at the academic table alongside those who
create in the more accepted fashion. Charlie Parker deserves to sit next to Igor
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Stravinsky; Jonathan Winters deserves the same recognition as James Thurber, since all
of those mentioned created works of value, intelligence, and beauty, despite their
different methods of creation. And to continue with a Derridean thought and my
metaphor of the dinner table, I would suggest that the table in question reserve an empty
seat for the guest to come. Miller reminded me of the importance of the guest to come in
his discussion of Derrida within the context of the Jewish tradition to leave a seat for
Elijah (p. 47). I write these words in full awareness of the paradox of my situation. I
write these words with the full knowledge of the irony I demonstrate as I propose
privileging the improviser (always a collaborative activity?) alongside the solitary artist
of careful vision and re-vision, while employing the seemingly linear method of the
solitary writer, looking back on what I’ve written and looking ahead at what still needs to
be done. The solitary artist who struggles to innovate is important to creation but so is the
one who works in collaboration(?) with others, or the Other within the individual self,
attempting to create something new, something wonderful right away, or at the very least,
the seed(s) of something wonderful. My desires do not come lightly or without careful
thought. For almost three decades I have worked as a teacher in a variety of public
schools, with students of different ages, interests, talents and academic abilities. I’m
proud of what I do, although I acknowledge my mistakes. I am mindful of what needs to
be done. This mindfulness has been informed and transformed by largely traditional
education (my undergraduate and graduate degrees in history have proven invaluable to
me), instinct, intuition, reflection, a Reform Jewish upbringing, and for the past several
years, my immersion into the world of curriculum studies. Although I always suspected
something was wrong with so much of public education I was unaware of the
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specificities: patriarchy, heteronormativity, unregulated capitalism, literalism, racism,
xenophobia, American exceptionalism, commodified play, violence, performativity, and
ironically, scientific illiteracy has all found its way into the hidden and public curriculum.
Indeed, given the current situation it would be easy and understandable to retreat into
despair. To retreat into one’s nest surrounded by the totems and comforts of the
bourgeoisie. I’ve done that. At one point in my life I was the married father of two. I was
part of a two income family that was able to afford a nice home in a relatively upscale
middle-class community: swimming pool, tennis courts, and yard of the month. I was
Charles Babbitt (1922), incapable of self-reflection and un-willing to try to find a way out
and as such did not feel the need to start anything that might approach self-realization.
Babbitt was Sinclair Lewis’ scathing critique of what man had become by the early
twentieth century. Lewis’ fictive Babbitt was his aesthetic response to the deleterious
effects of unregulated industrialization on humankind. In this sense Lewis’ critique
coincides with that of Marx and the Frankfurt School. Was I the product of a society that
encourages alienation from one another? Was I complicit as an educator, delivering a
product that seems to nurture passivity toward those things that should matter in
exchange for a comfortable couch and a large screen television? Those questions didn’t
seem to matter to me because when things seemed especially unfulfilling for reasons that
I wouldn’t fathom, I could always medicate myself with weed, alcohol, and sports,
reveling in the ,“thrill of victory and the agony of defeat.” It was therefore fortunate for
me that for most of my life I not only possessed a sense of humor, but the ability to make
other people laugh, because I was able to exploit this “talent” when I enrolled in a class in
“comedy improv” in 1988, which coincidentally was the second year of my teaching
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career in the Georgia public school system. It was also about the time I discovered jazz
music. Although I didn’t know it then, my experience as a student and eventual performer
in improvisational comedy, and my eventual immersion into live and recorded jazz
music, would open me up to a new way of being in the classroom and interacting with my
students.
For now, I would like to situate myself as a “White Jewish male” and examine
when, and perhaps why, jazz music, ostensibly a Black aesthetic, resonated with me. I
was a White, twenty something Jewish male, from Long Island, now living and teaching
in a predominantly Christian part of the South, in McDonough, Georgia. As it happened,
one day as I was driving and listening to music on the radio (and switching between the
stations of Georgia State and Georgia Tech), I chanced upon a jazz piece that
surprisingly, impacted me to the point where I couldn’t drive and listen at the same time.
So, I pulled over. When the DJ finally got around to naming the five or so songs in that
set I learned that the music that essentially “blew me away” was made by John Coltrane
and his quartet playing Irving Berlin’s “Russian Lullaby” from an album entitled
Soultrane (1958), which was coincidentally released the year of my birth. Up to that
point my musical menu consisted mostly of rock and pop music, and some classical
music, some of which I was forced to attempt to play during that time in my youth when I
took (although not by choice) piano lessons. My father only listened to sports on the radio
and Muzak. He claimed the “elevator music” calmed him down. It did not. Occasionally
my father listened in our home to klezmer, the music of eastern European Jews, especially
the songs with a singer, since the lyrics were in Yiddish and he loved to sing along.
Although my father was born in the Bronx, NYC, his parents, Russian Jewish immigrants
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who arrived in 1920, spoke Yiddish in the home. Even as an adult he was fluent in this
language that inexplicably made him happy and sad simultaneously. And since my father
and I rarely spoke about anything at any length, I never found out why he had that
reaction to klezmer music, although I have my suspicions. My mother loved Broadway
Musicals and took me to as many musicals as she could (when they had Wednesday
matinees) in Manhattan during most of the 1970’s. To be sure there is something of a
commonality between “show tunes,” and jazz for example, and yet I would argue in
retrospect that they contained enough diverse musical genres to perhaps make me more
willing to listen to different types of music. Coltrane’s version of Berlin’s Russian
Lullaby sounded somewhat familiar to me yet also different. Berlin, a Russian born Jew,
must have absorbed elements of klezmer music and these elements can be heard in some
of his tunes, like Russian Lullaby. This was the familiar part of the song. But the way
Coltrane transformed that song, in the improvised choruses and in the statement and restatement of the melody, was brilliant. It’s difficult to really know why this music had
such an emotional impact. What can be said is that song by Berlin and Coltrane, and his
quartet, began my informal exploration of jazz music (and a possible re-birth) and my
obsession with record collecting. It is purely coincidental that my teaching career in
Georgia, introduction to improvisational theatre, and immersion into jazz happened at
roughly the same time. But in retrospect, improvisational theatre, jazz, teaching, and
eventually curriculum studies would all impact the way I approach knowledge and being
in the classroom.
Before I discuss the efficacy of a pedagogy which comes from the teacher who is
willing to step out from behind the lectern, to remove the cloak of expert, to be aware of
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the gap and use the gap between teacher and students, and take that leap with them in
pursuit of a real education, to improvise with them, to seek out surprise, I would like to
offer some examples of what improvisation is and is not: Although it can be and is often
used as such, improvisation is not a “fun way” to learn and remember the material. It’s
not a method to improve one’s grades, or make lawyers better able to argue a case in
court (at one point as an improviser me and my improvisational partners were employed
by a group of lawyers as part of their mock trials. My friends and I portrayed a variety of
witnesses, all to help hone the skill of the lawyer to think on his feet, before the case went
to trial). It’s not a way to give one an edge in the business world by improving one’s
ability to innovate. And it’s not an easy path to creation or the lazy man’s approach to
composition. While it is true that improvisation can be those things and for many people
this is enough, I would argue that we should hold out for improvisation’s greater
possibility(s). We should adopt Jacques Derrida’s pronouncement (1982) that
improvisation is an impossibility. His reasoning isn’t meant to sound defeatist. Instead, as
I discuss in chapter 3, Derrida is opposed to the possibility of improvisation because by
accepting it as part of the possible one limits its achievements. One reduces
improvisation to just another tool to use in the pursuit of a pre-determined goal. When
this happens any chance at a dialogical encounter suggested by William Pinar (1994) is
removed, and the rupture of something new being created, whether it be the justice
Derrida sought in the law or the democracy to come; a new form of art, like cubism, a
new scientific theory, like relativity, or a new way of shaking up the academic canon
suggested by Pinar when he writes, “…The possibility is staggering. What is possible is a
genuinely experimental field which sees itself as deliberately abandoning present
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understandings, unearthing material of which we have been unconsciousness…” (p. 122)
will be locked away under the cloak and “safety” of a conservative approach that limits
access to information, prevents the unexpected; all the while it nurtures a passive student.
For me and many who study curriculum, William Pinar’s work looms large. For
example, in Autobiography, Politics and Sexuality: Essays in Curriculum Theory 19721992 (1994), he provides inspiration regarding the “process of education” (p. 120), while
promoting the necessity and willingness to take risks (p. 122), and the need to learn from
the tension between theory and practice (p. 123). Indeed, regarding the relationship
between theory and practice Pinar reminds us that, “…It is a call for authentic
investigation of experience, in which our theoretical expositions are dialectically linked
with that of experience…” (p. 123). I find a striking similarity between the tensionality of
theory and practice in the field of curriculum, with the tensionality between technique
and musicality I discuss later as described by curriculum scholar and musician Marla
Morris (2009). Morris makes the important point that, “…technique is part of the
musicality not separated from it…” (p. 76). Given Morris’ and Pinar’s insights a strong
case could be made for the requirements in theatre and music education never to separate
technique from theatricality and musicality respectively. Pinar (1994) also looms large
because he calls us to be attentive to the idiosyncratic moment when he writes:
What is special, what is unrepeatable, potentially interesting and on occasion
revelatory, is the moment by moment experience of particular individuals in
particular room [sic] at particular times. There are always issues to be addressed,
often not conscious for either students or teachers, which the aware teacher can
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help identify, and make use of in order to ground whatever the planned lesson is
in the actual and immediate experience of everyone in the room (p. 126).
Although Pinar is far more articulate than I regarding the importance of that idiosyncratic
moment, in retrospect I had an inkling of its importance when my life was starting to fill
with and focus on teaching in the classroom, improvisational comedy and jazz. I also find
it interesting that as I explored the field of curriculum my writings organically gravitated
toward an understanding of those nascent moments of creation within an aesthetic
context, when creativity erupts and is pursued. My work attempts to examine those
moments that are unplanned yet as Pinar says, “revelatory.”
As I hope to demonstrate with the words I have written, at its admittedly
utopian best, improvisation is about future realization(s) and connection(s). It is about
moving beyond the difficulty of recognizing the individual self and the potential for
transformation that can occur when that self is seen as part of the collective Self (Sarath,
2013). For Dewey, the arts was a way for him to let us know that if we participated in
that aesthetic experience, in the manner in which he describes, it would be possible for us
to connect our individual experiences with the larger community of experience. As I’ve
already mentioned, I am not critiquing Dewey’s compositional approach, nor the artists
he finds so praiseworthy to the arts. Instead, I wish to offer another option for realization
of the individual self and the possibility of transcendence that can occur with connection
to the collective Self. As a classroom teacher and student of curriculum, I am interested
in what we are creating together as we improvise our way through, playing with time,
being out of time, in that nascent moment of creation through its “final?” form, not to rest
on our laurels, nor to revel in the alleged magic of improvisational creation, but rather to
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demystify those moments of improvisational creation. I want to be able to be part of the
moment yet retain the ability to step outside, if only briefly, so as to observe, reflect,
critique, and possibly improve that moment. But, for those who might expect a
technique, or a series of methods to be employed in the classroom (seven ways to use
improvisation in the classroom might appeal to teachers, administrators and publishers
but I’ll never do it), as a guaranteed way to ensure student success, as defined by
mandated standards, I’m afraid the words I write will prove to be a disappointment. The
attentive teacher instinctively knows the folly of considering a surefire methodology that
claims to produce good teaching, as do the many Curriculum scholars I have read, such
as William Pinar (1994, 2006), Ted Aoki (2005), Cleo H. Cherryholmes (1988), William
Ayers (2004), Peter Appelbaum (2006, 2012, 2013), Marla Morris (2009)and Henry
Giroux (1983), for example, who seek a way out of the taken for granted; who seek
transformative experiences.
I would like to offer another personal recollection in the hopes of explaining
myself better. About seventeen years ago from when I write these words, I was asked by
the social studies coordinator of our county to come up with a presentation for an
upcoming workshop for social studies teachers. She was aware of my teaching and had
heard of my experience as an improvisational performer. Although I normally shy away
from those things I agreed. My presentation consisted of several improvisational “games”
that had been used as a vehicle for comedy which were now modified to help the student
remember, understand, and analyze some important historical themes and develop
historical thinking skills. I introduced, for example, a game known as “expert panel.” In
this game there is a host and a panel of three experts. I played the host, and three teachers
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at the workshop volunteered to be the experts on the panel. Typically, the host asks the
audience to suggest a topic for the experts to discuss and if this game were being played
in an improvisational comedic performance comedy would hopefully ensue. Since the
majority of the people at the workshop were honors and advanced placement U.S.
History teachers, the topic suggested was the gilded age and the experts were three wellknown figures from that time period: Andrew Carnegie, Cornelius Vanderbilt, and J.P.
Morgan. This configuration seemingly had little chance at creating comedy, which was
fine since the goal was to give the teachers a novel way to help the students understand
the significant themes, and historical skills, of the gilded age. My job as host was to field
questions from the audience and in time they caught on to the structure and content of
improvised questions and answers. They also came to realize that they might have a turn
“on stage” when the next game is played. The novel approach of interacting with and
presenting the material (and interacting with one another) combined with the nervousness
that comes when someone is outside of their comfort zone, (people fear performing and
public speaking, for example) produced laughter from the audience and participants on
the panel. I find it fascinating that teachers with years of experience in the classroom fear
public speaking, despite having spoken to and allegedly with their students for years.
How limited must be their discussions for them to fear public speaking and performing so
strongly?! Predictably, some of the participants tried to show off with either their
knowledge of the material or their ability to make what was for them a joke. When the
workshop was over I learned that the participants enjoyed my workshop and they claimed
that they would play some of the improv games in their classrooms. I want to talk about
what they enjoyed and why they enjoyed it. I would first argue they enjoyed what was for
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them a novel approach to the teaching of what has become for many a boring time period
of U.S. history, the gilded age. I would also argue that they enjoyed stepping out of their
usual persona as teacher (but not of expert) as they pretended to be one of the robber
barons from the gilded age. Interestingly, their nervousness made them inclined to hide
behind the laughter being produced, that in turn produced more laughter, although it was
a laughing at rather than a laughing with, but more on that later. What could have been a
serious and informational exercise became constrained by the laughter. However, when I
spoke with the teachers who played the game or those who watched it, it became clear
that they saw the laughter as one of the highlights of the game. For them it was the proof
they needed to try the game in their classroom. Their reasoning was that if the teacher can
help the students have fun and learn something then it was a win-win situation for
everyone. Now don’t get me wrong. I’m not against laughter in the classroom unless it’s
being used to bolster the powerful at the expense of the weak, obscure information or
prevent interrogation that could potentially change what we know about a given subject.
In other words, the game they played was useful to them because it was a fun way for
both students and teacher to learn an immutable body of information, not a potential
vehicle for iteration and innovation. In their nervousness and thinking they had to
perform, they hid behind the masks of funny accents and gestures. Interestingly, when
given the opportunity to unveil they found another way to conceal. They avoided risk,
retreated from the funktionslust (the joy of doing), avoided the difficult, did not notice the
ambiguity, avoided the chaos, presenting instead, a false and limited joy cloaked in
superficial humor. In her book, On Not Being Able to Play: Scholars, Musicians and the
Crisis of Psyche, (2009) curriculum scholar and musician, Marla Morris, describes an
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honest and more complete joy as she contrasts the times she could with the times she
couldn’t play music. Indeed, Morris writes,
There is playing and then there is practicing. When I am able to play, I wouldn’t
call it practicing. I play. I do not separate out the practice from the play as I did
when I was studying as a classical pianist. My practicing days are clearly over. I
just play and that is a totally different thing from practicing. I do not do grueling
repetitions, I do not play slowly for an hour, I don’t care what my fingering is and
I don’t care if I get it right. After two injuries, I play. Playing means technique is
part of the musicality not separated from it (p. 76).
Those of us in the classroom trying to find a way to be with the students and for the
students can learn a lot from musicians, especially those who also happen to be engaged
in the type of scholarly work that demands an unflinching honesty and the willingness
and capability to reflect. Indeed, Morris’ observation regarding the relationship between
technique and musicality (or in the case of theatre, technique and theatricality) is seen
and often repeated in the reflections of jazz musicians and theatre game players that
comprise much of this study. Their observations partially serve to validate my study of
aesthetics as a way out of our performative culture.
Unfortunately, the grasp of that performative culture is strong. This is why the
teachers in the audience and the panel tried to make jokes. Jokes can be useful but only
when they speak truth to power, when they disrupt, when they challenge the status quo,
when they point out contradictions, and when they inspire others to dig deep to reveal the
truth, albeit truth with a small (t). That day in Griffin, Georgia, I saw the misuse and
misunderstanding of improvisation. And I saw no real disruption to the status quo.

22
Instead, what I saw and participated in was the continuation of a conservative approach to
education. This is education that is controlled from the top down- process and product. It
is education that is tainted by the control of a largely damaging, centralized, yet at times
inept, authority. The novelty of the improv games and humor produced only superficial
changes to a conservative pedagogy: a pedagogy that controls teachers and students by
limiting access to information, and managing students and teachers It is a pedagogy
which insists upon over testing the students, over evaluating the teachers through a
complex, unintelligible, inaccurate method of observation, all while maintaining the
claim of accountability for students and teachers, and the proclamations of a job well
done.
We teach in a real and metaphorical toxic environment. The industrial and
postindustrial age, and our response to these ages, has robbed us of the joy we once had
in doing, what I talk about later as funktionslust, and replaced it with the production
requirement of being done. The pressures of production have of necessity impacted the
approach people take to work of all sorts and as a result academics have suffered. The
students in my advanced placement class in United States history are advertised by the
College Board as the cream of the intellectual crop, and yet, they typically shy away from
the difficult, viewing it only as an obstacle instead of a source for inspiration. They are
reluctant to embrace complexity, especially if it entails what for them is an inherent
contradiction, such as a historical writing prompt that contains the requirements of
precision and ambiguity. In a sense, the current system of top down education, which
utilizes what Freire (2000) has described as the banking model, discourages students to
take risks and play with ideas, especially those which are complex and ambiguous. My
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student’s reluctance to embrace apparent contradictions is symptomatic of a series of
larger problems: tradition is either revered or reviled but never both; emotion, passion,
and desire are viewed as incompatible with rational thought, and tensionalities between
two positions are avoided as no one apparently wishes to dwell in the in-between.
Ambiguities are to be shunned, not mediated, as they should be. We in the public
schools need to revise our non-aporetic stance regarding what we know, what needs to be
known, and the way(s) in which we attempt to get there and if Peter Appelbaum (2012,
2013) and Jacques Rancière (2009) are right intellectuals who wrestle with curriculum
studies and the arts respectively, need to reevaluate what they do, that is to say their
pedagogical stance lest they recreate the very thing they are attempting to fix. This is
not to say what we know is completely wrong. It’s not. Instead, I am suggesting that we
need to nurture what I talk about later as “relational intelligence:” To know ourselves and
others, and to empathize with and understand the Other. This is why I fight for
improvisation in the way that Derrida (1982) perceives it. We can be capable of the
simultaneous skills of being fully enmeshed with the moment yet still retain the capacity
to be critical of that moment. We can shed light on the invisible to make it more visible.
We can embrace and occasionally conquer the difficult as did Einstein as is revealed in
Arthur Miller’s book, Einstein Picasso: Space, Time, And The Beauty That Causes
Havoc, (2001) and perhaps exclaim like Einstein did when he stated, “…It is a wonderful
feeling to recognize the unity of complex phenomena which appear to direct sense
observation as totally separate things” (p. 71). I’ve experienced those improvisations in
the classroom and on the stage. I’ve experienced the joy that comes from being part of an
ensemble, whether that ensemble is a group performing on a stage, or a class of students
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and their teacher, navigating their way through a subject that must remain difficult. I have
come out from behind my lectern, removing the appointed label of “expert.” While it is
true that I know more history and about the study of history than my students, it would be
misleading of me to pretend to be anything but a participant in a journey that from the
beginning has always been theirs to take. This is why I agree with William Ayers (2004)
when he states that, “…Our first commitment, then, is this: to recognize and call out the
humanity in each of our students. We become students of our students. We take their
side” (p. 66). Thus, when I speak of improvisation in the classroom I do so not to replace
the more widespread method of creation, revision, and re- creation. It works and will
continue to work. I simply offer this: real improvisation in the classroom, not the games
previously discussed, has the potential to serve the students by giving them experience in
and the expectation of insight that comes from the doing, and possibly, an understanding
of the past, present, and an abstract of a better future to come. It is my hope that my work
differentiates itself from the work of others because of the worlds I have inhabited and
the boundaries that I have crossed. At its best and perhaps most simplest, improvisation
has always entailed a type of disciplined wandering. The trick is, of course, not allowing
the tensionality between the two positions, discipline and wandering, to become so
overwhelming that one either quits or succumbs to the pull of one at the expense of the
other. As you will see in the study which follows, that goal can be somewhat elusive if
not impossible.
CHAPTER 2
i PLAY THEREFORE I AM: POCKETS OF
PROTEST
In chapter 2 I talk about jazz and improvisational theatre as a potential model for
a way out from the moribund, the taken for granted, from the usual ho-hum that passes
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for education today. I examine the impact that true improvisation has on jazz music and
theatrical performances. Some, like Curriculum scholar Ted Aoki (2005) have found in
jazz a possible way out of the morass, which of course served to validate my initial
instinct that there was something there. I incorporate the writings of jazz musicians
(Bailey, 1993), and some, like Nat Hentoff (1976) who write about jazz, calling it the
“sound of surprise” (p. 25). In my research I found a consistent search for surprise by the
musicians or, in the case of musician Pee Wee Russell, surprise after the fact, for example
when a student musician transcribed an improvised performance of Russell’s showing
him the written musical transcript of the previous night’s improvisational performance. I
expand on the potential of improvisation to improve a previously written piece by
comparing a musician’s take on the power of jazz improvisation to imbue a standard song
with something new, with that of comedian Lenny Bruce’s take on how his written
material is improved when he improvises. The conclusions are the same for musicians
and comedian: in each case they remarked, in retrospect, that when they performed
something old it was changed by the inclusion of improvisation, even if the time spent
improvising was minimal. I write about the disruptive power of jazz in a way that
suggests a power distribution from the bottom up rather than the top down. I also write
about jazz music’s ability to foreshadow a political future to come (Attali, 1999). French
economist and jazz aficionado Jacques Attali, seems to expand upon the cultural
connection discussed by me of the Frankfort school in his arguments regarding the
music’s ability to serve as an abstract for a new social order. And, lastly in this chapter, I
talk about play in its broadest sense. I connect an older, non-commodified conception of
play by Friedrich Schiller, (2004) because his insight on play for our current generation
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can make us better use play for what many would agree are serious purposes: I will argue
that the origins of spontaneity, crucial to improvisation, is found in play, not before play,
and I anticipate a fundamental epistemological debate regarding spontaneity: Is it
constructed or immanent to the situation? When jazz musicians perform they play, when
theatrical improvisers perform (and rehearse) they play, and when teachers and students
interact in the classroom they should play. They should do this to expand rather than
conserve; they should do this to disrupt, rather than maintain.
CHAPTER 3
IMPROVISATION AND THE DESIRE FOR THE IMPOSSIBLE
This chapter is fascinating and frustrating. A lack of consensus among those who
write on creativity, spontaneity, autonomy, and originality, within jazz and theatrical
improvisation, has compelled me to consider the merits of their disparate arguments, and
to dwell in ambiguity and inconclusiveness. This situation exists because there seems to
be no definitive situation that will produce that improvisational moment. For example,
when interpreting the influence of constraints on creativity, writers like Nachmanovitch
(1990) view them as crucial to igniting the “essential surprises” (p. 86) which constitutes
a creative moment or moments. In contrast, other constraints, like racist infused popular
culture prove impossible to surmount as seen for example in the work of Amy Seham
(2001) who writes about improvisational theatre. Indeed, instead of creating a spark that
might ignite a creative surprise the large majority of improv players Seham describes
succumb to a group mind infected with an assortment of social ills. And adding insight
while complexifying the discussion is Jacques Rancière (2009), because his work forced
me to reconsider what I assumed about the performer and audience, both literally and
figuratively. Moreover, I discover another obstacle as jazz musicians fight to improvise
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within the time constraints of thirty two bars. Why do some musicians fall prey to time
constraints and offer up recycled clichés, while others use the same constraints of time as
moments of inspiration? I found some explanations within sports analyses (Gumbrecht,
2006) and in the work of Ekkehard Jost (1994), a professor of musicology and a musician
at the University of Giessen, as they describe a similar type of muscle memory shared by
athlete and musician. Indeed, Jost writes about a musician who, “will fall back on ideas
he has worked out at one time... he plays what ‘live under his fingers’” (p. 137). A
similar kind of memory seems to exist in our conversations. Today, for example, far too
many people are satisfied with the exclamation, “It is what it is!” What they actually
mean to say is, “I give up. I have no thought, original or otherwise that might shed some
light on your situation. I lack the information to place your problem in historical context
and I lack the empathy to care about your situation in the first place.” I describe how the
process of improvisation is negatively impacted by commodification as I compare a
forced spontaneity of the stage actor with the play of a child learning theatre games
during the Depression (Spolin, 1986), from a woman who understood what it meant to
teach. She understood spontaneity and knew how to tease it out of the children she
worked with. Spolin enjoyed and encouraged spontaneity because “…through
spontaneity we are re-formed into ourselves…” (p. 4). Thus, when a spontaneous
moment is created and employed, the things we work with, athletic play, theatre, music,
and curriculum are potentially improved. A desire is inculcated within the people who
play for infinite malleability. But don’t get me wrong. I am not proposing an infinite
malleability that can serve as a justification for anything goes. Instead, I propose an
infinite malleability because it will hone our skill in dealing with the complex: filled with
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precision and ambiguity, but not understood as mutually exclusive.
CHAPTER 4
“YOU SHOULDN’T NEED A WEATHERMAN TO KNOW WHICH WAY THE
WIND BLOWS: POPULAR CULTURE AND IMPROVISATION
Chapter 4 continues a discussion on the merits and pitfalls of popular culture. I
will argue that the problem regarding popular culture as it relates to the musician,
theatrical improviser, or audience is largely a function of the stance one takes regarding
popular culture, rather than placing the blame on popular culture itself. In the beginning
of chapter 4 I work to compare contemporary popular culture with medieval folk
traditions to try and exact from the latter the impact and transformation written about and
noticed by Bakhtin (1984). As I read Bakhtin’s descriptions of this folk culture I was
struck by the similarity it had with contemporary popular culture improvised and
composed. I describe the difficulties of using popular culture as a site and a source of
praxis with help from cultural theorists such as Daspit and Weaver (2000), Lyotard
(1984), Heidegger (1977), and The Frankfurt School (1973, 2002, and 2007). My reason
for focusing on popular culture as a site for praxis is because, in its various iterations,
popular culture has served as the raw material for improvisation, as is the case when a
jazz artist quotes a popular song while improvising; making the song fit the time
signature, harmonic, and melodic structure. Also, at different times in the modern and
postmodern era, jazz has served as an example of popular culture. Thus, as I interrogate
improvisation in jazz and theatre it makes sense to examine popular culture because of its
association with the arts, high and low, improvisational and composed, as part of my
overall analysis of the connection between good teaching and improvisation.
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Perhaps one of the reasons why the Bakhtinian folk tradition seems
worthy of our attention is the connection between that folk tradition and the people who
created, nurtured, and transformed that tradition. While illiteracy and genuine fears of
their eternal souls burning in hell contributed to a largely passive stance when it came to
organized Christianity, Bakhtin’s analysis of medieval folk traditions refutes that
passivity. Indeed, the participants of that folk tradition took an active role in the creation
of their songs, stories, and theatre. Bakhtin reminds us that these creative outlets, which
at times were vulgar, served as an outlet and critique of political and economic discord. I
wonder, therefore, whether or not our largely passive stance regarding popular culture
can be changed. Is it possible for us to create our culture? Or are we stuck as passive
consumers of a product that is largely unsatisfying despite its large portions? Or am I
stuck on my high horse so to speak, regarding popular culture and the way in which that
culture is accessed? Am I behaving like one of
the elite upset about the “low level” of journalism or television always assumes
that the public is moulded by the products imposed on it. To assume that is to
misunderstand the act of “consumption.” This misunderstanding assumes that
“assimilating” necessarily means “becoming similar” to what one is, making it
one’s own, appropriating or reappropriating it (De Certeau, 1984, p. 166).
Leif Gustavson’s (2008) important study of youth culture, which I discuss in chapter 6,
and Constance Penley’s (1997) NASA/TREK, which I discuss in chapter 3, supports De
De Certeau’s assertion regarding a perhaps more accurate way to conceive of
“consumption” and “assimilation.”
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To be sure some popular culture, especially the ones which exist on the margins,
can critique the status quo and remove, or at least minimize passivity from the observer.
This is why I discus the film, The Rocky Horror Picture Show. As I will argue, Rocky
Horror mostly works as an act of resistance and creates an alternative public space for
the filmmaker and filmgoer to work out their sexual ambiguities in the safe environment
of a mythical, late night, non-judgmental “feature show.” Certainly part of the allure of
Rocky Horror is the in your face sexuality, camp and kitsch that make up so much of the
film. Perhaps the more important conclusion that one can derive from the Rocky Horror
film experience is the significance of the organic way in which the film goers interacted
with the film as they attended the midnight showings (the only time to release films like
Rocky Horror or Pink Flamingoes, by John Waters) during the 1970’s and early 1980’s.
It is important to examine the source of those improvisations, not in the vain hopes for a
recipe for improvisation, since that would be a waste of time, but to continue my attempt
at demystifying the act of improvisation. Interestingly, as time wore on many of the
“spontaneous remarks” made by the audience members of Rocky Horror quickly became
part of the film experience. What was at one time the constructed improvisational
response of an audience member or members eventually became part of the film’s
“script.” Week after week audiences yearned to hear their favorite improvised lines or
reenact one of a series of actions, like the tossing of toast in the air that at one point was
the spontaneous response to a filmic cue (It is reasonable to ask why an audience member
had an available piece of toast to throw up in the air. It’s possible that a smuggled in
sandwich served as the initial prop). In this way, Rocky Horror demonstrates how
popular culture that dwells in and is created in the margins, by non-compositional
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methods like improvisation, can lose its ability to shock. Lose its ability to provoke
improvisation, and instead return the participant to his more familiar role of spectator and
consumer.
CHAPTER 5
PLAYWRITING AS SOLO IMPROVISATION: MY TURN TO TAKE A SOLO
In chapter 5, I create a form of popular culture, the play. I wrote this play
that takes place in a dystopian future for many reasons: I wrote this play because I
thought it would be a way to distance myself from a linear, organized, academic work. I
got the idea to include a work of fiction within an academic work when I read the
monumental Academic Outlaws (1997), by William G. Tierney. In his book he offers a
work of “ethnographic fiction” (p. xxi), entitled “Ashes”. Tierney wrote this story,
“…with the hope that its narrative structure would give me greater leeway to present life
in the academy than other textual techniques might afford” (p. xxi). I thought a play
might give me a similar leeway in promoting an improvisational approach to being in the
classroom. When I initially set about to write this play I did so with the intention of using
as much of the improvisational moment and techniques as possible in the construction of
the play, while also attempting to portray that improvisational moment(s) through the
words and actions of the characters of the play. I treated the play like an elaborate
improvisational game. For example, I assembled the who, what, where, and when for
each scene in the same manner in which a player on stage asks the audience for that
information prior to the creation of an improvisational scene (with the very important
distinction that I asked and answered all of the questions). In other words I assembled the
ingredients for the improvisational scene to come. I knew who my characters were, what
they were doing, and a good degree of information regarding place and time. I purposely
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refrained from story boarding the plot. Instead, I wanted the action of the play to emerge
organically from the character’s interactions and to set myself up for the possibility of
surprise within the writing process. I wrote the play because it was a way for me to “take
a solo.” Solo improvisation is taken up by Judith Lewis (2013) who writes that “…in
solo improvisation, the inherent qualities and purest possibilities of improvisation…may
become apparent to an extent, which might even influence the way in which we look at
possibilities in collaborative improvisation.” (p. 256). Additionally, I learned about an
idea of Slavoj Žižek’s in an essay by Peter Appelbaum (2013) called “…retrodictive
curriculum theorizing…in which one writes the fictional history of an imagined
future…to suggest that we confront the catastrophe by perceiving it as fate, totally
unavoidable, and then projecting ourselves into it” (p. 85). Indeed, my description of a
dystopian future was a way for me to expose and perhaps attack the insult to intelligence
and humanity that is the current school experience. Lastly, I wrote the play because I
wanted to play with hyperbole. My thinking was hyperbole could describe the insanity of
school in ways that traditional scholarship could not.

CHAPTER 6
IMPROVISATION, INSTITUTIONS AND STANDARDS

In chapter 6, I examine the impact that improvisation has on standards and
institutions. I examine whether or not improvisation can serve to give us some distance
from those standards in order to critique them and eventually to improve them. In my
analysis I discover that improvisation can fully separate from the standard its attempting
to critique. I do find it useful to examine opportunities for improvisation in the classroom,
jazz hall, and theatre to still engage in praxis despite the limitations. I am helped in this
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discussion by Curriculum scholars like William Ayers (2004), William Pinar (1994)
Henry Giroux (1983) and Ted Aoki (2005). Once again I look outside of the academy to
others who might offer insight into my query. For example, I benefit from the work of
anthropologist, Laurie Frederik Meer (2007) and her analysis of a Cuban theatre form
that uses improvisation and the Cuban authorities’ reaction to improvisation. I found it
interesting that a society which praises collective action fears improvisation to such a
degree that the players are never allowed to improvise in public. I also reexamine the
American improv scene, especially from the 1950’s through the 1980’s with the help of
Amy Seham’s (2001) encyclopedic history of improv. The analyses of the Cuban and
American improv scene demonstrated the significance of the group mind. Unfortunately,
improvisation alone was incapable of isolating the systemic problems of white reign,
heteronormativity, commodification, colonization and the usual assortment of ills the
critical theorist is attempting to expose so as to empower the oppressed. I also gain some
insight from the great British Theatre director Peter Brook (2008). Interestingly, in my
analysis of the interaction of the new thing created by and through improvisation with the
accepted standard of a given institution I discovered a common theme: the actor or
musician who improvises, who seeks to create something new, rarely let’s go of her hold
on the standard which came before. Instead, a tension exists between the old and the
attempted new or as Aoki (2005) likes to write, the, “… ambiguous, ambivalent space
between this or that, between planned curriculum and live(d) curriculum …” (p. 421422). I found it interesting that the space between planned and live(d) was more dynamic
if the participants in that space had a desire or urgency to do, or at least make known,
what needs to be done, as did the participants of Playback Theatre described by Meer
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(2007) Those Cuban actors were filled with anger and passion. They were also predisposed to take risks. In contrast, the space between planned and live(d) inhabited by the
majority of white improvisers described by Amy Seham (2001) lacked energy or urgency
since the participants of that space were more inclined to accept the status quo rather than
reject it.
CHAPTER 7
BEYOND PERFORMATIVITY AND A COOKBOOK CURRICULUM

In chapter 7 I examine improvisation, performativity, and good teaching. I
acknowledge the negative interpretation of performativity brought largely to our attention
by Lyotard (1984), and Cherryholmes (1988) and the continued existence of performative
pedagogy in American schools and elsewhere. For example, in England Anne Storey
(2007) gave me some insight into an important cultural shift that has taken hold in
England, which has been repeated in America. Alarmingly, many new teachers are
entering the field from a background of mid-level managerial positions, outside of the
world of education. Although they are being pushed out of their old professions because
of changes within the economy, their placement as teachers is being promoted as a coup
for education since their “skills” as managers are seen as directly applicable to and
desirable in the classroom. Like the United States, England is placing emphasis on
“…defining and ‘managing’ the performance of teachers” (p. 253). And I examine the
possibility of agency which emerges out of an alternative version of performativity that
come from scholars such as J. Hillis Miller (2007), Karen Barad (2003), and Eve
Kosofsky Sedgwick (2003) (who build upon the work of Austin, Butler and Derrida) in
addition to others, and in conjunction with those who have written about improvisation
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within jazz and dramaturgical settings, in my attempt to promote a richer experience in
the classroom. Sedgwick’s work is especially intriguing since she examines performative
speech and what she terms as periperformative speech (2003). Sedgwick acknowledges
the relative strength of performative speech acts to either maintain or challenge the status
quo, yet maintains that the more nuanced periperformative responses such as, “…I won’t
take you up on it. Who are you to dare me? Who cares what you dare me to do?…tend to
have a high threshold of initiative…” (p. 70). In other words, she argues that the
periperformative has a greater ability to buck conventional thought. Her insight into the
power of various speech acts is useful to the teacher in the classroom as she and her
students make their way through classes that at times can be contentious.
CHAPTER 8
CODA AND CURRICULUM

In chapter 8 I wind down. Like the musician who returns to the coda after a
lengthy journey. My intention with this brief chapter was to “restate the melody” in a way
that is familiar yet different enough to instigate continued conversations. And central to
my work is my continued dwelling in between two poles: what Aoki (2005) has described
as living within the ambiguity of curriculum as planned and curriculum as live(d). I hope
that I was able to convey the importance of not simply dwelling in between those poles.
More important is the response to the inevitable tensionality of those two poles. The jazz
musicians, theatrical improvisers, audience members, teachers and students who do good
work did so because, instead of succumbing to the pull of one or the other extreme, they
offered a response, some mediated and thought through beforehand, and others seemingly
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spontaneous, that addressed both concerns. In this sense they were able to mediate their
wandering with the discipline which comes from hard work.
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CHAPTER 2
i Play Therefore I am
“Above all, don’t fear difficult moments, the best comes from them.”
Rita Levi Montalcini (Nobel Prize Winning Scientist)
“In jazz you never know what’s coming.”
Nat Hentoff (Jazz writer)
In my youth I had some stage time. High school plays, community theatre, and
the small yet potent semi-professional theatre. None of my performances were
extraordinary save for a few memorable lines that had more to do with the playwright
than the actor. When I was twenty-eight I enrolled in a class that focused on
improvisational comedy. Predictably, it was hard and many of the “performances” were
ragged and unpolished. In the beginning we were only performing for ourselves so it
didn’t matter as much whether or not we put on a good show. Finally, when we did
perform for a live audience we created shows which were very uneven and amateurish.
For reasons that are still unknown to me I endured these “performances” for many
months. Gradually we (improvisational theatre is usually performed as an ensemble) got
better. The first time I was part of something really good I was playing (more on the
importance of play later) a theatre game called interview. It’s a deceptively simple game
played by two actors. The audience comes up with the name of the show and the field of
the “expert” who is interviewed. The questions and answers are made up on the spot. We
killed (a theatrical expression meaning the audience really liked us). In retrospect this is
the first time I experienced the power of improvisation within an aesthetic context. This
chapter is the beginning of an exploration for me. I wish to examine the promise of
improvisation within two fields that I feel intuitively, and know intellectually, share an
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aesthetic connection: Jazz and improvisational theatre. My reason for this examination is
that will argue that that improvisation has important things to teach us, especially in the
realm of educational pedagogy. For now, I will focus on the perceived impact of
improvisation on jazz and comedic performances.
Those who believe in the power of improvisation feel that improvisation can
imbue a pre-written performance with not only renewed energy but also change its form.
In his study of improvisation, Jazz guitarist and writer Derek Bailey (1980) ostensibly
goes beyond his field, because in his examination of improvisation he quotes the great
comedian Lenny Bruce: “‘If I do an hour show, if I’m extremely fertile, there will be
about fifteen minutes of pure ad-lib. But on average it’s about four or five minutes. But
the fact that I’ve created it in ad-lib seems to give it a complete feeling of free form’”
(p.65). Bruce’s monologue takes on an added strength and changes its form because of
the inclusion of an improvised bit. Indeed, Bailey writes, “...Lenny Bruce often compared
his working method with those of the jazzman and here he emphasizes the importance of
the introduction of new material. It doesn’t only supply fresh stuff to work on, it imbues
the whole with a spirit of freedom” (p. 65). Thus for Bruce and Bailey the act of
improvisation is transformative. In this sense the whole is greater than the sum of its
parts.
Whitney Balliett (1992), longtime jazz critic for the New Yorker, calls jazz “the
sound of surprise” (p.25). Often it’s the musician who experiences this surprise. Jazz
writer Nat Hentoff (1976) recalls an incident when,
One night, in the late 1940’s, a student from the New England Conservatory of
Music came into a jazz room in Boston where Pee Wee [jazz clarinetist Pee Wee
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Russell] was playing, went up to the stand, and unrolled a series of music
manuscript pages. They were covered, densely, with what looked like the notes of
an extraordinarily complex, ambitious classical composition. ‘I brought this for
you,’ the young man said to Pee Wee Russell. ‘It’s one of your solos from last
night. I transcribed it.’ Pee Wee, shaking his head, looked at the manuscript. ‘This
can’t be me,’ he said. ‘I can’t play this.’ The student assured Pee Wee that the
transcribed solo, with its fiendishly brilliant structure and astonishingly sustained
inventiveness, was indeed Russell’s. ‘Well,’ Pee Wee said, ‘even if it is, I
wouldn’t play it again the same way-even if I could, which I can’t’ (p. 13).
There is a lot in Russell’s statement. First, this incident is an example of what can happen
when jazz music is played by a powerful improviser. Russell was able to improvise a
brilliant piece of music on the spot. But more importantly, this incident, like so many in
jazz, shows a constant, often repeated tenet of jazz improvisation in particular, and
improvisation in a more general sense: Most improvisations, musical, theatrical, or other,
combine the well-learned tenets of an aesthetic tradition with the creation of something
new through improvisation. Importantly, there is a problem regarding the way
improvisation is understood by its practitioners: The improvisational creation is viewed
as new and spontaneous, completely unfettered by the past and its connection to an
aesthetic tradition. This conversation has been complicated by Jacques Derrida (1982),
Michel de De Certeau (1984), Judith Lewis (2013), and Edward Sarath (2013) as their
arguments complexify the improvisational moment and its components.
But to return to my earlier statement regarding the apparent merging of old and
new and the consequential tension which exists between those two things, there are
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fascinating parallels between an improvised jazz piece and the Buddhist Mandala.
(Although it is beyond the scope of this study to examine the similarities between jazz
and Eastern religions like Buddhism, I would like to offer one example of an important
similarity. In a combined study of symbols within dreams Carl G. Jung and others (1964)
write in the important book, Man and His Symbols, "The mandala serves a conservative
purpose—namely, to restore a previously existing order. But it also serves the creative
purpose of giving expression and form to something that does not yet exist, something
new and unique…. The process is that of the ascending spiral, which grows upward while
simultaneously returning again and again to the same point" (p. 225). I find it striking that
in the same way the mandala serves to conserve and create, so does the attempt by the
jazz musician to create something new with improvisation). The jazz musicians’ creation
arguably does conserve in the sense that so much of his improvisations rests on, and is a
reaction to, the tradition of jazz music. But when improvisation is used, as understood by
many who practice the art, something new is also created, as is argued by the musicians
in Bailey’s study (1980), alluded to in Jung’s take on the mandala (1964) and seen in
Paul Berliner’s (1994) mammoth study of jazz. Thus, when shown a manuscript of the
previous night’s performance, Pee Wee Russell couldn’t believe it was he who produced
it. Moreover, allowing it was he who produced it for a moment Russell would eventually
claim that he couldn’t re-produce it. Nor would he want to. Jazz isn’t about playing
what’s already been played. In fact one of its primary attributes paradoxically is its
ephemeral character. Importantly, Russell would not have been able to recreate the
performance that so impressed that student from the New England Conservatory of
Music-whose name alone is anathema to the spirit of jazz- were it not for his ability to
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improvise. Indeed, Bailey writes, “There is no doubt that the single most important
contribution to the revitalization of improvisation in Western music in the 20th century
was that made by jazz...” (p. 64). Thus improvisation in jazz not only improved jazz
itself, and the performers who play jazz, but other forms of Western music that had
deemphasized (for example classical music) the importance of improvisation.
A lot has been written on the power and influence of improvisation to improve
music and the musician: Bailey (1980), Corbett (1994), and Berliner (1994). Indeed, this
theme of improvisational transformation is fundamental to a Canadian journal on
improvisation called, Critical Studies in Improvisation (2004-present). Jacques Attali
(1999), a French economist employed by Francois Mitterrand, published a seminal book
in the 1980’s on jazz music’s ability to do more than just improve the music. Attali’s
Noise The Political Economy of Music was in one way a rebuke to the pessimism of the
Critical Theorists of the Frankfurt School, who emigrated from Germany in the 1930’s
and 1940’s. Clearly, their idealistic fervor and attempt to create a better metanarrative
that saw the value of popular culture had been crushed by the realities of National
Socialism. Indeed, as Martin Jay has written (1993), Kracauer, Horkheimer, and Adorno,
“...rarely showed anything but visceral distaste for all variants of mass culture...” (p.
369). Their point is well taken. The horrific realities of National Socialism thus make
Attali’s arguments all the more significant. Indeed, in his forward to Attali’s book (1999)
postmodernist Frederic Jameson writes, “The originality of Jacques Attali’s book then
becomes clear: he is the first to have drawn the other possible consequence of the
‘reciprocal interaction’ model-namely, the possibility of a superstructure to anticipate
historical developments, to foreshadow new social formations...” (p. xi). Jazz music for
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Attali, especially free jazz, the most experimental form of jazz to date, became for him an
abstract manifestation of a new social order. It reflects a new way for humankind to exist
in a world that is designed to alienate, although the specific forms of this society to come
remain far from fully formed. In free jazz Attali sees an abstract of the promise of
liberation and the fulfillment of humankind’s capabilities. It isn’t so much the inherent
properties of Jazz music per se that Attali is attracted to but rather the fact that jazz is
music that is forever concerned with creating something new. It stirs things up. It
threatens the status quo. Power operates from the bottom up, or from side to side, at times
it’s hard to tell who is in charge: Importantly, in jazz power never operates from the top
down. Thus, what is most radical in jazz is not the product but the process, despite the
fact that the two are inextricably linked. It is perhaps this characteristic of jazz that is the
reason it is seen as threatening by some. Since its creation in the late 19th century, jazz
music has been Othered. In Balliett’s study of jazz (1959) we understand the initial
marginalization of jazz music and the musicians who play it in a scathing review of jazz
icon Louis Armstrong: “...Grossman heaps most of the evils he finds in swing, bebop,
and progressive jazz on poor Armstrong, describing him as playing with ‘an
undisciplined emotional expansiveness,’ and ‘wildness’...” (p. 18). The critic’s
condemnation of Armstrong is due to many factors and while I would argue that the
central reason is race, another important reason is jazz music’s abstract disruption of
power structures. To be sure, white America, in the early 20th century, held distorted,
inaccurate views on African Americans, especially the African American male. Since
jazz music was the creation of African Americans, mostly male, jazz music started off as
damaged goods in the eyes of white America, because of its association with the African
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American male. Jazz also suffered from its connection to brothels (jazz music, either live
or recorded, was often played there), and the act of sex, for which jazz was a euphemism.
It tainted jazz from the beginning. Jazz music existed on the margins of society. Jazz
could not be anything but Othered. “To jazz” was to engage in sexual intercourse and in
that sense is analogous to early rock music. Indeed the terms ‘jazz’ and ‘rock’ were
initially euphemisms for the act of sex. It’s interesting that both terms have lost their
ability to shock. They have been tamed. I will examine a few of the reasons behind this
phenomenon in the latter part of my chapter. Interestingly, jazz as a musical form also
met resistance from many within the musical academy, for reasons that go beyond race.
This resistance remains to this day. Indeed, commenting from his position as a college
music instructor, Ken Prouty (2008) writes, “If we accept Attali’s argument that
improvised music creates new forms of social interaction and new dynamics, we can
posit that the reaction against jazz improvisation in the academy taps into a similar belief
that improvisation represented a challenge to the existing order...” (p. 5) In other words,
jazz improvisation and jazz music (not synonymous) was accurately seen as a political
threat. Thus, the drive within the academy to defend the canon from a radical element is
based on their accurate perception that improvisational jazz represented a larger political,
economic, and social threat. One could argue that their defensiveness bolsters Attali’s
thesis.
For now I would like to continue my discussion of Attali’s thesis that jazz music
contains a foreshadowing of a new way to politically and economically organize society
and examine two additional claims. I would argue that Attali’s thesis and these two
claims are related. The first important claim is that jazz music can reduce or eliminate
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humankind’s alienation. The second claim is jazz music’s ability to allow the musician to
live in the moment, to achieve what Hans Gumbrecht (2004) has termed an “epiphany”
(p. 113). Gumbrecht’s use of the term epiphany is important to my analysis of that
nascent moment of creation that does two important things: First, it is a response that, in
the case of the jazz musician, is a musical response to all that has come before. Second, it
is simultaneously a direction for the rest of the players, or in the case of solo jazz, a
direction for the solo artist as she continues her piece. Still, in many ways epiphanies
remain more of a mystery than expected event in the course of an improvisational
player’s aesthetic life. Indeed, they are unpredictable and of course difficult, if not
impossible, to pre-ordain by virtue of one’s skill or breadth of knowledge. At this point it
seems reasonable to accuse Attali of giving to jazz that which it couldn’t possibly
possess: the power to reduce alienation. In light of this concern Attali (1999) writes,
“...Alienation is not born of production and exchange, nor of property, but of usage: the
moment labor has a goal... the producer becomes a stranger to what he produces…”
(p.134-135). Clearly musicians like the previously mentioned Pee Wee Russell and
scores of others have been able to compose brilliantly conceived music yet afterward
have no idea how they accomplished it or even what their accomplishment was. Russell
and others of his ilk would make very bad assembly line workers or any other kind of
employee as far as corporate America is concerned, because as they produce they would
intuitively create products that are counter to the requirements of the CEO and his
allegiance to the stockholders. They would also alter the production process in ways that
would make Frederick Taylor, who perfected the assembly lines of the early twentieth
century, wince. Indeed, for Attali the fact that he and the other musicians were unaware
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of their end goal is central to their ability to potentially move away from alienation and
open up to who they are, in contrast to the commodified version of what they are
expected to be. What is happening to them? They are playing in the fullest sense of that
term, instead of succumbing to what Peter McLaren (1995) has referred to as, “…a
culture modeled on a masculinist heroics, a reactive desire and a compulsive need to
consume…” (p. 88). Indeed, within this play is a refutation of McLaren’s concern:
Importantly, within their play lies an act of disruption, since the very thing being
disrupted is a passivity, cloaked in consumerist action, which McLaren critiques. In this
type of play is also an opportunity for freedom. Indeed, in Releasing the Imagination
(1995), Maxine Greene writes:
But then I think of how much beginnings have to do with freedom, how much
disruption has to do with consciousness and the awareness of possibility that has
so much to do with teaching other human beings. And I think that if I and other
teachers truly want to provoke our students to break through the limits of the
conventional and taken for granted, we ourselves have to experience breaks with
what has been established in our own lives; we have to keep arousing ourselves to
begin again…to act in such a way that I break loose from anchorage and that I stir
others to break loose along with me, so that we all become different, that we all
engage in a dialectic to reach beyond where we are (p 109-110).
To be sure, Greene isn’t referring to the type of play exhibited by jazz musicians,
but I think the freedom she desires is at times displayed by those who improvise and seek
to improvise, like jazz musicians. I would argue that the play exhibited by jazz musicians
can serve as a model for teachers who desire to break out of the taken for granted.
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Teachers should play with ideas as they’re introduced in classroom discussions. In this
way they can model an approach to information. In time, perhaps their students can take
the same approach.
In a similar manner, the social fabric that supports alienation, and its necessary
components, like commodified play are hurt when actual play, like that of the jazz
musician is part of the human experience. The political stability, informed by a type of
political passiveness, that is necessary for an unregulated industrial society, would be at
risk if people extrapolated ideas from the jazz musician’s experience and applied them
toward societal organization, or play. Unfortunately, the ability to break free from the
controlling elements of that society has been corrupted by the various components of
society that support a flawed economic system, such as commodified play, or a violent
patriarchy described by McLaren. I talk more about liberating play in chapters three and
four, but for now I would like to remark on this one thought by Schiller (2004).

In his

study of art and society Schiller writes, “...Man plays only when he is in the full sense of
the word a man, and he is only wholly Man when he is playing...” (p. 80). Although it
would give my high school Latin teacher fits to have to revise Descartes’ famous dictum,
I agree with Schiller. Thus it would be more accurate to say, i play therefore I am. (I
thought I was oh so clever with my variation on Descartes, however, a quick Google
search showed me I wasn’t the first to come up with this expression) Schiller understood
that humankind would be somewhat undeveloped if she lived only in her head, accepting
and dwelling within a play that is artificial, commodified, and disconnected to whom we
actually are. Gumbrecht (2006) knows this too as is evidenced in his examination of the
interplay of athletes.
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The best in jazz musicianship embody this concept of play. Bailey (1993) and the
musicians he interviews explain this very serious play in their discussions of ideomatic
and non-ideomatic jazz. In a nutshell, ideomatic jazz refers to the technical skills
necessary to play the instrument and the ability to use a “vocabulary” that has already
been created. This vocabulary is part of a complex harmonic and melodic structure. This
is the “language” of the academy. It is a language of consensus. It’s been peer reviewed
and verified by “experts” in the field. It works, so use it. Non-ideomatic improvisation
occurs when musicians appear to play the “wrong” notes. Non-ideomatic expression isn’t
always the goal, per se, but it can result from the unbridled play of musicians willing to
take a risk and play without a predetermined end product in mind. Occasionally, this type
of unbridled play produces radical results, as was the case when “be-bop” first appeared
on the scene in the 1940’s. In many ways, musically and socially for example, be-bop
was an act of violence, albeit violence of a musical sort. Jazz music had become co-opted
by white musicians, almost from the very beginning (who typically sanitized the music).
Be-bop was therefore an attempt to take it back, however, the deleterious nature of Jim
Crow also contributed to the musicians’ need for violence, even, as was apparent in this
case, in the abstract sense (Charlie Parker was reputed to have remarked to the poet,
Amiri Baraka that he plays jazz the way he does so he doesn’t have to kill white people).
Gumbrecht has argued (2004) that some aesthetic experience contain an element of
violence that I would argue is part of the process that allows the musician to switch
between idioms or devise new ones. While his examples are a Bullfight or a boxing
match, (2004) literal acts of violence, I would argue that jazz contains a similar act of
violence, both in the abstract and in its execution. Indeed, since the 1930’s jazz musicians
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have engaged in “cutting contests” whereby they would attempt to outplay any musician
who dared to challenge them on the stage. In fact the early reputation of sax great
Coleman Hawkins was based on his ability to outplay his opponents. It was said that he
destroyed them. I find it intriguing that jazz incorporates language that refers to violence.
Interestingly, a similar violence occurs within improvisational theatre. Indeed, coming
out of Wisconsin in the late 1980’s “Theater Sports” combines the competitiveness of an
athletic event with the unpredictable theatricality of improvisational theatre. Moreover, it
is common for the comic or the improvisational comedienne to use the expression “I
killed” in reference to her relationship with the audience. To do well is to kill them and
despite its metaphorical status still produces the same effect that Gumbrecht (2004) refers
to in his description of the bullfight or boxing match. To kill them is to welcome “...the
risk of losing control over oneself-at least temporarily” (p. 116).
For musicians like Prouty (2008), when the best musicians play they are able to
switch back between the older idioms and the one they just created. “...improvisation lies
not just with the creation of new spaces and possibilities, but also with the adherence to
established techniques and approaches, with what has come before...” (p. 9).

In time the

new idioms successfully change the structure and content of the older idioms and in this
way revitalize them. Non-ideomatic playing, discussed by Murphy (2004) keeps things
fresh: “Ideomatic improvisational techniques are the key to the continuity and stability of
jazz (and other musical idioms), not just because of the way they form a framework for
clear expression and communication among those competent in the idiom, but also
because of their pedagogical utility...” (p. 135). But for jazz music to not merely survive
but thrive, its practitioners must engage with non-ideomatic playing. The same concept
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holds true for any aesthetic medium. Of course the real question is where the musicians
get these new idioms from. We might also ask ourselves the same thing about those
athletes who have just made the play of a lifetime. Are they the result of mastering the
fundamentals? The athletes, like the great musicians, have so wholly mastered the
fundamentals that not only can they apply them when needed but because of their
attentiveness to the moment, in a Benjaminian (2007) sense, now have the ability to alter
that moment, and by extension the fundamentals, as necessary, yet when examined in
retrospect know not from where it came (“I’m just glad to help us get a win”).
Gumbrecht (2004), in his discussion of the arts, writes, “...if it occurs we do not know
what form it will take and how intense it will be: there are no two bolts of lightning... and
no two orchestra performances that will interpret the same score in exactly the same way.
Finally (and above all), epiphany within aesthetic experience is an event because it
undoes itself while it emerges…” (p. 113). Admittedly, Gumbrecht is referring to
interpretations of classical compositions but his point still has merit for our discussion
because the performers of his orchestra are improvising, albeit at a lesser rate than most
jazz performers. For in that moment of improvisation (and for Gumbrecht this can occur
in team sports too) the player has rid herself of the shackles of production in a Marxian
sense. Perhaps this is what Gumbrecht means when he states that the event “undoes
itself.” Or he could be referring to the ephemeral nature of the event: in other words one
will never hear in the case of music, or see in the case of sports another event exactly like
the one that so impressed us again. Gumbrecht’s analogy of team sports and its natural
association with play are fitting. When we witness a beautiful play in team sports (pick
your favorite if you’re a sports fan) all that was once prominent-commercials for erectile
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dysfunction, bad beer, and trucks; or who’s winning the game- fades away, and if we are
attentive to the beauty that is happening we too can get lost and gain something from the
“temporality of the moment” (p. 113). In sports, this moment might only last a few
seconds, if that. In jazz it depends on the time and the performer. A favorite anecdote
among jazz aficionados concerns the young Louis Armstrong. His ability to improvise for
thirty or forty choruses is well documented. Moreover, Armstrong’s playing seemed to
defy temporal limitations. He was able to create that epiphany in aesthetic experience that
Gumbrecht praises so highly. Armstrong’s ability to create these epiphanies is part of the
reason for his legendary status among musicians in the know and attentive listeners.
Armstrong’s improvisational skills are what Attali (1999) refers to as his ability to
compose. He writes, “...To compose is to stay repetition and the death inherent in it...to
locate liberation not in a faraway future... but in the present, in production and in one’s
own enjoyment” (p. 143). Attali’s use of the term composition is perhaps problematic,
because it implies that improvisation is simply fast composing. Musician and professor of
music Edward Sarath (2013) will dispute this claim.
For now I would like to return to my discussion of the nascent, improvisational
moment of creation. Although they are working from two very different theoretical
frameworks, Attali and Gumbrecht both see the importance of creating and appreciating
these moments of intensity; however, while Attali finds references to a utopian future to
come (a threat to the modern and postmodern eras) Gumbrecht’s findings are less
grandiose, but still important and perhaps more realistic. He seems to concentrate on
ways for the individual to overcome that Cartesian split of mind and body, which for
Gumbrecht are more important than overcoming the constraints of a superstructure,
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which seem to fuel Attali’s efforts to find clues embedded within the music of a utopian
society to come. Gumbrecht (2004) is refreshingly honest in his declaration that “... There
is,... no pedagogically guaranteed way of leading students... ‘toward’ aesthetic
experience;... there is no predictable, obvious or typical yield that aesthetic experience
can add to our lives in the everyday world's...” (p. 101-102). In my analysis of
improvisational theatre, jazz music, and popular culture, I have found Gumbrecht’s
pronouncement, regarding the impossibility of predicting how or when these intense
moments of improvisational creation can or will happen, to be an honest feature of the
improvisational moment. Perhaps this characteristic of improvisation can help us
understand why improvisation can never be taught or learned through a specific method.
As Roland Barthes (1972) has reminded us, “The invariable fact is that a piece of work
which ceaselessly proclaims its determination for method is ultimately sterile: everything
has been put into the method, nothing is left for writing:…No surer way to kill a piece of
research and send it to join the great waste of abandoned projects than Method…” (p.
201). Method kills liberating pedagogy.
Given Barthes’ and Gumbrecht’s proclamations on method, the one surefire
way of preventing a student from experiencing possible moments of creative intensity is
to make things too simple for them, by suggesting that there exists a method to get there.
In other words, it is purposeful creation of complexity that forces a student to react in
innovative ways that at times creates moments of sheer brilliance. For musicians like the
previously mentioned Pee Wee Russell his brilliance is a consequence of having to react
to the instantaneous decisions made by his fellow musicians. The music he played had to
fit with what his fellow musicians created and he in turn had to make sense of their
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complexity. They in turn had to react appropriately to his creations. Sometimes these
complicated conversations work and sometimes they don't. To be sure Russell’s ability to
improvise brilliantly is based on years of playing and honing his skills as a musician. In
learning the ideomatic structure well enough to be able to, when necessary, turn it on its
head, so to speak. Gumbrecht (2004) further writes, “For good academic teaching is a
staging of complexity; it is drawing our students’ attention toward complex phenomenon
and problems, rather than prescribing how they have to understand certain problems...”
(p. 128). Thus, it would be reasonable to suggest that the stimulus to create these
moments of intensity within an aesthetic experience is for students, or jazz musicians, or
actors in improvisational theatre, to be forced to deal with an array of complexities. To
be sure accurately deciding the nature and makeup of these complexities can be
problematic. Many in the academy resort to an established canon that can potentially
reinforce the existing order and prevent the student from creating something new and
wonderful. This is the critique that has accompanied the charge of neo-conservativism
against Stanley Crouch and Wynton Marsalis (1990). In the jazz world the critique
against this well-known jazz writer and jazz musician is that their approach to jazz is
similar to that of a museum curator rather than an active creator of the “products” that
wound up in the museum. I understand the attachment to the canon. Neither Russell nor
Armstrong would have been able to create something wonderful in jazz music if they had
not mastered the idiom of jazz, although in Armstrong’s case he invented much of that
idiom. Also, as a live performer it is tempting to rely on something that has worked
before. And yet both comedians and jazz musicians have experienced playing the same
song, or telling the same joke twice and not getting the same result. Failure feels bad and

53
no one wants to die (violence in language again) on stage or in the classroom.
Armstrong’s and Russell’s “genius” however lies in their new response to that idiom
instead of their rigid adherence to it (and more importantly to their willingness to take a
risk and try something new or allow something new to occur). In improvisational theatre
there is a saying, well known to those who practice and perform its art: “You can’t break
the rules until you learn the rules.” Perhaps their “genius” lies in knowing when and how
to break the rules; or allowing oneself to be attuned to the moment that in effect makes
that decision for you. Still, the origins of spontaneity are complicated. It is quite possible
that true spontaneity is an impossibility, if both the act and the product must represent
something entirely new created as an ephemeral epiphany. Deleuze and Guattari (1994)
seem to suggest that the musician constructs her improvisational response to the needs of
a complex musical problem rather than give thanks to the gods of spontaneity. The
musician and athlete have taken part in an aesthetic experience that Deleuze and Guattari
would describe as being “immanent to itself.” In this way they can explore and open up
the song or the athletic play in ways that are solely concerned with what is happening
within that play or song at that moment rather than lose focus to a concern that is external
to the event. John Corbett (1994), who examines music in his book, Extended Play:
Sounding off from John Cage to Dr. Funkenstein, has this to say on the subject of
spontaneity: ‘...We say quite the opposite: desire only exists when assembled or
machined. You cannot grasp or conceive of a desire outside a determinate
assemblage...each group or individual should construct the plane of immanence on which
they lead their life and carry their business...It is constructivist, not at all spontaneist’” (p.
85). I am very interested in the examination of spontaneity since it seems integral to the
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study of improvisation. It would seem clear, however, that every jazz musician who
effectively answered the demand of complexity, and construct what appears to be a
spontaneous reply to a musical prompt, did so because she was extremely well versed in
the idioms that have already been created. In other words she knew the rules.
For Attali the most important movement within jazz began in the late 1950’s and
continues to this day, however not in the economic relationship Attali would like. The
movement is known as free jazz and many jazz artists work in this mode (or perhaps it
would be better to say they work outside the mode) since it affords them the opportunity
to create something new more often. The problem is it doesn’t always work. Or it isn’t
respected by the “experts” in jazz. Indeed, well respected jazz critic Whitney Balliett
(1959) has argued that “... Most experimental jazz has been governed by a queer
dilettantism of newness for newness’ sake, and much of it has been little more than an
agglomeration of classical technique pasted onto standard jazz content...” (p. 82). More
often than not new musical forms are misinterpreted or simply unappreciated. For
example, when Louis Armstrong first heard Bebop, the new revolutionary noise in the
late 1940s, he likened it to “Chinese music.” In other words Armstrong was most
definitely not impressed with the new sound. Ironically, those who first heard Louis
Armstrong's music in the late 1920s and early 1930s (when Armstrong was bringing
together for the first time seemingly disparate elements of music, creating his gumbo, so
to speak) felt the same way about his music when compared, for example, to the classical
canon so familiar to the Creole community of New Orleans. Marsalis’ allegiance to
Bebop is therefore doubly ironic since he is acutely aware of the transition from the type
of music played by Louis Armstrong to that played by its inventors, Charlie Parker,
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Dizzy Gillespie and Thelonious Monk. The same process that created Louis Armstrong's
music and Bebop music is behind free jazz. But Attali (1999) argues (although I partially
disagree with his assessment) that jazz had become colonized and that free jazz
represented “...the first attempt to express in economic terms the refusal of the cultural
alienation inherent in repetition, to use music to build a new culture” (p. 138). I would
argue that Armstrong and those Bebop innovators like Monk did exactly the same thing
that Attali’s free jazz musicians did when they created their distinct forms of music. I
would further argue that free jazz has been misinterpreted as a musical style without form
because the form it has is so different from that which came before. Attali would
disagree with Balliett about the musical merits of some free jazz but ultimately conclude
that free jazz failed since some of its adherents became part of the problem when their
small record labels were bought out by the major labels. Many who write on jazz
improvisation acknowledge Attali’s insight yet disagree with his pronouncement of the
death of free jazz. Indeed, journals like “Critical Studies in Improvisation,” have churned
out hundreds of scholarly articles inspired by Attali’s book. However, the majority of
these, as well as books by prominent jazz writers like Corbett (1994), refutes his claim
that free jazz has lost its ability to free humankind.
I’ve encountered many examples of the liberating effects of free jazz by
reading interviews of jazz musicians who are part of the free jazz movement. One
common theme seems to be the incorporation of different musical genres- a pastiche, to
borrow a term from Jameson - into ideomatic jazz structures in an attempt to construct
the plane of immanence referred to by Deleuze and Guattari. Moreover, their discussion
of the plane of immanence would seem to negate the idea of the musical genius who

56
spontaneously creates fantastic music out of nowhere. In other words it isn’t magic or
divine intervention that creates an athletic or musical genius. These people are made, not
born...my apologies to all the athletes and musicians who interpret their talent as a God
given gift! And yet with all this hard work there is still no guarantee the free jazz
musician will create something of value let alone one that is unencumbered by the
hegemonic demands of the culture (and tainted by that culture) in which it occurs. Indeed,
the British free jazz musician Evan Parker (1994) states:
Sometimes...it’s as predictable as addition, you get exactly what you expect,
other times it’s entirely unpredictable. For example, if...you have two basic
rhythm patterns happening across the two hands-and then superimpose a related
but different pattern of articulation from the tongue, you get a final result that is
very hard to predict-because there’s a three-layer process of filtering that might
throw up patterns of accented notes which you couldn’t think up (p. 83).
The free jazz musician is a believer in autonomous art that in the end can never be
autonomous. Perhaps this is the lie the musician tells herself in order to play. I would
argue that since its inception jazz has been a semi-autonomous art that must believe in an
autonomy that in reality can never be achieved. Given this necessary paradox, one must
acknowledge the contributions made by people like Adorno (1978) (2002), and some of
the other critical theorists described by Martin Jay (1973), as they attempted to
understand art and hegemony. In reference to the Frankfurt school in general and
Adorno’s concept of culture in particular, Benzer (2011) has written that “...Culture could
not be understood, as Adorno put it, ‘in terms of itself’...” (p. 80). Adorno saw popular
music (and for him jazz was part of popular music) as serving the needs of the culture
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industry. Their needs can range from promoting a specific political agenda to making a
profit to helping the masses find relief through distraction. While Adorno correctly
interpreted that some of the music had become colonized, and in some cases sanitized, for
white audiences (creating the sacred without the profane) or simply had become
derivative, he missed what had been created by improvisation that was truly great.
Adorno (1978) wrote that
The ideological function of jazz when it first asserted itself as the upper bourgeois
form of contemporary vulgar music was to conceal the commodity character and
alienated manner of production of this music; it was to be offered under the
trademark of ‘quality goods.’ Jazz was to evoke the appearance of improvisational
freedom and immediacy in the sphere of light music (p. 162).
Adorno’s claim (2011) was that “Improvisations became ‘normalized’ the boys can only
swing it in a narrow framework” (p. 101). To be sure, when Armstrong codified jazz
music the other musicians who tried to play like him perhaps did create music that only
appeared improvisational, as Adorno claims. I would suggest that the improvisational
freedom Adorno found lacking in jazz music, specifically its ability to move beyond the
commodity character, can be found in some of Armstrong’s 1920’s recordings like
“Potato Head Blues,” or “West End Blues.” Armstrong’s brilliant obbligato at the
beginning of this latter piece was his critique on music that only serves as an opiate for
the masses. Moreover, this obbligato is an important example of one of the ways an artist
can overcome Adorno’s “commodity character” and dwell in what De Certeau (1984)
argues as “…the art of being in between…” (p. 30). De Certeau is referring to the skill of
a North African immigrant in Paris to survive and possibly thrive despite the obstacles of
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the constraining order. Indeed, as a poor Black youth in the roughest neighborhood of
“Jim Crow” New Orleans, Armstrong surely honed his skills in figuring out how to
“make do.” I have no doubt these skills in improvisation of place transferred to
Armstrong’s music, especially his early work, given his oeuvre. These skills are perhaps
the reason he was able to as De Certeau (1984) writes, “…find ways of using the
constraining order of place where he has no choice but to live and which lays down its
law for him, he establishes within it a degree of plurality and creativity. By an art of
being in between, he draws unexpected results from his situation” (p. 30). I would argue
that Armstrong’s music is as serious as the music Adorno holds in high praise, such as
that created by Schoenberg or Hindemith. Indeed, Armstrong’s improvised obbligato,
combining elements of Western and non-Western music such as African and Caribbean,
represents not only a “degree of plurality and creativity” but a rupture of the musical
fabric which contributed to the vitality of all popular twentieth century music.
Adorno’s claim regarding jazz rings mostly true as jazz music became more
mainstream. In some cases this meant white musicians playing, for the most part, poor
facsimiles of jazz music. It didn’t swing and it had been depleted of all its sexual energy
and anger. It lacked a foreshadowing of tension. For example, just listen to any recording
by either the Paul Whiteman orchestra (except for the solos of Jack Teagarden or Bix
Beiderbecke) or Bob Crosby’s (brother to Bing) group. In fact Bob Crosby was so square
that musicians, that is to say jazz musicians, would say “Bob Crosby’s in the house,” if
they were holding marijuana and a cop walked by. Similarly, Pat Boone was the
“answer” to record companies in the 1950’s who wanted the money of the baby boomers
but didn’t want to incur the wrath of their parents. And Black musicians during the
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1930’s and 1940’s had their music suffer when they paid attention to the financial needs
of the recording industry. Adorno (1978) and Attali (1999) rightly criticized the impact of
commodity concerns yet even within these constraints I would suggest that some of the
better musicians were able to break free and play what they wanted. In fact when records
were able to record twenty minutes of music per side rather than the two to three minutes
of the 78 era, musicians were better able to expand their musical vocabulary and make
more serious, complex music. These records would influence scores of later musiciansBenjamin’s criticism of mechanical reproduction, or Adorno’s criticism of commodity
constraints, notwithstanding. Indeed, in Martin Jay’s (1993) study of Horkheimer he
writes,
One might still call for a deliberately engaged political act of the kind that Brecht
or Hans Eisler advocated, but the meager impact of attempts to apply their ideas
in the 1960’s suggests the limits of this approach... The culture industry may well
be not as totalitarian as Horkheimer and Adorno assumed in their bleaker
moments. But whether it allows more than pockets of what one commentator has
called ‘artificial negativity’ remains to be seen (p. 380).
The issue is whether or not these pockets of protest are enough. Given the output of the
jazz community I would say perhaps. But it is sobering to reflect on the fact that jazz is
no longer mainstream. What kind of impact can it have it if only serves a small
percentage of the population? Perhaps this is why Gumbrecht explores popular sports. If
we were to find harbingers of a utopian society to come, or an avenue that lets us be more
fully human, it probably makes more sense to examine an aspect of popular culture that
resonates for more people.
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CHAPTER 3
IMPROVISATION AND THE DESIRE FOR THE IMPOSSIBLE
It's not easy to improvise. It's the most difficult thing to do. Even when one
improvises in front of a camera or a microphone, one ventriloquizes or leaves
another to speak in ones place...the schema and languages that are already there.
There are already a great number of prescriptions that are prescribed in our
memory and in our culture. All the names are already pre-programmed. It's
already the names that inhibit our ability to ever really improvise. One can't say
whatever one wants. One is obliged more or less to re-produce the stereotypical
discourse. And so I believe in improvisation. And I fight for improvisation, but
always with the belief that it's impossible. And there where there is improvisation
I am not able to see myself. I am blind to myself. And it's what I will see...no...I
won't see it. It's for others to see. The one who is improvised here, no I won't ever
see him. (Derrida, unpublished interview, 1982)
For personal and professional reasons, Derrida’s thoughts on improvisation
intrigue me. His pronouncement regarding the impossibility of improvisation would seem
strange to a participant or “player” who found themselves caught up in the popularity of
improvisational theatre during the last half century, although Derrida would probably
applaud their continued efforts. And yet his understanding of the impossibility of
improvisation should find resonance in those who write about improvisation as it is
practiced in the theatre, and by musicians who perform jazz music – an arena where
others use improvisation as a way to create. For many, practice in improvisation has the
potential to enable us to respond more creatively and individually to an ever changing
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present and help us create more accurate meanings either about ourselves as individuals
or society at large- instead of uncritically accepting those values from the past as if they
had the power of universal applicability. Unfortunately, more often than not, it fails to
accomplish this task and those who either perform through improvisation, write about it,
or both, often get caught up in the obstacles (and there are many) in achieving true
improvisation, and eventually dispose of it. But this is a mistake. These practitioners
disregard an important way to see things in a new way. They play it safe and simply
repeat what has worked in the past. “If it ain’t broke don’t fix it!” Indeed. More
unfortunate is the fact that institutions that claim to cultivate knowledge do not encourage
their students or teachers to engage in activities that are similar to what jazz artists and
improvisation players do, instead they hide behind those activities which are safe and
more appropriate to a classroom setting. For now, I would like to explore some of the
obstacles to improvisation as it relates to Derrida’s idea of impossibility.
To quote one of my favorite characters, “Omar Little,” from an extremely well
written show produced for HBO, The Wire, “Those Greek myths are deep.” I’ll examine
why The Wire is important in chapter 3 as I discuss Constance Penley’s (1997)
NASA/TREK. For now, I would like to let Omar’s profound observation regarding Greek
Myths return us to the impossibility of improvisation. Indeed, for somewhere in the
nexus between Echo and Narcissus is where Art (in its mimetic sense) and spontaneity (in
its Romantic sense) exists. In this space lie the source and products of improvisation and
its goal - the recovery of the Self, which I will explore in my last chapter. Often the
inspiration to improvise can be structural or referential. For jazz musicians the structure
can be as simple as verse-chorus-verse, a thirty two bar blues, or more often, rhythm: the
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steady beat of drums and bass that frame a tune and the shifts in rhythm that inspire,
perhaps by forcing, soloists to create within many constraints, such as the thirty two bars
which constitute the song. The reference is often a popular song or part of one. In
improvisational theatre the “structure” can be one of hundreds of games all designed to
allow the players a chance to play and create; and the reference is typically extracted
from popular culture or everyday speech- a culture by the way that has insinuated itself
into the marrow of our thoughts. This is one of the things Derrida is referring to when he
argues that improvisation is impossible. For him far too many of the ingredients of an
attempt at spontaneity had been created before and by someone else. In this sense they
prevent the individual from autonomous improvisation because the product and process
of that creation lacks complete originality. Perhaps the lack of complete originality is
okay? In an interview (1997) with free jazz legend, Ornette Coleman in July of 1997
before and during a three concert series by Coleman, Derrida writes that,
Perhaps you will agree with me on the fact that the very concept of improvisation
verges upon reading, since what we often understand by improvisation is the
creation of something new, yet something which doesn’t exclude the pre-written
framework that makes it possible…there is repetition, in the work, that is intrinsic
to the initial creation-that which compromises or complicates the concept of
improvisation. Repetition is already in improvisation: thus when people want to
trap you between improvisation and the pre-written, they are wrong (p. 322-323).
It would appear from the above statement that Derrida is agreeing with Berliner (1994),
who writes, “In the final analysis, the spontaneous and arranged elements of jazz
presentations continually cross-fertilize and revitalize one another...” (p. 35), and Bailey
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(1993) as they, and the countless musicians interviewed, proclaim improvisational music
as the combination of something new with something old, without the Derridean
problematic of the need for its impossibility. Sara Ramshaw, (2008) in Time Out of Time:
Derrida, Cixous, Improvisation, helps explain the Derridean paradox of impossibility in
this manner: “Improvisation takes place. One time alone. Out of time. And yet absolutely
of the time, in tune with time. Creating its own time…Derrida reads improvisation as an
impossibility that is only ever possible as the impossible…” (p. 162). Ramshaw’s
reasoning is that the improvised piece is appreciated after the fact, and in the moment of
creation, by using “…pre-existing or prevailing laws of language, music and
temporality…” (p. 163), yet importantly, the very thing that is appreciated in time is
something that can only exist and be created out of time. Indeed, Ramshaw further writes
and quotes Derrida, “…Impossibility is thus not the opposite of possibility; instead it is
‘the condition or chance of the possible’. In Derridean terms, ‘possible’ and ‘impossible’
say the same thing” (p. 163). Thus, like Derrida I fight for the impossibility of
improvisation for to give in and focus on the non-Derridean possible would limit the
results. I agree in the impossibility of complete originality but I would argue that the
attempt to produce something original is worthwhile in and of itself and occasionally the
product might be something really special. The use of pre-conceived structures and the
incorporation, for example, of an aspect of popular culture need not negate the
improvisational moment as defined by Derrida. Indeed, this spontaneous and conscious
effort should be consistently promoted because of the possibility of achieving that truly
creative moment or breakthrough, and because of the growth potential it affords the
individual.
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At times, “... the very predicaments brought on by a limited field of play, or by
frustrating circumstances, often ignite the essential surprises that we later look back on as
creativity” (Nachmanovitch, 1990, p. 86). Indeed, improvisational jazz music was the
aesthetic product of an oppressed people who were forced to improvise to survive as
involuntary participants in the colonization of the New World. In contrast,
improvisational theater was in large part a white, male, middle class, intellectual jab at
the conformity and bourgeois culture of the 1950s. Thus, we have two different art forms
born from frustrating circumstances albeit the former saw more actual suffering than the
latter. Yet, despite, or perhaps because of those struggles and lack of struggles, each
group created an aesthetic that helped define who they were and where they wanted to go.
So what happened? Why do actors produce scenes that are stale or filled with
stereotypes that constrain rather than uplift; and why are musicians either incapable or
unwilling to find their own voice? Why do they rely on clichés? And why do actors
reproduce the status quo? In her study of improvisational comedy, Amy Seham (2001)
writes that “Because popular culture is the source of most improvisers’ references, these
stereotypes are repeated and revalidated by audience laughter and recognition” (p. 103).
I would argue that it isn’t the reference to popular culture or the use of clichés per se that
is the problem. Instead, it is the way in which those clichés or popular culture references
are used by the actors. An un-appropriated reference can reify the status quo unless the
actor is adept at interrogation and a kind of dramatic inversion occurs that makes it very
clear that the stereotypes are being critiqued, and not supported. At times, it is the
conscious or perhaps unconscious decision of the musician or actor -when faced with the
dilemma of coming up with something wonderful right away- to please an audience that

65
is easily pleased- repeats something that has worked in the past while not adding anything
new to it. In some cases it is artistic peer pressure, and the consumer instincts of the
audience as consumer which constrain the improviser and prevent her from creating
something new. In this case it is an overreliance on Echo and a denial of the individual
self. Echo is the accepted canon. It is what has been approved by the gatekeepers. The
self is never completely free of the canon but does have the ability to alter that canon
either in rearrangement of the vocabulary or the rare occurrence when a revolutionary
discovery has been made. Or the reverse can occur and the scene or musical event can
devolve into overt displays of narcissism in which case the player or performer becomes
blind to all that is around him. This is unfortunate but at times the audience will accept
technical skill alone as enough despite the fact that communication between the group
and the individual performer stops. The self is not enriched despite its vigorous
appearance.
As I read Seham (2001) I partially agree with her as she and I lament bad
audiences, their reliance on tainted popular culture and the impact that has on
improvisational actors. And yet, Rancière forces me to reconsider a position which posits
enlightened performers and bad audiences, for example His insight requires a different
definition of “aesthetics” and the “politics of aesthetics” (p. 59). Rancière differentiates
his version from that of the modernist, postmodernist and the “aesthetic of the sublime”
(p. 61) as he explains why an “aesthetic break” occurred that created a gap between
performer and spectator. He begins with his definition of mimesis and his admonishment
to us for believing “…the photography of some atrocity will mobilize us against
injustice…” (p. 61), as he writes of mimesis:
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the concordance between the complex of sensory signs through which the process
of poiesis is displayed and the complex of the forms of perception and emotion
through which it is felt and understood…there was a language of natural signs,
there was a continuity between the intrinsic consistency…of the play and its
capacity to produce ethical effects in the minds of the spectators…The stage, the
audience and the world were comprised in one and the same continuum (p. 6061).
In other words Rancière (2009) might suggest to Seham (2001) that she is placing too
much faith in improvisational theatre to change the audience for the better simply by
virtue of what is represented in the art. Indeed, as Rancière (2009) writes in The
Emancipated Spectator, he might remind Seham (2001) to read Rousseau’s Letter to
D’Alembert on the Theatre, so she can learn how he, “…questioned the supposedly direct
line from the performance of the actors on the stage to its effects on the minds of the
spectators to their behavior outside the theatre…” (p. 61). In fact what happened on those
improvisational stages bolsters Rousseau’s and Rancière’s claim regarding the inaccuracy
of mimesis because when the actors tried to enlighten their audiences they failed. And at
times, realizing that failure, failed again when they started sensing what the audience
“liked,” through their off the cuff suggestions, and their reactions to the scenes.
Consequently, they geared the scenes to give the audience what they seemed to want and
in the end blamed the audience for the catastrophe. I, too, as an improvisational actor on
countless “stages” blamed them as well. Much of what Seham hoped improvisation
would highlight and fix (racism, misogyny, and homophobia, for example) was
reproduced and the age old problem that Rancière describes rears its ugly ahead once
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again. In his essay, Tropological Curriculum studies: Puppets and Statues of
Curriculum Quagmires, Peter Appelbaum (2013) applies a largely Rancièrian view,
along with his own and Žižek’s, in his cogent analysis of curriculum studies as he
describes, “…a traumatic experience. We act on our theology, which includes a faith in
the enabling and emancipating potential of education, only to find social reproduction as
the accompanying catastrophe. Schooling as enabling is at once probable and
impossible…” (p. 83). Regarding the improvisational stages Seham (2001) and I
essentially played the part of the schoolmaster hoping to educate the ignorant masses and
when that didn’t happen we blamed the audience. Applying his position to curriculum
studies Appelbaum (2013) complexifies our simple analysis as he re-conceives the
Reconceptualization:
Curriculum theorizing carries with it the legacy of Renaissance teaching of
rhetoric, which emphasized tactics of metaphor over metonymy and other
rhetorical moves; this led to both a narrowed epistemology mutually generative of
racist and colonial practices and the accompanying presumption that language
itself is a neutral technology, separable from oppressive forms of social practice
(p. 96).
In other words, as Appelbaum (2013) interprets Rancière (2009), those of us who think
the arts can serve as an automatic way out of the moribund are sadly and frustratingly
mistaken, “…condemned to melancholic nostalgia for those moments in our early
professional development when theories promised ways out of hell into nirvana” (p. 97).
But all is not gloom and doom. In his application of Žižek to curriculum studies
Appelbaum (2013) suggests the following:
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Rather than manipulate our models, metaphors, and designs for educational
encounters, we might find more rewarding the notion that our models, metaphors
and designs are names for the chasm they themselves construct, between our
imagination and those externalized fetishes we call systems of reproduction and
regimes of truth (p. 98).
In an earlier essay Appelbaum (2012) offers another possible way out of the “quagmire.”
He writes in Mathematical Practice as Sculpture of Utopia: Models, Ignorance, and the
Emancipated Spectator that if one wants to avoid a “…pedagogical stance that structures
the audience as passive spectators…” (p. 14), one should consider the models of
American sculptor, Josiah McElheny and those whose work is similar such as Isamu
Noguchi. Appelbaum (2012) argues that these artists, “…use models to create new
worlds, imaginary spaces of learning outside of time and space. The models become
‘proposals’-invitations to come and play and explore ideas…” (p. 16). Appelbaum is
careful to differentiate these models from those which would, “…drag us down into
realms of accuracy, correctness, and explanation…” (p. 16). I like this idea despite
Appelbaum’s own admission that it might seem “grandiose,” (p. 18) to apply “…theories
of social change for school mathematics” (p. 18). Appelbaum’s description of Noguchi’s
model for a UN playground reminds me of the improv game I talk about in chapter 6,
known as the “Harold.” If done carefully, this improv game creates not so much a scene,
but a spark, for both audience and player, to think about and possibly reimagine what a
scene could be. In my experience playing this game it was the worst received by player
and audience. I’ll take up Appelbaum’s (2012) insights regarding Noguchi’s model and
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its further connections to the “Harold” in chapter 6 but for now I’d like to continue with
some obstacles to improvisation.
I have no recipe for eliminating those chasms referred to by Appelbaum (2013).
Clearly there are many obstacles to improvisation. And as I have described they come
from within and without. In writing about the high culture of Berlin during the 1920s, J.
Moreno (1947) has stated that, “Conditions of high cultural and technological
organization coincide alarmingly with increased immobility of thought and action” (p.
40). Moreno sees the modern state as unhealthy to the human condition since it is in the
interest of the plutocrats to decrease humankind’s mobility of thought and action. He
places high hopes on a ‘theatre of spontaneity’ to counter the poison of the industrial age.
In Moreno’s theatre the actor and audience are both integral to the performance. When its
utopian ideal is achieved both are enriched by an experience which can only be
momentary. Thus, the spontaneous theatre is an on-going process. Moreno anticipated
some of the problems that can derail his utopian dream but did not live long enough to
see the most egregious: the appropriation of talent by the culture industry working at the
behest of market forces and the willingness of the audience to allow this to happen.
Some of the obstacles to improvisation are reactions to time constraints. We see
this fairly regularly in jazz musicians and improvisational actors. Ekkehard Jost (1981), a
professor of musicology and a musician at the University of Giessen, in Germany states:
If we think of improvisation as both a spontaneous and a conscious (i.e.,
controlled) translation of musical ideas into motor action... it will be clear that this
procedure demands a certain amount of time... the musician... may find himself,
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forced to reduce his ‘reaction time’; thus he will not think out musical ideas, but
will fall back on ideas he has worked out at one time... he plays what ‘live under
his fingers’ (p. 137).
In other words when jazz musicians are having their conversation-especially one that is
“up-tempo” - they often feel compelled to react and respond musically as quickly as their
fellow musicians passed the musical message to them. While the best players figure out a
way to respond well by trusting their intuition with something that makes musical sense
and is original, more often than not the skilled musician will respond quickly with
something that’s musically appropriate but un-original. In a sense he is playing from
memory. But it is not solely an aural memory. It is also a physical memory somewhat
analogous to the actions of a baseball player when he is attempting to pick up a ground
ball he has picked up a thousand times before and throw the runner out at first base. The
ballplayer is relying on the physical memory that lives under his hands, arms, and legs;
all of which are used in response to the many variables of the game including the present
moment. Similarly, the musician is using what lies under his fingers or in other words his
technique to hopefully respond to the musical needs of the ensemble. In like manner the
improv player might resort to a physical gesture, mimicry, or inject a phrase he has used
before because he knows that this type of response has worked before and hopes that it
will work again. At times it does, especially with passive audiences that have been
nurtured in and expect an environment where risk is something always to be avoided.
And like the ballplayer, the musician's or improv actor’s gestalt is multisensory. The
better players, that is to say the ones who seemingly have unlimited things to say, have
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the complex kind of consciousness, which I call extended consciousness and of
which there are many levels and grades, provide the organism with an elaborate
sense of self—an identity and a person, you or me, no less—and places that
person at a point in individual historical time, richly aware of the lived past and of
the anticipated future, and keenly cognizant of the world beside it (Damasio,
1999, p. 16).
Importantly, not all improvisational players have that “extended consciousness” that
Damasio is referring to. In fact most do not. When pressed, the less experienced or least
accomplished musician or actor will draw from a Rolodex file of riffs, phrases, and
various musical or theatrical gestures that have been done many times before, mostly
with success. Is it simply that the musician or actor is so concerned with creating a
“finished product” that he is willing to forgo the spontaneous moment in exchange for
what he thinks is a sure fire crowd pleaser? If this is true then it must be asked why the
audience is so easily amused? What would improvisers create if there was no audience
other than each other? The short answer is it depends on the company one keeps.
Beginning improvisers mistake all instant responses, like laughter, as a sign that they are
on the right track; likewise jazz musicians who are technically proficient but without
original ideas tend to encourage the proliferation of those very same ideas. In contrast,
improvisers in theatre or jazz who are willing to trust their intuition and take a risk
always have the potential to create something wonderful and unique because it is a
response to the shared and unique present, not a past that was someone else’s experience.
Everyone must be trained in creativity, but not through or with a method. Instead, they
must have a history of experiencing first-hand the difficulty yet ultimate joy of
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responding creatively to a problem or idea. Although it might seem a paradox it is only
after rigorous training that a jazz musician can create something truly unique. In their
study of musical improvisation Csikszentmihalyi and Rich (1997) arrived at an
interesting conclusion following the interview of dozens of accomplished jazz musicians.
They argue that “...Only after they internalize a musical idiom, and learn the relevant
performance skills, can musicians perform spontaneous variations that can be
appreciated, evaluated, and if they are truly exceptional, selected for inclusion in the
cannon of performance...” (p. 63). In other words before the spontaneous production of
creativity can begin (and this holds true for jazz musicians and improvisational theatre
performers) the musician or actor must be so well versed in the vocabulary of either
genre that they can access it when necessary and in the process attempt to create
something unique and creative. This training is arduous, time consuming, and for many
frustrating. Both the actor and musician must develop a critical relationship with the
traditions of their fields: the canon must be revered and when appropriate reviled. This is
why Derrida argues for the impossibility of improvisation. Yet he fights for it because it
is the only way to free a discipline from hegemony and find freedom within hegemony.
Ingrid Monson (1996) studies creativity and suggests that the hegemony Derrida fears is
perhaps overblown. “I am suggesting that to reject the deconstructionist perspective on
speech, voice ...sound is to reject the idea of subjects so overdetermined by hegemonic
ideologies that they are unable to speak or take action on their behalf...” (p. 106). She
argues that an adequate response to hegemony can be found within the text: Since jazz
music is performed the musicians are able to take advantage of the subtle and not so
subtle nuances of tone, timbre, volume, and time. These nuances are impossible to fully
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notate on the page (read text) and thus creates pockets of freedom for the talented
musician. The sounds at their disposal are seemingly infinite and the talented musician
makes judicious use of them. Of course who determines if the product is creative? “It is
impossible to separate creativity from persuasion...” (p. 46). In other words all creations
musical and otherwise must pass the test of a fellow performer or audience. Both groups
are steeped to some degree in the tradition and both groups have varying levels of
attachment to that tradition. Perhaps what we call style is the ability of the improviser to
convince an audience or fellow performer of the rightness of their choice. At this point I
would like to examine the process and products of improvisation in jazz and
improvisational theatre.
The Process
The player who improvises works in the moment and yet draws from an arsenal of
either learned licks and dominant structures or cultural references that are either verbal or
physical. At times they are Echo, repeating the generally accepted truths. Other times
they are Narcissus, seemingly so wrapped up in their own head that they see no one and
thus, speak to no one. Yet both serve a function for a commodity driven society and this
is why this type of production thrives in the industry called entertainment. But it isn’t true
improvisation and it didn’t have to be this way. Indeed, improv as we know it started out
as a way for children to make better use of their time by first creating and then inhabiting
that spontaneous moment, creating vibrant theatre, and learning about themselves as
children living in Chicago during the Depression. Viola Spolin (1986) worked with these
children and is important to improvisational theatre, intuition, and creativity because she
created a collection of “games” that enabled the player to improvise more freely. Hers’
was an attempt to create an organic process that would enable the participant to discover
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their self; Spolin created a space where the children could fully communicate with each
other and create what was for her legitimate theatre. “Through spontaneity we are reformed into ourselves” (p. 4), is a maxim that was central to her work. Spolin saw firsthand the harmful effects of the Depression and the alienation inherent in the industrial
age. Her improv games were an effort to counter their harmful effects and her hopes were
that the recovered self would more closely resemble the perfection (although I am
uncomfortable with that word) that exists in Nature or God. Spolin and others like her
think that there is this perfect structure-some call it Nature others call it God- that is
waiting to be tapped into. When an actor or musician is in touch with this structure they
have created true art since their creation resembles, or more likely is informed by, the
perfection that is Nature or God.
This idea of drawing from the perfection that is God or nature is a holdover from
the Enlightenment and has since been challenged by the critical theorists of the Frankfurt
School (1973), John Dewey (2005), and post -modern philosophers such as Jacques
Derrida (2008), Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe (1994), Jacques Rancière (2009) and John
Caputo (2000). They reject metanarrative whatever its origin. At most they admit to a
quasi-structure (2000); however there appears to be considerable disagreement regarding
the transcendent qualities of this quasi-structure. French philosopher/amateur musician,
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe (1994) argues against the effort to recover the self as part of a
continuing effort to connect with a transcendent quasi structure. Instead, he suggests a
mimetic process of constructing art that proposes an eradication of the self and he defines
mimesis as an, “...absolute vicariousness, carried to the limit...something like an infinity
of substitution and circulation...the very lapse ‘itself’ of essence” ( p. 116). Lacoue-
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Labarthe’s ideas of “an infinity of substitution and circulation” are very much in line
with most jazz musicians. Most tend to argue against a definitive version of a particular
song and place more emphasis on the process of creation described by Lacoue-Labarthe,
always thinking about the song to come, yet paradoxically knowing this could never
happen. Jazz pianist Thelonious Monk perhaps said it best in the film Straight No Chaser
(1988) when he lashes out at his producer Teo Macero during the recording of an album:
“Every time you play you rehearse,” he yells. It is impossible and perhaps unwise to
create a definitive version of a song and yet the artist seems to always try to do just that.
This is the paradox of jazz performance and all musical production for that matter. And
this idea does seem to bolster Derrida’s idea of impossibility or the impossible possible
discussed earlier.
In Musica Ficta, Lacoue-Labarthe (1994) explores the impact of Wagner’s music
on four artists while further developing the ideas he put forth in his book on Mimesis. He
elaborates on the paradox of the production of something new when to most the definitive
version is already there and writes, “...that Wagner’s work left to his
posterity[Adorno’s] a task every bit impossible as the one left in philosophy by German
idealism (Hegel) to its great successors: to continue to pursue what is completed...” (p.
118). Lacoue-Labarthe and Derrida recoil from the notion that an idea, artistic creation,
political thought, etc., could be definitive. This is because eventually these “exemplars”
become constraining and prevent the democracy to come which is of vital importance to
philosophers who interpret art in its connection to politics. In his writing about Derrida,
Caputo (2000) writes:
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The democracy to come will be marked by justice beyond the law, by equality
and freedom beyond fraternity, by an infinite dissymmetry beyond equality, by a
friendship beyond the paternalism of the canonical concept of friendship that has
contracted democracy to something less than it is, by a friendship which can only
be measured by the measurelessness of its gift (p. 63).
Of course, even if we could agree that a definitive version of something can exist,
the question regarding its components in and out of time still remains. Indeed, this
paradox which surrounds the creation of art as a finished product is the reason why those
in improvisational theatre and jazz who pursue creativity seem to place a greater
emphasis on the process and not the product. Nachmanovitch (1990) refers to the German
word funktionslust, and uses its meaning-the pleasure of doing- to bolster his notion of
creativity: “...Creativity exists in the searching even more than the finding or being
found...” (p. 45). Moreover, despite coming from a different theoretical framework
Lacoue-Labarthe (1994) would seem to agree as he writes that, “... the essence of
mimesis is not imitation, but production ‘in its broadest sense’...” (p. 80). But production
does not occur in a vacuum, and this is why the improv performer or jazz player often
finds himself in the guise of Echo, repeating musical phrases or verbal catch-phrases,
imitating caricatures, or attempting to embody another personae. These are the
‘prescriptions’ and ‘stereotypical discourse’ spoken of earlier by Derrida. It is why
improvisation in its purest sense is impossible. I would argue, however, that
improvisation can still be created despite the fact that the materials at our disposal are
often the hand-me-downs of those who came before. Great jazz music and brilliant
improvisational scenes have been created by using the ingredients of a dominant
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discourse (as Armstrong did with his brilliant obbligato to West End Blues) and more
often than not these occur because of the tasteful application and reappropriation of the
ingredients of that discourse. Of course the problem is who decides what is tasteful or
appropriate for the moment. In the translator’s preface to Musica Ficta (1994), Felicia
McCarren tells an anecdote of a time when Lacoue-Labarthe attended one of the last
concerts given by the jazz trumpeter, Miles Davis in Paris. Miles had stopped mid-phrase
to utter an expletive. While most of the audience interpreted the expletive as non-musical
and an interruption to the concert, Lacoue-Labarthe offered a different explanation: “He
was working,” (p. xiv) explained Lacoue-Labarthe. For Lacoue-Labarthe, Davis was
attempting to continue his creation and the fact that he looked outside the accepted
musical lexicon shows the extreme effort Davis puts in his work (while also serving as a
demonstration of how Lacoue-Labarthe understands language and the reading of words
and musical notes as text). It is possible that Lacoue-Labarthe would be less forthcoming
with praise had a lesser musician without the reputation or technique of Davis attempted
the same thing. Indeed, there can be no pleasure in doing if the technique isn’t there to
some degree. Give an untrained artist the materials to create and you will get a
cacophonous mess.
“To create, we need both technique and freedom from technique...we practice
until our skills become unconscious” (Nachmanovitch, 1990, p. 73). One of the
fundamental tenets of improv is that you have to learn the rules before you can break
them. Once again you have to behave like Echo for a while at least until you can begin to
discover your own voice. For most this process of discovery comes easier within the
practice halls of a theatrical improv class. At some point everyone can speak and attempt
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to create a spontaneous conversation. Not surprisingly, most scenes by beginning improv
players attempt to recreate the dialogue and action from popular culture but eventually
become cacophonous. At this point the inexperienced player panics and seeks a quick exit
or end to this type of scene. Experienced players fear cacophony less and the best use it
to create some truly wonderful scenes. In contrast inexperienced players view cacophony
as something to be avoided so they use more of the bits and pieces that they have
observed in the past which have worked. Those attempting to create music, however, face
an additional challenge since the inner workings of the instrument must be learned before
an echo of a voice let alone an original voice can emerge, and thus entails more practice
before a technique can become second nature let alone be discarded. Once technique
becomes second nature the player is able to practice improvisation. This improvisation
can take many forms: “...Improvising jazz solos does not consist mainly in inventing new
licks, but in stringing together learned licks and references in new and appropriate
combinations...”(Belgrad, 1998, p. 180). The inventiveness of the artist comes out in the
overall gestalt. At times the creation of a new riff is aided by the intentional or
unintentional use of a “mistake”: a wrong note played and later “justified” is central to
spontaneous jazz collaboration. In improvisational theatre, “...Players say that the best
scenes often result from unexpected slips that are inventively justified” (Seham, 2001, p.
52). These “mistakes” come from a variety of places but I would argue are crucial to the
creation of improvisation.
One of the risks of course in pursuing mistakes is the well-founded fear that the
player will be unable to justify it and make it fit as if it was intentional. When the process
is viewed solely as a means to a finished product players of both genres are less likely to
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take risks. They remain Echo, safe and secure, producing nothing new. Bebop jazz of the
1940s was a conscious decision by the musicians to re-appropriate their music from white
bands performing for white audiences. These musicians were willing to forget about the
finished product so they could partake in the funktionslust that might lead to new things.
“...In bebop the spontaneous articulation of new musical ideas was valued above
precision or accuracy...” (Belgrad, 1998, p. 187). Ironically, by the mid-1950s, bebop
became codified as the norm for jazz music, yet fortunately most of the major players
refused to rest and continued to make new music-sometimes to the chagrin of some
critics, musicians, or the public who- once they figure out what they like- want more of
the same. The public didn’t understand that their gluttony would eventually lead to the
stultification of the music they love. Fortunately, musicians like Ornette Coleman were
willing to endure the criticism of the critics, public, and even some fellow musicians.
Coleman’s critics saw in his music a repudiation of all that had come before except for
those who saw in the new music the same spirit that initially filled early be-bop.
“Coleman is consistent in eliminating the bonds of functional harmony and divisions into
bar –patterns. But he holds fast to what could be called the traditional superstructure: the
schematic order of theme, solo improvisation and theme, with the tempo remaining
constant” (Jost, 1981, p. 139). Coleman’s decision to retain some of the Echo suggests
that creativity can exist even while using the ingredients of a previous thing. True, it’s not
improvisation in the sense that Derrida hopes for, but perhaps it’s the best we can do.
Coleman had to play the music the way he heard it. Or to put it another way he could
only be honest about the music he was creating if he was honest and accurate in his
musical description of himself, the self, fighting for a place to insert his own voice. But
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what is this self? “It is, as we habitually, and lazily say, a matter of influence! But stated
more rigorously, mimesis is the effect of the typo-graphy and... of the fundamental
‘insemination’ which at bottom defines the essence of the paideia ... and by which we
call the ‘subject’...”(Lacoue-Labarthe, 1994, p. 127). Lacoue-Labarthe seems to imply
that Coleman must be more than simply the embodiment of everything that has
influenced him musical or non-musical since at every point in Coleman’s creation of
music he has a choice. And what makes Coleman special is the fact that he can use his
music to give voice to this phenomenon, that is to say, to communicate all that he is. It is
also apparent that when another musician tries to play like Coleman he inevitably fails or
at best give a superficial rendering, since he are not being true to his self. Since we all
change, the self must too and this is why music and theatre, if it is attempting to speak for
the moment- somewhere between Echo and Narcissus- must continually change too. The
alternative is being a victim of cultural hegemony instead of a player who can fight his
way out of it and as De Certeau (1984) says “make do.”
Product
Ultimately all who aspire to produce art, let alone great art, must wrestle
with the dilemma of their relationship to tradition and the process by which they produce
that art. Some like Nachmanovitch (1990) see spontaneous production as better able to
respond to that tradition while simultaneously producing something new and wonderful.
They privilege spontaneity as better able to produce or uncover a greater truth. As it turns
out this is not the case. Part of the problem is that true spontaneity, often contains a
mixture of the new and the old. An additional problem occurs when the individual self
attempts to respond to tradition: the self is either ignored and tradition continues; or the
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self is privileged to the point where tradition is ignored. For example, in her study of
improvisational theater over the past half-century Amy Seham (2001) poses one central
question: “... The question must be asked: when the group works as one mind, whose
mind is it? How does the seeming rightness, inevitability, and spontaneity of improv
mask the unmarked power of hegemony” (p. 65)? Specifically, she wonders why gender
stereotypes were promoted by improvisation rather than challenged by it. Seham is
disappointed that the promise of improvisation as it was understood informally by its
players as a greater path to truth went unfulfilled as improvisation became popular and
therefore a marketable commodity in the 1980s. Earlier in this work I offered an
explanation to Seham’s question through the work of Jacques Rancière (2009) and Peter
Appelbaum (2013). A different explanation to her question can be found within one of
the rules of improvisation itself-never deny. A player should never deny the reality of the
scene. Instead, they are taught to take whatever has been created before and add
something to it. It is always “yes and” not “yes but.” Those two phrases represent one of
the central tenets of improvisation and also reveal one of its major weaknesses, since
denial was understood as not refuting what came before. In actuality, as a player I was
often part of heated discussions revolving around the definition of denial. Some of the
other players and I preferred another definition of denial. We saw it as a denying of the
reality of the scene. And yet, given the different gazes by the players on that nascent
scene it should have been expected that there would be different interpretations of that
reality. Accordingly, this definition created contention, but not actual denial. Still,
perhaps the more important reason that improvisational theater nurtured rather than
challenged gender stereotypes, or race relations, for example, is that the improv player is
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tapping into tainted reserves. In effect, they are drinking from a bad well. Seham (2001)
writes that, “... most improv-comedy practice demonstrates that spontaneous group
creation usually taps into reserves of shared references, received truth, and common
knowledge...” (p. xxi). It would seem that the proper relationship to tradition is to
interrogate it and evaluate it and try to figure out what to keep and what to throw out.
But how does one decide what to keep and what to throw out? In a sense this question is
an epistemological problem. Csikszentmihalyi and Rich (1997) write that, “…it is
impossible to separate creativity from persuasion…” (p. 46). To be sure the power to
persuade is a complex phenomenon. But I would argue that the ability of an actor or
musician to persuade an audience or fellow player to accept a new idea is directly related
to that player’s style. Style deals with tradition and the new delicately in the same way a
chef uses ingredients. Just the right amount and you have the perfect dish of gumbo. But
make even the slightest error and the sublime is gone. Style is measured and extreme. But
the practitioners who have style know when the time is right for one or the other. Jackson
Pollack had style. Sandy Koufax had style. Charlie Parker had style. George Carlin had
style. Style understands tradition and knows the present. It lives in the moment and
beyond the moment. Style has an encyclopedic memory and an astute insight into the
present. And those who are paying attention know style when they see it. This is the point
when they can be persuaded to accept something new and thus change the traditions they
keep with them. But of course not everyone is paying attention. Some audiences and
performers are too deeply connected to a canon they view as immutable. And once that
issue is settled will the performers have the fortitude to withstand the criticisms and
hostility when they challenge that canon? Lenny Bruce had style and was able to
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persuade many to follow him. But not everyone was persuaded. “…what we call
creativity is a phenomenon that is constructed through an interaction between producer
and audience. Creativity is not the product of single individuals, but of social systems
making judgments’ about individuals’ products” (Csikszentmihalyi and Rich, 1997, p.
45-46). Ultimately, his critics killed him, albeit indirectly.
Far too often and out of necessity most improv players use the audience as a
barometer of what is good or what is bad. Thus, when they laugh or seem to like what's
going on in the scene -regardless of whether or not that scene is promoting gender
stereotypes or racial prejudice- more than likely the improv players will continue doing
whatever has pleased the audience up to that point. Moreover, when a majority of
reference points is bad popular culture that is accepted at face value, in a literal sense, the
only product that can be produced, the only communication that could take place between
player and audience, is a perpetuation of the hegemony that lurks within those reference
points.
Bad ingredients produce bad results. Sometimes the ingredients are an uninterrogated popular culture; sometimes it is a repudiation of the Self. In his discussion
on the impact of Mahler on the French poet Mallarme Lacoue-Labarthe (1994) writes,”...
thus defined it implies the ‘elocutionary disappearance of the poet.’ It is a work without
subject...” (p. 76). Lacoue-Labarthe is concerned of course with the battle between the
spoken words of the poet and the impact of music, each vying for communicative
supremacy. But he is also concerned with an interesting definition of true art. LacoueLabarthe seems to argue that for true art to appear the artist must in effect disappear in
some type of structure or in Heidegger's (2001) case a national aesthetic so overpowering
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and saturated that any addition of the self would seem superfluous. Paradoxically, one is
always striving to create the definitive version of art. But Lacoue-Labarthe (1994) warns
us of the danger that can occur when an artist challenges what is taken for definitive. For
example, he writes in his book on mimesis that, "... the choice of a representative of
mimesis... as being at once everything-and nothing. The phamarkos, individual or
collective, is always a monster..." (p. 116). In this sense Lacoue-Labarthe and Rancière
appear to disagree. Providing some insight, Lacoue-Labarthe (1994) writes that mimesis,
"…can only be (that is, 'be') declination, instability, 'disinstallation'"(p. 82). In his
description of mimesis, Lacoue-Labarthe refers to it as a type of "infinite malleability"(p.
115), which Rancière might declare as infinitely problematic. Some good examples of
this type of malleability lies in the initial bebop music of the 1940s; the free jazz
movement that began in the 1950s; the experiments in improvisation that came out of the
University of Chicago in the 1950s, and some current improvisation that works to both
stay on the margins and comment on mainstream improvisation-to create the “ironic
distance” Caputo (2000) speaks of in his request for a more radical hermeneutics. One of
the more interesting groups is called Improv Everywhere and as their name implies
they've taken what they do improvisationally outside of the traditional indoor venue to
the outdoor stage. They work in and around the New York City area and perform what
they term as "pranks," although what they do is much more than that. Their mission is to
add fun to what they see as a somewhat drab reality and they encourage the general
public, unwittingly of course, to participate in their pranks. One of their pranks was
called "The Best Gig Ever." They found a somewhat talented but unpopular band called
Ghosts of Pasha from Vermont, and found out where they were performing, and sent
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about 50 of their players whom they call "agents" to the concert. These agents responded
enthusiastically to all the songs and even memorized most of the lyrics, sang along, even
made requests. Had they not attended this concert at best the audience would've
numbered perhaps two or three people. While their intention was to provide the band
with the best concert experience they have ever had things took an unexpected turn when
the band found out that the whole thing was contrived. They were angered rather than
pleased and saw what Improv Everywhere did as a continuation of the marginalization
that was so much of the band members' childhood and indicative of the bands present
problems. In a sense pretending to be fans of the band only highlighted the fact that the
band lacked a large fan base. Improv Everywhere became that annoying kid from high
school, who exists to make fun of the weak, open and sensitive. And in some way Improv
Everywhere became analogous to the well-intentioned curriculum theorist, who in the
end reproduced the very thing he was fighting against. Not all of Improv Everywhere's
pranks turned out this way but what happened with the Ghosts of Pasha is clearly a
cautionary tale of what can happen when risk and the pursuit of infinite malleability,
despite the best of intentions, collide.
The reason that some jazz music is so good at promoting a seemingly less harmful
form of infinite malleability is because jazz music is only indirectly confrontational
unlike the previously mentioned efforts by Improv Everywhere. It is also because of what
lies within the raison d'être of jazz itself: never repeat what's already been done. This
ethos prevents humankind’s inclination toward definitive versions of art in any form.
Jazz always attempts to be about what's coming next, not what's happened before. Yet, it
is able to at times achieve this without completely renouncing tradition. In this manner
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the jazz tradition specifically and improvisation in general appear close to Derrida’s
version of improvisation as a possible impossibility. Improvisational jazz dwells
somewhere between Echo and Narcissus. Between traditions, as it has been defined by
the gatekeepers and something unique- a uniqueness that can’t exist because in reality
tradition’s hold is never completely relinquished. Perhaps jazz is to be applauded for
how it balances its relationship between the present and the past and also the way in
which it is able to find the sacred within the profane within the context of a secular
world? Indeed, in his writings on black culture Michael Eric Dyson (2004) makes an
important point: "... with black creative cultures, it's always about the great next... the
secular telos that pulls black America forward, even as we reappropriate what has been
appropriated and generate the next form of creativity..."(p. 206). For example, in the
1950s, jazz tenor saxophonist Sonny Rollins grew increasingly dissatisfied with himself
and the state of jazz in general. He dropped out of the music scene, cleaned up his
addiction to heroin, and worked as a janitor. He only got back into the music scene when
he felt he had something new to say. Another interpretation of this event is that Rollins
figured out a way to balance his own voice against jazz tradition-to find that ironic
distance. In this regard Jost (1981) writes: "Rollins takes the opposite path [of Ornette
Coleman]. While the inner structures of his music, their melodic and harmonic content,
are largely in line with the laws of Fifties' jazz, the overall form of his pieces is
permanently open to spontaneous alteration"(p. 139).
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CHAPTER 4
YOU SHOULDN’T NEED A WEATHERMAN TO KNOW WHICH WAY THE WIND
BLOWS: POPULAR CULTURE AND IMPROVISATION
During the Middle Ages as both feudalism and theocracy waned, and played less
of a part in most people's lives, local folk traditions began to blossom. As Bakhtin (1984)
describes these folk traditions he writes, “… The cultural folk humor that had been
shaped during many centuries and that had defended the people's creativity in nonofficial forms, in verbal expression or spectacle, could now rise to the high level of
literature and ideology and fertilize it…”(p. 72). The richness and rawness of these folk
traditions would ignite and provide the material for the “high art” most closely associated
with the Renaissance; however this is not the only reason for their importance. For
Bakhtin, these folk traditions entertained, nurtured individual and group identity, and
perhaps, even provided an outlet for political and other types of authoritarian discontent.
Yet this creative outlet was changed by the industrial and post-industrial revolution. Art
and play in their many forms became commodified and discontent became, at times
constrained within the grooves of a pop song. The industrial revolution created an
epistemology of certainty, while temporarily taking the creative process out of the hands
of the very people who needed to participate in that creative process. Unfortunately, this
certainty also promoted the rigid distinctions between “high art” and “low art”, “experts”
and “amateurs” keeping them separate and thus robbing each of their ability to influence
the other. Moreover, as Lyotard (1984) has written in his essay on the postmodern
condition: “…the central question is becoming who will have access to the information
these machines must have in storage to guarantee that the right decisions are made.
Access to data is…the prerogative of experts of all stripes. The ruling class is and will
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continue to be the class of decision makers…” (p. 14). Keeping the “experts” at bay,
placing them in their ivory towers, and forcing them to be financially accountable to the
major corporations is as destructive to them as it is to the people who lack not only the
access these experts possess but the means to become an “expert”. I would suggest that a
lack of access to information in the post-industrial age prevents a critical analysis of the
processes and products of the postmodern era while also maintaining that epistemology
of certainty mentioned earlier.
To be sure it is problematic to describe art as “high” or “low”. Art as both product
and process is fluid and it is difficult to pinpoint where elements that were once
considered “low” first began to influence art considered “high” and vice versa. For now, I
will continue to explore two aesthetic experiences, jazz music and improvisational
comedy, in an attempt to flesh out their connection to popular culture, and their ability to
serve as a model for praxis. As I have mentioned, my reasons for this choice are personal
and academic. For years I performed improvisational comedy in the evening while
teaching history at a public high school during the day. At my day job I am part of a rigid
hierarchy, a worker on an assembly line. My job is to dispense information –certified by
“experts at the top”- to students who are only differentiated in their ability to soak in that
information. At night I was part of an alleged ensemble of comedic performers. Our
primary task was to make the audience laugh. The latitude in which we went about this
task and the necessary interaction that took place between the players and the audience
created an aesthetic experience very different from my day job. Instead of suffering from
the literalness associated with education in the public schools, the players and audience
were part of a collective with the potential to gain experience in and the expectation of
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evaluation, interpretation, and ironic distance. And for better and worse much of our
fodder for play came from popular culture. What is important in the relationship between
popular culture, the players, and audience? When we were at our best the players and
audience were able to transform even the most insipid elements from popular culture. At
our worst we simply recreated the banality that comprises most popular culture. We as
consumers of popular culture became consumed by it. In contrast to a place such as
Disneyland, an icon of popular culture, where “…amusement is the commodified
negation of play” (Kuenz, J., Willis, S., Waldrep, S., & Fish, S. 1995, p.185), when we
were at our best, the players and audience at those improvisational performances were,
engaged in play in its fullest sense, creating our own amusement, and at times,
transforming the banal to entertainment of the highest order, but in reality what we
created went beyond mere entertainment. Indeed, this type of play-a serious play- is very
different form the type usually associated with toys or amusements such as Disneyland,
for these represent a false type of play. In this sense, Roland Barthes (1972) writes, “…
Faced with this world of faithful and complicated objects, the child can only identify
himself as owner, as user, never as creator; he does not invent the world, he uses it: there
are, prepared for him, actions without adventure, without wonder, without joy”(p 53-54).
I bring up Barthes’ condemnation of toys and others and my condemnation of
amusements such as Disneyland in order to suggest that what we need are not
amusements or toys ready made for us that limit our interaction and thus our ability to be
part of the world. Instead, we need to overcome the alienation that comes with our
commodified culture. To do that we need an aesthetic experience that can help us become
part of the world; an experience that will enable us to move beyond that Cartesian split
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between mind and body; an experience that will make us present; not present as in the
response to a roll call, but present in the world. This type of presence will help us
challenge the notion of “expert” and create a knowledge base that is fluid, and openended. It will help us cultivate an attitude that gives us the freedom to deviate, fluidity,
and innovation.
I would argue that a site for us to gain this presence is in the realm of popular
culture, while keeping in mind that popular culture is not homogeneous; its products exist
at the margins and the mainstream. Yet, it is important that we keep an eye and an ear on
both for as cultural scholar Stuart Hall (1996) has reminded us, “…It is for this reason
that what is socially peripheral is so frequently symbolically central…” (p. 471). When
jazz music began, for example, its creators were clearly on the periphery of American
society, yet what they proposed was critical for the development of our nation. Many
writers on jazz music have commented how this original music, composed of an amalgam
of cultural influences, created an aesthetic that enabled those who made and listened to
this music, to understand and at times challenge their place in American society. For
those in the mainstream who would listen could be found an important critique. Indeed,
it is not a coincidence that when jazz music first became codified in the 1920’s Jim Crow
and Klan membership were at their height.
It would seem paradoxical that a culture industry, tainted by unequal power
relationships, sexism, racism, consumerism, homophobia, etc., could serve as a site for
praxis. Indeed, much has been written by critics of the culture industry, Adorno (2002)
and more recently Jacques Attali (1999), which link the aforementioned problems within
that culture industry. Still, in his study of the Frankfurt School, Martin Jay (1973)
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informs us that unlike Adorno and Horkheimer who dismissed popular culture,
“…Kracauer was optimistic about the disruptive, oppositional potential in film, whose
realistic capacities he particularly praised. As an avant-gardest in Burger’s sense, he was
highly sympathetic to the threat this new mass medium posed to the aesthetic hierarchies
of traditional culture…” (p. 373). And of course there is Walter Benjamin (2007), who in
his famous essay on Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction argued that some of the
art of the modern era had the ability to destroy the “aura” surrounding “high” art and thus
challenge the destructive hegemony previously noted. It is well known of Adorno’s
disdain for popular culture, preferring the “high art” of Berg, Schoenberg, or Hindemith.
I would argue, however, that the type of praxis Adorno finds in the compositions by
Berg, for example and the kind of praxis Attali sought but did not find in free jazz can be
found in some of our popular culture and the way in which some jazz musicians and
improvisational theatre players incorporate that material. The important point to note here
is that in order to achieve this praxis one must exert effort. There are no nuggets of
universal truth waiting to be scooped up and applied like a balm without the necessary
interpretation and mediation. This is why much of the vitality of jazz music is due in
part to the musician’s willingness to incorporate elements from popular culture and her
ability to take full advantage of the moment in which that music is created, but more on
that later.
What are the advantages of popular culture as a site for praxis? Jason Earle (2000)
has written that for one thing, “…Popular culture texts provide the dominant means of
communicating knowledge to the general public in a postmodern society…” (p. 121).
The issue of course is how these texts are received and/or incorporated into new aesthetic
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products. In other words, are they taken uncritically, within a non-aporetic stance thereby
perpetuating the very problems mentioned at the top of this essay or are they processed
with an ironic distance? Are they merely a diversion from the struggles of daily life or a
site where those problems can be critically assessed? In their introduction to a collection
of essays that find value in popular culture yet acknowledge its ambiguities, Toby Daspit
and John Weaver (2000) have written, “…We view all popular culture texts as inscribed
within a history and culture that is shaped by capitalism, consumerism, choice ideologies,
white supremacy, sexism, and homophobia…”(p. xxvii). In other words, all cultural texts
are in part artifacts from a society where power is unevenly held. That is except for the
ones touted as free of those maladies by Adorno. Assuming he is correct about his highly
praised art, Adorno would prefer to spend time with cultural artifacts that contain within
them a dialectic that mediates society’s ills. Instead, popular culture requires the
participant to engage with that text and provide the critique from outside of that popular
text. As the great jazz bassist and composer Charles Mingus has stated, “You have to
improvise on something.” Thus, why not improvise on a text that reaches more people
and leaves open room for iteration? Instead of the wholesale denunciation of popular
culture by the Frankfurt School and those who maintain a curatorial aspect of culture,
instead of a narrow-minded academic elite that rigidly adheres to an established canon, I
propose that we interrogate popular culture as an addition to the established canon, with
the hope of eventually tweaking that canon and in some cases blowing it up. I further
suggest that improvisational comedy, as created and performed in the latter half of the
twentieth century, and jazz music, from its inception at the beginning of the twentieth
century through free jazz, are two aesthetic models that can demonstrate the advantages
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of interacting with popular culture, while simultaneously serving as a product of popular
culture, both at the margins and at the mainstream. The salient feature of improvisational
comedy and jazz music is the mandate within each not to repeat what has gone before. In
this way jazz music and improvisational comedy avoids the risk of maintaining an
established canon (despite the fact that there are museum curators within each) and thus
create an epistemology that promotes one way of doing things.
Jason Earle (2000) points out another advantage of interrogating popular culture
instead of texts that promote only an empirical approach when he writes:
Instructional research texts seek to embody an instrumental rationality that is
oriented towards focusing on the means rather than a discussion of valued future
ends…a key feature of the entertainment-oriented texts of popular culture are that
they offer ‘the image of something better to escape into, or something that we
want deeply that our day to day lives [doesn’t] provide’ (p. 127).
The instrumental rationality Earle speaks of is certainly desirable to those who view
educators as neutral dispensers of objective information that is timeless in its quality and
truth quotient. Like many in Curriculum studies, Earle is frustrated with a pedagogy that
takes it for granted that we all want the same objectives and all we really need is a tried
and true method to get us there. Is it possible for us to engage with these “entertainment
oriented texts” and avoid becoming “technologically enframed” (Heidegger 1977, p. 144)
as Heidegger has previously warned? In regards to a critical musicality that would
promote the kind of criticality this essay is partially focused on, Heidegger (1977) seems
to imply the possibility as long as those who engage with the music “engage with
‘decisive confrontation’ in its reflection upon technology” (p. 144). Heidegger's notion of
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decisive confrontation as a means of escaping from the pitfalls of instrumentalism can be
realized within some of the best of popular culture as we examine the way in which that
popular culture had been created and also because of what popular culture represents: at
its best popular culture can promote a collective intelligence. This collective intelligence
is a consequence of several aspects of popular culture: the first is its ability to shock. The
shock could be the result of vulgarity, or it could be the result of what Bakhtin (1984) has
described as the grotesque. Prominent British theater director Peter Brook (2008) has
described one of the primary advantages of shocking both the actor and the spectator. He
argues that it creates within the actor and the spectator a greater awareness of the instant
as he writes, “… As shocks and surprises make a dent in the spectator's reflections, so
that he is suddenly more open, more alert, more awake, the possibility and the
responsibility arise from onlooker and performer alike. The instant must be used, but
how, what for” (p 56)? It would seem that Brook is using what Rancière (2009) refers to
as an “intricate dramaturgy of sin and redemption” (p. 7). Rancière is chiding the
producer of this type of theatre and likens it to the attempt made by the “schoolmaster”
who uses a similar approach to reduce the distance between himself, the enlightened one,
and the “ignoramus.” Indeed, Rancière is concerned with the collective intelligence of the
spectators, however he disagrees with the theatrical producer or writer, for example, who
would argue that they can change the level of that collective intelligence by simply
exposing the ignorant audience to an enlightened play. He writes, “…The distance the
ignoramus has to cover is not the gulf between her ignorance and the schoolmaster’s
knowledge. It is simply the path from what she already knows to what she does not yet
know, but which she can learn just as she has learnt the rest…” (Rancière, 2009, p. 10-
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11). Taking Rancière’s argument seriously the instant is perhaps best attended to by an
improvisational approach, because at that moment all who are active bring forth their
knowledge, life experiences, and their individual take on the situation, without the
mediation of the “schoolmaster.” But patience is required. And for those who claim a
moral imperative, patience is at times in short supply. Indeed, to continue the Rancièrian
metaphor he writes further that the schoolmaster, “…does not teach his pupils his
knowledge, but orders them to venture into the forest of things and signs, to say what
they have seen and what they think of what they have seen… (2009, p. 11) For in that
moment, when they are at their best, are small versions of the utopias sought by the
previously mentioned members of the Frankfurt School, and Bakhtin for example. To be
sure the moment is often squandered or not completely perceived and used. Perhaps the
best we can hope for is a brief respite from the alienation of a commodified culture?
Daspit and Weaver (2000) remind us of an important point made by Dick Hebdige: “…
As Hebdige reveals counter cultures or subcultures form ‘up in the space between
surveillance and the evasion of surveillance’ and are neither simply affirmation or
refusal, neither ‘commercial exploitation nor genuine revolt’” (p xxi). Indeed, in this
sense, we need to reevaluate the thought that marginalized or dominant groups are
homogeneous and separate. And we must reexamine the taken for granted notion that
subversion only exists in the margins, and the more important likelihood that it doesn’t
exist at all. For example De Certeau (1984) writes that
Marginality is today no longer limited to minority groups, but is rather massive
and pervasive; this cultural activity of the non-producers of culture, an activity
that is unsigned, unreadable, and unsymbolized, remains the only one possible for
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all those who nevertheless buy and pay for the showy products through which a
productivist economy articulates itself. Marginality is becoming universal. A
marginal group has now become the silent majority (p. xvii).
The Creative Moment
Since I am concerned with the possibility of the purely spontaneous moment
within the nascent creative moment, it might be of some value to examine a sub-genre in
jazz that many who play and write about it claim to find the most spontaneity. In my
research I’ve encountered many examples of the seemingly liberating characteristics of
free jazz by reading interviews of jazz musicians who are part of the free jazz movement
(1993). One common theme seems to be the incorporation of different musical genres- a
pastiche, to borrow a term from Frederic Jameson- into ideomatic jazz structures ( the
jazz canon) that seem to be an attempt to construct the “plane of immanence” referred to
by Deleuze and Guattari (1994) . And as I read about some of the best aspects of popular
culture and improvisational theatre, I find a similarity in the way the players construct
their “plane of immanence” to take advantage of the moment discovered even as parts of
that moment seem to escape them as the players attempt to grab on. Perhaps this immense
difficulty partially explains a fairly well known profane comment from Lou Donaldson,
an alto sax player of the bebop variety who said in the film, Blue Note- A Story of
Modern Jazz (1997), “This shit is hard to play.” And yet with all this hard work there is
still no guarantee the free jazz musician, for example, will create something of value let
alone one that is unencumbered by the boundaries of the culture in which it occurs.
Indeed, the British free jazz musician Evan Parker states in Bailey (1994):
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We were looking to extend the range of timbres available and to balance the
overt virtuosity that was central to our instrumental approach at the time with
another type of playing approach. We wanted some sounds which weren't
associated with instrumental improvisation. (p. 94).
Parker is unique among musicians in that he understands the dilemma posed by a variety
of theorists who study creative moments within an aesthetic practice. Most free jazz
musicians and those in the theatre seem to view art as autonomous. I would argue that
since its inception jazz and theatre, even those that profess to be improvised, are a semiautonomous art.
Indeed, it’s certainly encouraging to read curriculum scholars like Ted Aoki
(2005) , for example, who found in improvisation a way to “…move beyond the hold of
instrumentalism of curriculum implementation” (p. 370). For Aoki the benefits of
improvisation became apparent during the course of a visit from the jazz trumpeter
Bobby Shew. Upon reflecting on that visit Aoki writes,
And why improvisation? I told him that in education, and in curriculum
particularly, under the hold of technological rationality, we have become so
production oriented that the ends – means paradigm a way to do, has become the
way to do, indifferent to differences in the lived world of teachers and students.
Could improvisation be a way to create spaces to allow differences to show
through (p. 368)?
As curriculum scholars like Marla Morris (2009) have commented there needs to
be more analysis of music as part of an arts based inquiry. In her book On Not Being Able
to Play Morris has written, “As against Nietzsche, I suggest that music is not immediate.
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Like other forms of expression, it is a form of mediation that must be processed through
the ear and thought. For some people this processing fails and they suffer from tone
deafness...” (p. 232). What is interesting to me is the different ways in which musicians
and actors experience this mediation. At times it’s a genuine struggle, a race against the
clock because both your fellow players and audience are waiting for you to play the right
note at the right time, right now (and of course variations exist on what that looks or
sounds like). Or say or do something on the stage of improvisational theatre, that if not
capable of justifying the entire scene, is at least capable of making what came before
make sense. In order to hit that note or add just the right thing to that scene requires a lot:
One must be able to tap into the tradition of jazz or theatre, understanding that as a player
you are part of a continuum. While mastery of many of the tenets of that tradition is
required, mastery is not enough. At some point you have to say something new. This is
that rupture in time that Derrida has written about. One must add to the ongoing
conversation, with a statement of sorts that seems to incorporate the past, anticipate the
future, and perhaps briefly occupy a space beyond linear time. In other words there must
be innovation. But if innovation occurs one must be open to the possibility of breaking
with a good bit of that tradition. This is hard. The audience will at times fight you since
some of them are there to hear the same thing that touched them on your record or the last
time they saw you live. Improv players who develop characters, especially those with
signature lines the audience remembers, are thus encouraged to perform those characters,
saying those lines, again and again. This is not to say that there can’t be good work done
with characters that have appeared on the stage before. There can. But for this to happen
there must be continual reassessment and hopefully revelation. And for this to occur (and
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remember you can’t force it) the moment must be understood and realized by players and
audience. This creates a space for revelation, not a guarantee that it will happen. Most of
the time the best one can hope for is a reasonable attempt at getting the craft right. In
almost two decades on the improvisational stage as a player I can remember only a
handful of revelations. They came and went so quickly if you blinked you probably
missed it. The first time one of those wonderful moments happened to me I was still a
relatively new player. I had maybe a year or two of stage work behind me. We were
performing a relatively easy game called “expert panel.” I was one of three “experts”.
The “subjects” of our expertise were given to us by the audience. Another player served
as the host of the show, fielding questions from the audience and guiding the discussion
on stage. While I can’t recall the questions asked or the answers I gave I distinctly
remember feeling completely relaxed. Secure in my character and in my ensemble. We
had each other’s backs! Inexplicably, one of the answers I gave resonated with the
audience and seemed to come out of nowhere. And it was at that moment that I
understood one of the attractions to improvisation- that is the creative moment that seems
to come not from a place of struggle, but rather from a place of calm. It just seems to
flow from you without any effort. Despite this brief revelation my personal struggles on
the improv stage have been frequent. In twenty years of working either directly or
indirectly with improvisational theatre I can only recall a handful of times when the right
words and bodily actions came to me right away. Don’t get me wrong, I’m not suggesting
that the only advantage of improvisation is when it seems to happen with little effort. I
certainly understand, however, the desire by many to be able to create without appearing
to exert so much effort. Perhaps when those things do happen we should think of them as
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happy accidents. And who knows maybe the reason they appear to occur so easily is
because of the struggles that had taken place at an earlier time: A time where the real
work begins.
Krazy Kat
I learned about this comic strip from Gilbert Seldes (1957) who describes it in his
book, The 7 Lively Arts. Seldes has written about popular culture around the same time as
some members of the Frankfurt School were alerting us to the insidious hegemony
contained within that culture. Remarkably, Seldes was able to select an assortment of
“entertainment of a high order” from places not typically associated with art. Moreover,
his selections seem to defy the warnings of the Frankfurt School who prefer only the right
art and tend to find it in the usual places-theatre, painting, opera, and symphonies. George
Herriman conceived Krazy Kat, the comic strip. He was a Creole from New Orleans
whose family left the area shortly after the white authorities declared Creoles to be black
and no longer white. And not wanting to test out the separate but unequal facilities of the
Jim Crow South the Herriman family split to California. Seldes has written that,
“…Krazy Kat, the daily comic strip of George Herriman is, to me, the most amusing and
fantastic and satisfactory work of art produced in America to-day…” (p. 207). I might be
biased but I take Seldes’ suggestions regarding popular culture seriously. His
pronouncements and analysis seems to be right on the mark. But don’t take my word. ee
cummings, Walt Disney, and Bill Watterson who created Calvin and Hobbes cite Krazy
Kat as a major influence on them. I find it interesting that the creator of this comic was an
insider who became an outsider because of the convoluted logic of whites who responded
to modernity through the nostalgia of a racist past. I also find it interesting that this
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masterpiece of a comic was created seemingly by accident. Herriman was working on a
comic called The Family Upstairs (1957) and had some empty space in the panels. Rather
than leave them blank he started drawing some of the characters that would eventually
become the ones in Krazy Kat in the blank spaces of the Family Upstairs. Importantly,
these new characters were not merely there to fill up space. They were a commentary on
the goings on in the Family Upstairs that eventually became so profound they
commanded a strip of their own. I should point out that the Simpsons started in much the
same way: as an ironic commentary to the Tracey Ulman Show. I would suggest that
Herriman, in his creation of Krazy Kat, was doing the same thing great jazz and improv
players do when they play with their material: first they reevaluate then they reveal.
Seldes writes: “The theme is greater than the plot. John Alden Carpenter has pointed out
in the brilliant little forward to his ballet, that Krazy Kat is a combination of Parsifal and
Don Quixote, the perfect fool and the perfect knight. Ignatz is Sancho Panza and, I should
say, Lucifer…” (p. 210-211). And he also states, “…It happens that in America irony and
fantasy are practiced in the major arts by only one or two men, producing high-class
trash; and Mr. Herriman, working in a despised medium, without an atom of
pretentiousness, is day after day producing something essentially fine…” (p. 207).
It is to Herriman’s credit that he was able to produce art of a high order within a
despised medium and it is to Seldes’ (1957) credit that his discerning eye can spot high
art in lowly places like the comic strip and slapstick film: Seldes is careful to differentiate
the slapstick of Buster Keaton, Harold Lloyd, and Charlie Chaplin, the latter of whom he
holds in the highest regard, with slapstick that only bore a superficial resemblance to the
aforementioned artists. In his analysis of Chaplin, Seldes importantly points out that
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when Chaplin began as a player in the Keystone Comedies his talent quickly surpassed
that of his fellow players. Indeed, Seldes (1957) writes,
It was there that he first detached himself from life and began to live in another
world, with a specific rhythm of his own, as if the pulse-beat in him changed and
was twice or half as fast as those who surrounded him. He created then that
trajectory across the screen which is absolutely his own line of movement (p. 3637).
Like the previously mentioned Louis Armstrong, Chaplin honed his many skills through
the kind of careful observation that can only occur because he was able to create a
temporary distance from the goings on around him. Chaplin’s comedic genius, at times
conceived through improvisation, manifested itself as “…the world intruded with all its
natural crassness upon his detached existence…” (Seldes 1957, p. 38). Seldes writes
about Chaplin’s improvisational prowess in one of his earlier films entitled, His Night
Out (p. 38). In one scene, Chaplin and another actor, Ben Turpin, are playing drunk and
expectedly stumbling down the street. Turpin’s character starts acting as policeman and
grabs Chaplin by the collar, yet with no clear destination in sight. At one point, as
Chaplin is still being dragged by Turpin, Chaplin falls flat on the ground. While being
dragged in this position Chaplin reaches out and grabs a daisy and as Seldes writes:
The function of that gesture was to make everything that went before, and
everything that came after, seem funnier; and it succeeded by creating another,
incongruous image out of the picture before our eyes. The entire world, a moment
earlier, had been aslant and distorted and wholly male; it righted itself suddenly
and created a soft idyll of tenderness. Nearly everything of Charlie is in that
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moment, and I know no better way to express its elusive quality than to say that as
I sat watching the film a second time, about two hours later, the repetition of the
gesture came with all the effect of surprise, although I had been wondering
whether he could do it so perfectly again (p. 396).
Seldes argues that Chaplin’s gesture made everything that came before and after funnier.
While I agree, I would also argue that Chaplin’s gesture made everything that came
before seem right and everything after possible. In that one improvisational gesture,
Chaplin became the equivalent of that great jazz musician(s), theatrical improviser(s),
student(s) engaged in the process of creating, or classroom teacher(s), who has listened
and incorporated and understood everything that has come before and accurately
responded to it as the perfect ensemble player, aware of and part of that nascent moment
of creation. In this way Chaplin’s gesture validates everything that has been done in the
film up to that point, even the “mistakes,” and sets up the rest of the film’s successful
drama to come.
Perhaps it is possible to avoid the complicated elitism of Adorno or for a more
recent example, the narrow-minded elitism of Wynton Marsalis, the director of the
Lincoln Center Jazz Orchestra, when it comes to expanding the scope of a particular
artistic medium. No one working in the early twentieth century could have imagined that
“entertainment of the highest order” could have emerged from the lowly comic strip or
the Keystone Comedies. Like much of popular culture most of it is at best mildly
entertaining preferring instead to reaffirm and thus reify traditional notions of gender
relations, heteronormativity, and white reign, for example. When I first became aware of
improvisational theatre I had high hopes. We were part of a talented ensemble and we
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had an audience that was willing to pay to see us three nights a week. Admittedly most of
the players overlooked the political aspect of their work and instead focused on
improving as a comedic player. And that meant for many jockeying for position on the
stage to see who could get to the funny first and most often. In other words the audience
was there to see comedic improv and the players would try their best not to disappoint.
For whatever reason, perhaps my background in history, or a smattering of political
protests, I became aware that we could also use our performances as a platform to make a
point. For example, at times any scene was automatically funny because it contained a
flamboyant gay male character. We were laughing at him as the audience seemed to
enjoy their reaffirmation of heteronormativity. But occasionally, the player on stage and
probably the audience as well were able to interrogate that notion so the gay character
was no longer the punch line of the joke. Unfortunately, those occasions were rare. Why
is this so? In her book, whose improv is it anyway? beyond second city, (2001) Amy
Seham studied the last half-century worth of improv to discover why something with the
potential to be so liberating became so oppressive. She was especially concerned that the
few women who were able to garner stage time more often than not wound up reifying
traditional gender roles rather than shattering them as she though they would.
More often than not female improvisers create scenes that reinforce traditional
gender stereotypes. For those who challenge this position it… is considered
inappropriate to the agreement based work at improv Olympic and is certainly
seen as an inhibitor to the collective achievements and organic truths of the zone.
Yet any real challenge to society and status quo requires conscious thought and
the deconstruction of normative values (p.68).
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In other words if a female player wishes to challenge traditional gender
stereotypes, for example, she would not only have to go against an audience that
seemingly approves of the stereotypes but against her fellow players on stage. She would
have to deny the intentions of the group. This of course cannot happen since the primary
rule of improvisation is to never deny. In other words, the female improviser was coerced
by consensus as to how to mold a character that adheres to accepted norms. A second
reason Seham found for the reinforcement of traditional gender roles came when she
investigated the common source of knowledge for players and audience: “… Because
popular culture is the source of most improviser’s references, these stereotypes are
repeated and revalidated by audience laughter and recognition…” (p. 103). For most
improvisers laughter is the ultimate goal. And to reference Heidegger, the source of that
laughter has been kept in stored reserve waiting to be unleashed at the right moment. Part
of the problem is the audience and player’s limited knowledge base. This is why in all my
time on stage our best show was in front of a Mensa convention. My least favorite show
was performed in front of five hundred drunken Shriners and their stripper dates. But in
each case where nothing wonderful happens in front of a general audience, both the
players and the audience were either unwilling or unable to move beyond the classic
cultural touchstones. Unlike Gilbert Seldes, they were unable to choose wisely because
they were too willing to allow others to choose for them.
Flawed Mythologies: The Spectator and the Public Sphere
Contemporary mythologies have let us down and we are partially to blame.
Instead of accepting, working with, or creating the modern equivalents of ancient
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mythologies or medieval festivals- with their complex ambiguities and paradoxical
contradictions- contemporary society has mostly squandered their opportunity to
understand their experience and shape their society for the better. To be sure there are
many forces at work that have created this condition. Much of the blame can be placed in
the sphere of corporate America and the unholy alliance they have forged with the mass
media. Yet, part of the blame rests with us. Our fears and desires foreground some
mythologies or parts of mythologies, at the expense of others and cause us to confuse the
literal with the symbolic. In turn, our rigid adherence to these flawed mythologies
nurtures irrationality and stupidity at the expense of reason and fact. For example in his
examination of creationism, intelligent design, and evolution, Kenneth Miller (1999)
writes: “Membership in any number of creationist organizations required the applicants
to sign a statement attesting to the literal, historical truth of Scripture. A large chunk of
their time and effort was devoted to defending the biblical account of creation, and even
today creationists lead boat trips down the Grand Canyon of the Colorado...” (p. 40).
And while we are willing to participate and accept symbolic mythologies as the literal
truth most of us are unwilling to participate in and form the mythologies that make up our
everyday experiences.
For now I will discuss the role of the mythic. I will also discuss the mythic
component of cult phenomenon The Rocky Horror Picture Show and briefly discuss the
phenomenon of fan culture. These topics certainly merit individual attention. I lump them
together because they represent an attempt-albeit flawed- by people to mold their own
mythologies rather than accept the ones that have been mass produced for them.
Unfortunately, these sparse attempts at liberation will fail to unseat traditional norms or
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offer a better alternative. Perhaps this is why Grossberg asks, during his discussion with
philosopher Stuart Hall (1996), “...how is it that the very freedom of civil and cultural
institutions from direct political intervention results in the rearticulation of the already
dominant structures of meaning and power” (p. 161)? Hall’s theory of popular culture is
positioned somewhere between orthodox Marxism and Structuralism (Post). Indeed, his
theories provide a reasonable explanation as to how the spectator winds up relinquishing
his dialogic responsibilities so that he may fulfill the needs of industrial and postindustrial corporate culture.
It wasn’t always like this. Prior to the industrial revolution and the bourgeois
culture that followed, people participated in the creation, distribution, and reception of
their own stories and public festivals. “Human beings used to be influenced primarily by
the stories of our particular tribe or community, not by the stories that are mass produced
and market driven...”(Kilbourne, 2002, p. 56). These stories and festivals had a direct
connection to the needs, fears, and uncertainties of a tribe or community. While they
offered no guarantee of a solution to a variety of problems, or an easy explanation of their
experience, the complexity and inherent contradictions of these stories and festivals had
the potential to disturb the status quo (generally a good thing) and create the conditions
for a better alternative. For example in Europe, during the waning years of the Middle
Ages feudalism lost its authority to politically organize society in favor of monarchism
(granted, it is debatable whether or not monarchism was an improvement), the political
status quo was disrupted by the public and unofficial festival, and the conditions were
produced for the emergence of the Renaissance and the de-legitimation of feudalism.
“...The marketplace feast opposed the protective, timeless stability, the unchanging
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established order and ideology, and stressed the element of change and renewal”
(Bakhtin, 1984, p. 81). Unfortunately, the market place feast was unable to satisfy the
needs and fears of Medieval Europe. Death from war or plague informed their needs of
survival in the here and now and the afterlife. These needs were ultimately filled by the
Church and Monarchy. Clearly, disrupting the status quo and providing a reasonable
alternative are two very different things.
Still, the marketplace feast and the carnivalesque atmosphere that ensued was an
important part of medieval society because for better or worse it was the honest
expression of people living in medieval society. Gilbert Seldes (1957), while writing
about the arts of the early 20th century, also stressed the honest expression of people and
in fact was concerned that, “...the ‘intellectual's’ appreciation of the popular artist might
make him, in turn try to win the favor of the intellectuals and fatally deprive him of the
common touch...” (p. 93). Indeed, for Bakhtin (1984):
The carnivalesque crowd in the marketplace or in the streets is not merely a
crowd. It is the people as a whole, but organized in their own way, the way of the
people. It is outside of and contrary to all existing forms of the coercive
socioeconomic and political organization, which is suspended for the time of the
festivity (p. 255).
The festival was a way to briefly experience life unfettered, apart from the rules of
society. It combined elements of the sacred and the profane. And yes it wasn’t always
pretty. Thus an official response to the ugly side of life was to ignore it, repress it and try
to contain it, re-direct its energies, or chalk it up to the work of the Devil. Clearly a more
sophisticated analysis is needed since “...The essence of the grotesque is precisely to
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present a contradictory and double-faced fullness of life...” Bakhtin, 1984, p. 62). How
are we to truly understand who and what we really are if we refuse to acknowledge all
that we are capable of, both good and bad?
As the modern era ushered in new forms of mechanical reproduction through two
different yet similar mediums-film and television- the potential to create more complex
mythologies increased. Ideally, these mythologies would forge a powerful partnership
between “spectator” and “story.” The modern myth brings to the table unique visual and
aural components, each with the ability to seduce, alter time, transmit, and inspire an
assortment of values and ideas. Cultural theorists like Benjamin (2007) and Williams
(1989), who wrote about film and television respectively, were hopeful that these
mediums would aid humankind in creating a better society. Indeed, Williams saw
television as one of “...the contemporary tools of the long revolution towards an educated
and participatory democracy...” (p. 151). Television and film would serve the public by
informing, entertaining, and most importantly, forcing a “viewing” that is active. A new
type of public sphere would be created in which the spectator (in our case the television
watcher and filmgoer) and the image (film and television as contemporary mediums for
myths) would inform each other. In other words it was never preordained that television
and film would become the tools and the grease of corporate America. In reference to
television Williams writes, “...the technology of transmission and reception developed
before the content...” (p. 29) Television was a blank slate. It had the potential to do all of
the things referred to by Williams and helps create the stories that are similar to the ones
produced during an earlier time period, yet this time with the added benefit of increased
distribution and more complex content. Likewise film had the potential to mindfully
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entertain, educate, and transform an American public who for the most part were engaged
in the complimentary activities of the progressive era during the first two decades of the
twentieth century. Admittedly there remains a lack of consensus regarding the nature and
purpose of the progressive movement. Still, most historians would agree that more
democracy was a goal of the general public at all levels of government. And that
democracy would be had only when government changed the nature of its relationship
with big business. This relationship did change during the first two decades of the
twentieth century. Yet by the beginning of the 1920’s corporate America was poised to
produce and hopefully sell a lot of product. The public relations expertise that was
perfected by George Creel during World War I to disseminate propaganda and limit free
speech would be applied to the relationship between the consumer and producer. Indeed,
the idealism that existed prior to and during the progressive era would be either crushed
by the war experience or coopted by the newly formed, but experienced and large,
advertising machine. This is perhaps why film was ultimately unable to rekindle the
idealism of that earlier period. Writing on the films of that era Miriam Hansen (1991)
maintains that “...the scopophilic transgression of boundaries enacts a practical critique of
historical demarcations of public and private-the possibility of bringing hitherto
unrepresented discourse of experience into the view of a radically inclusive, heterosocial
public sphere” (p. 41). As millions of immigrants poured in from Eastern and Southern
Europe and as hundreds of thousands of African Americans moved from the rural south
to the urban and industrializing north an increasingly heterogeneous public could only
benefit from films that forced them to reconsider racial, ethnic, and gender norms.
Instead, sophisticated and yet to be famous filmmaker D.W. Griffith succumbed to the
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fears and prejudices of white society; he played into the American public’s reluctance to
embrace the ontology of German historiography as a paradigm of Truth; and hid behind
the first amendment with his release of Birth of a Nation and promotion of Intolerance
(1991). In effect, Griffith’s approach to film structure was regressive since he borrowed
from the narrative form of the bourgeois novel of the nineteenth century and established
this form as the dominant model for film. In her study of Griffith and that era Hansen
writes, “...Besides establishing Griffith’s reputation as the artistic ‘genius’ of the industry,
the film marks a point of no return both in economic terms and in terms of public
discourse on the cinema” (p. 163). Films were big business to be sure but more
importantly Hansen argues that the acceptance of Birth as a paradigm of Truth reflected
America’s odd relationship with empiricism and nurtured the types of myths that would
occupy the public realm while serving as an arbiter of Truth. Part of the problem rests on
the acceptance of one position over the other. I would argue that despite the irrationality
of mythical stories (and the widespread acceptance of films like Birth) at their core myths
contain real issues, obscured by a symbolic referent, which people are trying to grapple
with. Unfortunately, the scientists, intellectuals, and general public were unsuccessful in
dealing with the issue of race at the time of the release of Birth because of flawed
science. For example, the dominant science of that era concluded that intelligence was a
function of race. This is one example of many why those who embrace a rational,
empirical approach should try to “see” through the irrational (people are often reluctant to
confront the real issues directly) part of the mythic if only to re-visit the taken-for-granted
“Truth” which emerged from bad science.
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It is a shame that the potential Benjamin and Hansen discovered in early film
rarely lived up to their expectations and hopes. For Hansen the films of the silent era and
the theatres in which they were shown “shaped a mode of reception,” and often
“emphasized the presentness” (p. 43) in which the typical filmgoer found herself. How
far might humankind have progressed if this activity was allowed to continue? Similarly,
Benjamin saw the opportunity for human growth through the medium of film since in
film, “...a different nature opens itself to the camera than opens to the naked eye-if only
because an unconsciously penetrated space is substituted for a space consciously
explored by man...”(Benjamin, 2007, p. 236-237). Film, thus, had the potential to create
a vibrant, albeit ambiguous mythical experience similar to those that existed during the
time of the ancient Greeks or during the medieval period referenced by Bakhtin, but now
augmented by mechanical reproduction. For Bakhtin it was the very tension of those
ambiguities that lay the epistemological groundwork which helped usher in the
Renaissance. True, the film destroyed auras. But as Hansen and Kluge (1991) have
argued, it produced new auratic experiences (Hansen). Unfortunately these experiences
have been tempered or completely coopted by the needs of corporate America.
In spite of the grip held by corporate America on the media occasionally a work is
produced that retains the invigorating elements of ancient myth, the thoughts and
concerns of the common people, and the rejuvenating effects of grotesque realism
previously described by Bakhtin. It can be found in what has been termed the cult film.
Paradoxically existing on the margins yet also displaying both financial and critical
success, the cult film is exactly the type of film experience seemingly referred to and
hoped for by Benjamin and Hansen. Indeed, commenting on Benjamin’s and Kracauer’s
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position that the film spectator saw the film with her mind and body, Sobchack (1996)
has argued that the power of film was based on “...the medium’s essential ability to
stimulate us physiologically and sensually...” (p. 55). Released in England in 1973 and
brought to the United States in 1975 The Rocky Horror Picture Show was and still is a
film that draws its participants (I use this term over audience on purpose) because of the
strength of its presentation, its effective use of a variety of mythic elements, and its
ability to stimulate its audience “physiologically and sensually.” Perhaps this is why
Stuart Hall (1996), when commenting on popular culture in general, argued that, “the
arena where we find who we really are...is an arena that is profoundly mythic” (p.479).
Of course figuring out who we really are and accepting what we find are two very
different things. The carnivalesque sensuality of Rocky Horror postulated an ambiguous
sexual orientation at odds with the way the majority of Americans viewed their sexuality
in the 1970’s. The discomfort many Americans felt and still feel toward homosexuality,
for example, practically assured Rocky Horror its marginal status and midnight showing.
While those in the mainstream might relegate the appeal of Rocky Horror to the
eccentricities of youth I would argue that the appeal of this film lay elsewhere. At its core
the film is critical of the institution of marriage and heterosexuality as the written-instone standard of sexual relationships. Importantly, the film is able to overcome the
resistance of the audience to different forms of sexual expression not by didactic text but
by exploiting the sensual aspect of the medium, transvestism, and resurrecting Dionysus.
These are the elements that form the attraction. The lead character Dr. Frank N Furter
(played by the actor Tim Curry) doesn’t persuade the lost couple to try alternative
sexuality (Brad and Janet played by Barry Bostwick and Susan Sarandon, respectively)
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through conventional, rational, dialogue. Rather, it is a filmic seduction made all the
more powerful through the Dionysian connection. And as the participant’s proxy Brad
and Janet allow the viewer/ participant to be seduced as well. The Rocky Horror Picture
Show employs a pastiche of mythical and carnivalesque elements that help explain the
success of the film, seduce its audience, and challenge conventional notions of gender
and sexuality.
Indeed, in reference to Bakhtin, Hall (1996) argues that “The carnivalesque is not
simply an upturning of two things which remain locked within their oppositional
frameworks; it is also cross-cut by what Bakhtin calls the dialogic” (p. 470).

In this way

Rocky Horror works as an act of resistance and creates an alternative public space for the
filmmaker and filmgoer to work out their sexual ambiguities in the safe environment of a
mythical, late night, non-judgmental “feature show.” Certainly part of the allure of Rocky
Horror is the in your face sexuality, camp and kitsch that make up so much of the film.
But of course for some, “Being in ‘bad taste’ can be, as Pierre Bourdieu points out in
Inside the Mouse, “an act of resistance...” (p. 3). Released only three years after the
Stonewall Uprising, Rocky Horror speaks to the discontent and anger felt by many in the
gay community. The filmmakers might be criticized for taking an indirect approach in
expressing their anger and for creating a film in bad taste. For example there is an act of
cannibalism in the film. Perhaps a literal example of bad taste, but that criticism misses
the point. There is always a place for rational dialogue. But rational arguments formed
within specific political, social, and economic contexts can only get you so far. The many
scientists, for example, who argued for the legitimation of eugenics as a means to justify
the racial status quo of the early twentieth century, were rational men of science. The
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psychiatrists who concluded that homosexuality was a psychological disorder up into the
early 1970’s were rational men and women of science. And the pharmaceutical industry
perpetuates and empirically justifies addiction for millions all in the name of rational
science!
Every so often empiricism needs to be stirred up. People can and should demand
better science. But most people however are not going to get the chance to work within
science to make these demands. But they might get the opportunity to critique science
specifically and empiricism in general by exposure to or participation with the arts. Of
course there is the claim that the arts can manipulate? Consider Rousseau’s (1968)
argument toward the arts. While channeling Plato he warned: “The harm for which the
theatre is reproached is not precisely that of inspiring criminal passions but of disposing
the soul to feelings which are too tender and which are later satisfied at the expense of
virtue...” (p. 51). In the end Rousseau and Plato did not trust the public to weave their
way through the miasma of myth and reality. I certainly understand their trepidation.
Griffith’s Birth stoked the flames of white supremacy and legitimated the institution of
Jim Crow rather than begin the dialogue and hard work called for by intellectuals like
DuBois. The problem isn’t so much the film as it is the reception of the film. Griffith
wanted to be a filmmaker to a large audience. “... While it is true that commercial art is
always in danger of ending up as a prostitute, it is equally true that noncommercial art is
always in danger of ending up as an old maid...”(Panofsky, 1995, p.120). Instead of
interpreting the film as an excuse to begin a dialogue on race the strength of its narrative
structure seemed to make all future discussion unnecessary. Myth and reality became
fused and the truth about race relations and race lay buried. On more than one occasion I
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have felt frustrated by the masses inability to differentiate myth from reality. But is it
right to place all of the blame on the myth? Should Leni Riefenstahl have been tried at
Nuremburg for crimes against humanity because of her film, Triumph of the Will?
Humankind’s ability to answer the difficult questions concerning who we are and
what is our place in the world will not be enhanced by avoiding the mythic. The mythic
must be directly confronted but then rationally analyzed. “...The adherents of the cult of
the Rocky Horror Picture Show transform themselves into the characters, and especially
into Frank, by singing the songs and especially by donning his mask” (Aviram, 2004, p.
185). Thus, at times it is not enough to simply discuss the issues. How could my college
roommate refute the criticism of his parents toward his sexual orientation when they
bolstered their argument with psychiatric proof? He couldn’t. But what he can do is hope
that one day the certainty his parents have in science might be lessened. Not to dismiss
science outright, but to demand better science. The strength of the mythic is not in its
ability to offer easy solutions to complex problems. Rather, its strength is the result of the
contradictory nature of the well-constructed myth and the questions it would raise
because of those tensions. Rocky is a modern day myth and as Aviram (2004) argues
Frank is Dionysus. “The adherent suffers the effects of Dionysus paradoxically as both a
liberation and an enslavement to the lovely but tyrannical god...” (p. 184).

It was

liberating to dress up as a transvestite, challenge gender norms, and sexual orientation.
Yet, there is no guarantee that the participant in this bacchanal would be able to liberate
himself from the constraints of gender and sexual norms while also negotiating the
tyranny of pleasure. The audiences of the mid 1970’s could not anticipate the AIDS crisis
of the 1980’s. With penicillin in hand to combat the STD’s of the 1970’s they and the

117
filmmakers focused on the pleasure aspect of Dionysus while ignoring the political and
social ramifications that were part of the myth as well. But the myth is not to blame. The
problem is in the misinterpretation of the myth that was a result of the mythmaking being
coopted by corporate America who are experts at manipulating fears and redirecting
dissent. Consequently, the masses were prone to foreground some aspects of the myth at
the expense of others, confuse the symbolic with the literal, and ignore or de-emphasize
the rational.
From the time of Valentino and Gish, film helped humankind dispense with the
need for rational discussion; it exploited their voyeuristic tendencies, and stroked their
heightened pleasure receptors. Rocky’s liberal use of transvestism strongly challenged
gender norms and importantly positioned ambiguity into gender constructs that most
people accepted as scientific fact: “...This dualistic desire is characteristic of the
ambiguity at work in male drag performance: at once the female impersonator submits to
the cinematic representation of woman by donning her image; however, given the
ultimate power held by the male performer, he is also able to take control of women’s
image through the drag performance” (Robbins, Myrick, 2010, p. 271). Liberation from
stultifying gender and sexual norms is achieved for those who fully take part in the Rocky
Horror ritual. This liberation, however, is limited since man maintains his control of
woman’s image. Tim Curry is simply Faye Wray dressed in an outfit by Fredericks of
Hollywood. The message is clear: Women can expand the realm of their sexuality as long
as they are wearing fishnets and a bustier! This is one of the flaws of the Rocky Horror
myth. The other more important flaw is the introduction of Apollo to the story in the
guise of Riff-Raff, Frank-N-Furter’s henchman. In his essay on Rocky Horror Aviram
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(2004) writes, “And Apollo, of course, is placed both by Greek tradition and especially
Friedrich Nietzsche as the antithesis of Dionysus. Hence it is he and his sister who restore
to the audience the distinction between Transylvania and earthling and bring about the
end of the drama” (p. 189). Rather than sustain the myth the filmmakers chose a device
to end the plot and the myth which in turn eliminated all ambiguities. Why this occurred
is unclear. Perhaps they didn’t trust the audience to create their own distinction between
myth and reality. Or to look at the problem inverted, Rancière (2009) might argue
There is the distance between artist and spectator, but there is also the distance
inherent in the performance itself, in so far as it subsists, as a spectacle, an
autonomous thing, between the idea of the artist and the sensation or
comprehension of the spectator…In the logic of emancipation…there is always a
third thing…that is owned by no one, whose meaning is owned by no one, but
which subsists between them (p. 14-15).
In other words, even if the filmmakers eliminated the “flaws” pointed out by Aviram
(2004) that “third thing” might rear its head and produce an unwanted result.
Perhaps they needed a simple plot device, one especially that had already been
accepted by movie audiences. Are Rousseau, Plato, and Bloom therefore correct? Did
the filmmakers consider themselves the experts whose job it is to interpret and make
sense of experience? I don’t know. The one thing I can say is that the filmmakers were
confidant in their contention that traditional heterosexual marriage and sexual relations
within that institution need to be reexamined as the only standard by which men and
women interact with each other. Also, it is to the filmmakers’ credit that they were able to
recognize the at times destructive male gaze that informed the sexual escapades of the
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film. But as Robbins and Myrick (2010) have pointed out, “This penetrative control is
ultimately manifested as the RKO broadcasting tower which acts as the center of
meaning for the film, a sadistic impulse the film recognized as a potential danger, but
beyond which the film cannot move...” (p. 274). Apollo destroyed the source of Frank –
N- Furter’s phallic strength when he toppled the RKO tower. Unfortunately, the
filmmakers were unable to offer an alternative view and unwilling to let the Dionysian
myth play itself out or remain in ambiguity. Perhaps the problem lies in the possibility
that mythmakers who exist on the margin simply never had the experience to mold and
shape the public sphere.
Indeed, the creation of autonomous art and its distribution has been problematic
for quite some time. In his analysis of culture Grossberg (2010) writes, “... culture is
never merely a set of practices, technologies or messages, objects whose meaning and
identity can be guaranteed by their origin or their intrinsic essences...” (p. 157).
Potentially liberating ideas are frequently co-opted by those with power, motivation, and
the means to do so. For example, some historians who examined early television of the
1950s refer to that time period as the golden age of television. Serious plays by the likes
of Paddy Chayefsky, Horton Foote, and Rod Serling, were broadcast. But so were
programs with far less serious pretensions. And it was that type of programming which
won out. As Williams (1989) points out television has been handicapped from the very
beginning. He writes, “... within the broadcasting model there was this deep
contradiction, of centralized transmission and privatized reception...” (p. 30). Learning
from their experience with radio, corporate America exploited television’s technical and
financial need for centralized transmission, exploited the new mediums incorporation of

120
imagery with sound to manipulate their audiences to purchase their products. This is why
serious programs soon gave way to banal amusements, “the commodified negation of
play” (Inside the Mouse,1995, p. 185): corrupt quiz shows, the Mickey Mouse Club,
Howdy Doody, Bonanza (a father, three sons, each from a different mother, and a male
Chinese housekeeper) and Gunsmoke! Williams (1989) reminds us that, “... broadcasting
was developed not only within a capitalist society but specifically by the capitalist
manufacturers of the technological apparatus” (p. 34). The genius of the “capitalist
manufacturers” was to get the American public to purchase an “apparatus” that in turn
would manipulate them to purchase more things. The American public was being
groomed to be consumers, not producers of their own mythologies.
Despite commodification, banality and the sheer stupidity of television there will
always be programs, like The Wire for example, that deserve our attention: Programs
such as this one legitimate television because they complexify competing and
coincidental forces, and thus require the viewer to interact in order to make meaning.
Indeed, the viewer is compelled to make meaning of her own rather than receive one
which was pre-packaged. In this way the viewer’s gaze is altered from passive to active.
A similar level of activity may occur in response to a heavily commodified program or
even one which reifies a societal wrong; however that aesthetic stance would have had to
be already present in the viewer.

Of course if the American public is to improve its

mythmaking and myth interpreting ability; if it is going to fight against a commodified
culture it thinks it wants but does not need, then it is going to have to take matters into its
own hands. This does happen, but it is rare. For example, in her book NASA/TREK
Constance Penley (1997) describes how tens of thousands of fans of the television series
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Star Trek use the show as inspiration to produce unique, imaginative, and at times
pornographic fiction to help them better understand their experiences. Similarly, fans of
Bruce Springsteen like to share stories about Bruce because they, “... order and to find
friends personal experiences according to socially derived categories and must enable
fans to understand their experiences as shared” (Cavicchi, 1998, p. 168). Penley’s
NASA/TREK (1997) concerns the people who write fictions inspired by Star Trek. She
tells us these people are called “slashers.” Penley writes,
Although the slashers are writing for much smaller audiences – in fact, largely
for themselves – their work nonetheless embodies the same impulse as the female
nineteenth –century popular novelists: to transform the public sphere by
imaginatively demonstrating how it could be improved through making it more
answerable to women’s interests (p. 134).
The shared experience of Springsteen fans and the activity of Penley’s “slashers” are
similar in that they both represent informal, collective movements. These movements
attempt to understand and possibly change the public sphere. Indeed, while Springsteen
fans try to figure out ways to reconcile hard work, low play and bleak prospects, Penley’s
“slashers” hope to change a sphere that is either uninterested in women’s issues or
patriarchal. Slasher fiction is perhaps more effective at illustrating the complex issues
which surround and contribute to ill constructed gender norms than traditional academic
studies. The impact is immediate! In a similar way, HBO’s “fictional” The Wire, showed
the range of forces, the gestalt, that combine to limit opportunities for the working poor
of Baltimore. In both Penley’s (1997) analysis of “slasher” fiction and The Wire are two
attempts to improve the public sphere, even though the former is a fantasy response and
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the latter seems more realistic. Rocky Horror, NASA/TREK, and The Wire, for example,
demonstrate how the science fiction genre, fan fiction, and good fiction lend itself to the
construction of new mythologies that have the potential to transform the public sphere.
Because these mythologies are set in a future yet to come, or a dystopian present they are
more likely to help those who watch them extricate themselves from the types of cultural
constraints and limited meanings referred to earlier by Grossberg (2010). (Ironically
when Gene Roddenberry pitched the series to NBC executives he called it a western set
in space). Penley’s slashers use the Star Trek universe to better understand the sexual
and emotional needs of women by sometimes focusing on a homoerotic relationship
between two of its lead characters. Also, the Star Trek theme works to challenge gender
norms as it pertains to science. As Penley describes, women were better able to withstand
the rigors of space travel and had logged more flight time but it was the men who were
chosen to be pilots in the space race. It should come as no surprise that when a
patriarchal society went looking for “the right stuff” it found it only in male test pilots.
Penley’s slashers and the fiction they produce are an important example of an act of
resistance. So is the activity of the fans of Bruce Springsteen. To be sure it is a fantasy
response. Fan culture and some television shows are fantasy responses, but so is much of
mythic culture. Rocky Horror was a fantasy response and an important act of resistance
too since it attempted to force a reassessment of gender and sexuality norms. But because
of its flaws Rocky Horror did not create an alternative public sphere. Their attempts were
marginal at best. Could new media help us create new mythologies? In writing about the
current digital age Mark Hansen (2000) writes that, “... the digital image explodes the
frame...” (p. 35), but he also maintains “... yet so long as it is tied to the image frame of
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the cinema, this polymorphous potential will remain entirely untapped” (p. 35). I’m
afraid Mark Hanson is right. He is of course referring to the spectator’s role during the
pre-cinematic period and the demands that aesthetic medium had on the participant.
Indeed, as filmmakers like Peter Jackson and studios like Pixar become more adept at
creating images that allow the spectator to leave the image at the “frame of the cinema”
and simply sit back and enjoy the show not only will the potential of digital cinema not
be tapped but the ability of the participant to assume an active role in the creation of
helpful mythologies will remain untapped as well.
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CHAPTER 5
PLAYWRITING AS SOLO IMPROVISATION: AN ORIGINAL PLAY
Setting: The time is the near future. The place is a private, for profit, high school. In fact,
all of the public schools that were once a feature of America have been replaced by
privately run, for profit high schools (The Charter School movement of the early 21st
century served, in part, as an effective transition to complete and open privatization, after
underfunding and over testing unfairly caused a lack of confidence, among the general
population, in public schools). One company, Koch Industries, controls and owns ninetyfive percent of the schools in America. This same company also controls the energy,
pharmaceutical, media, prison, timber, paper, fructose, hydrogenated oil, fertilizer, seed,
and law enforcement industries. Monopolies like this one were once a problem, but all
anti-trust legislation had been repealed in the Santorum Bill of 2036. A small component
of anti-trust legislation remains but only because it can be used as a weapon against labor
unions, although few unions still exist.
The schools of the near future have taken on a completely new character from what they
once were: Administrators that were once human are now cyborgs, part human, and part
machine. This serves their employer well since they are now rendered incapable of free
thought or critical thinking of any sort. They are in charge of ensuring that the teachers
adhere to the mandated curriculum that was created by Patriot Perspective, a
conservative think tank, funded by Koch Industries. Koch Industries had attempted to
replace all of the teachers with “teaching drones,” but a loophole discovered by Senator
Ben Sanders, (great, great, great, grandson of the late senator , Bernie Sanders) requires a
small percentage of teachers to be fully human.
Despite the loophole, the assault on teachers, (as witnessed by the addition of “teaching
drones,” the elimination of unions and teacher’s pensions, the elimination of medical
insurance, and low salaries), has created a shortage of human teachers, except for a small
segment of Christians that see teaching the mandated curriculum as the path to salvation
or a way to bring about the End Times (they can never seem to figure that one out).
Filling out the human teachers are a small cadre of idealists, who view good teaching as
transformative, however they cannot be open about their belief in liberating pedagogy or
they will face arrest.
All theists are fundamentalists, and all religions have ended any activities connected to
social justice. Consequently, the Social Gospel was repudiated at the Southern Baptist
Convention in 2027. Speaking for all faiths they affirmed that Jesus, Muhammad,
Abraham, Buddha, Joseph Smith, the Reverend Jim Jones, L. Ron Hubbard, and Jenny
McCarthy (who became the patron saint of the anti-vaccine movement) wants them to be
wealthy. (It was at this point in the development of Christianity and its relationship with
federal and state governments, that it became the established religion of America).
Much of the world’s populations spend most of their time working long hours, while
being severely underpaid: Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Germany, Liechtenstein, and
Iceland are the only countries that have a middle class majority. A very small percentage
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of the world’s population is wealthy. Still, in the United States, the majority of white
Christians, and whites of other faiths, support a political and economic system that
nurtures and idolizes these small, wealthy, ruling elites. Inexplicably, these majority
groups consistently vote against their interests, although in actuality voting does very
little to effect any significant change, in part a consequence of gerrymandering, Citizens
United, no campaign finance laws, and the power of lobbyists. Still, Blacks, Hispanics,
Asians, Jews, Atheists and all members of the LGBT community can no longer vote,
unless any of the latter group has participated in Christian conversion therapy, or the
former pay an exorbitant poll tax. (In fact, the LGBT community was stripped of all civil
rights as stipulated in the Cheney Bill, which eventually became the 34th amendment to
the Constitution).
The average age of the human staff at Koch High 3476.9 (outside of Philadelphia) is
sixty-five, although there are a few young teachers in their early twenties. They were
selected for their affable manner, team spirit, obedience to authority, and obvious love of
their Christian faith. They score high on the battery of standardized tests and observation
instruments that evaluate their ability to teach the Curriculum as designed by Patriot
Perspective. This Curriculum is touted as “values based:” It promotes the “seven core
values:” obedience, patriarchy, un-regulated capitalism, white-supremacy,
Fundamentalist Christianity, American exceptionalism and heteronormativity. Everyone
at the high school, with the exception of the janitors, cooks, bus drivers, maintenance
men, human security staff, students permanently in “in school suspension” and lawn
maintenance staff, is white.
Main Characters: (The Quintet)
Eugene: fully human, male, early sixties, teacher.
Mark: a male student in his junior year.
Jack: a male student in his junior year.
Hannah: a female student in her junior year
Zoe: a female student in her junior year.
Additional Players:
J. P. Altgeld: prison inmate, arrested and convicted of improper use of his office for his
role in pardoning the criminals of the Haymarket Square Riot and a host of other charges.
Mary Harris Jones: prison nurse, arrested and sentenced by a military tribunal for
conspiring to murder in the Paint Creek Mine War of West Virginia.
Alex Berkman: prison inmate. Arrested and imprisoned for the attempted murder of
Henry Frick.
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Galileo: Prison Inmate. Formerly under house arrest, now incarcerated for stealing his
middle finger from a display in the Museo Galileo in Florence Italy.
Martin Luther King Jr.: Prison inmate. Convicted of violating an Alabama law from 1921
that made it a crime to boycott a business.
Lenny Bruce: Prison Inmate. Convicted of talking about Eleanor Roosevelt’s tits.
Dalton Trumbo: Prison Inmate. Convicted of failing to testify before the HUAC.
H.J. Rosenthal: Prison Inmate. Convicted of selling cocaine to fund the Sandinistas in
Nicaragua.
They are often surrounded by an assortment of students, administrators, human teachers
and drones, most of whom best remain anonymous.
Scene One: Personalized Learning
(Interior of a classroom. The students are seated and leashed to their desks. There are
forty two students in class. They are arranged in six straight rows, seven deep. A
“smartboard” is at the front of the class. The walls are bare, with the exception of six
portraits: Charles and David Koch, Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, Pat Robertson and
the Olsen Twins-who are considered the greatest actors that ever lived (Their television
show from the 1980’s, “Full House,” is played continuously on screens that teachers can
access as a “treat” for students when they are finished with their work.). The bookcases
and shelves are filled with trophies (there are no books) won by the school for excellence
in education. Electronic advertisements selling products and services by Koch Industries,
and “PSA’s” promoting the seven core values, frequently “support” the lessons taught by
the teachers. A small camera surrounded by an equally small bullet proof glass dome
hangs from the ceiling. No one knows if it records or not, or who is entitled to view the
captured images and sound. There are no windows. All of the lighting is fluorescent)
Eugene: (He is standing at the front of the classroom, unenthusiastically delivering the
tail end of a lecture on the Founding Fathers he has delivered more times than he cares to
remember. The teachers have been “rewarded” by the administrators with a “jeans day,”
so he is wearing blue jeans. It’s Friday, 28th period, the last class of the day, and week for
that matter. The number of periods per day was increased as an administrative response
to the dwindling attention span of students. )
And so, as we all can see, once America rid itself of British tyranny we established the
world’s best country.
Hannah: Mr. Debs?
Eugene: Yes, Hannah.
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Hannah: (She is somewhat nervous, and pauses before speaking) I think I read
somewhere that the American freedom fighters had to maintain the institution of slavery
so they wouldn’t lose the support of the Southern colonies prior to the Revolutionary
War?
Student 1 (in a monotone voice) America improved the lives of Africans by rescuing
them and paying for their passage to our great country.
Student 2 (in a monotone voice) Hannah, did you read that treasonous liberal pabulum in
a book?
Students 1-38 (chanting)) Treasonous liberal pabulum, Treasonous liberal pabulum,
(repeats and eventually fades out).
Hannah: (nervous, but steadfast) Yes
Student 2: (Still, using a monotone voice) Was it on the list of approved reading?
Hannah: (attempting to conceal a lie) Of course!
Zoe: (friends with Hannah, and trying to show support) Yes, it was on the list.
Students 1-38 (In unison and in a monotone) Godless African savages thanked America
for rescuing them from the jungle, paying for their passage, and delivering them to
patriotic, god-fearing Americans, who always had their best interest in mind.
(At that moment one of the cyborg assistant principals enters the classroom. All of the
cyborgs look alike and are gender neutral. The students and teachers are required to
address all cyborgs as “Mr. Charles” or “Mr. David.” The cyborgs do not care which of
those two names are used.)
Mr. Charles: (speaking like a large dog given the power of speech for the first time) Nice
work students! Mr. Debs! You have embraced the standards!
Eugene: (repeating a phrase he has said to Mr. Charles more times than he cares to
remember, while concealing his disgust at what he is about to say) Yes Sir! I strive to
ensure the success of all of my students as I deliver to them personalized learning!
(As Mr. Charles exits the classroom, the bell sounds, signaling the end of the school day.
The students are un-leashed and leave. Eugene walks to his desk, sits down in his chair,
and attempts to muffle a sigh, yet he can do nothing to temper his facial expression.)
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Scene Two: Woodshedding
(It is two days later, Sunday morning. As required by law, everyone in the community is
attending a Christian church where people hear the word of god as interpreted by Pat
Robertson, considered the most important theologian of all time. The quintet, taking a big
risk, is instead inside the back of an abandoned warehouse, (which was once a lawn and
garden center before climate change made that activity impossible, except for the
wealthy), on the outskirts of the city. Zoe had called everyone the night before, and had
asked them to come today because she had a surprise for them. An assortment of unused
lawn and garden tools are scattered within the structure. There are three wooden chairs,
one armchair, a sofa, a bookcase filled with an assortment of books and a crate turned
into a makeshift coffee table, in a back corner of the warehouse. Discarded and reclaimed
lamps provide lighting. A small space heater takes the edge off the cold in the winter.
Electricity is provided by a small solar collector hidden from sight. Eugene occupies the
armchair. Mark and Jack are seated on the sofa. Hannah is straddling one of the wooden
chairs, with her forearms leaning against its back. Zoe enters with excitement. She is
holding a heavy box which she quickly puts on the crate that is downstage center)
Zoe: Hey! Look at what I scored from the Goodwill last night!
(They gather around a small but sturdy cardboard box while grabbing at its contents)
Mark: Books!
Jack: Old books.
Hannah: (Grabbing a handful) Nietzsche, Dewey, Foucault, Vonnegut, Twain, holy shit
Kafka… here’s one about Einstein and Picasso! Nice haul my love!
Eugene: (To Zoe) I thought Goodwill stopped selling books years ago, since no one ever
bought them?
Zoe: They did. I found these bitches in a gym bag, near a bunch of old exercise
equipment.
Eugene: I suppose we should be thankful that most people have given up on either a
sound mind or a sound body. I can’t believe you were able to buy these.
Zoe: I didn’t buy them. They gave them to me!
Eugene: (somewhat incredulous) They gave them to you?
Zoe: Yep, the cashier didn’t know how to price them and when she asked the manager he
called corporate, but couldn’t get a hold of anybody. So, he hung up on them and told me
to take them.

129
Jack: (Highfiving Mark) Yeah man, that’s good for us!
Zoe: Gene, what’s wrong?
Eugene: (looking serious) Hannah, on Friday you brought up a viewpoint on American
slavery that isn’t supported by the standards.
Hannah: (defensive and annoyed) I asked a question Gene.
Eugene: Hannah, I don’t want to see you get in trouble.
Hannah: (annoyed) Gene, it was a question. The school code states that if we state an
unauthorized topic within a question we aren’t guilty of breaking the law.
Eugene: Hannah, you know what I mean. All the Borgs need is one excuse to zap us and
they’ll take it
Zoe: (concerned) Gene, we know you’re frustrated too.
Eugene: True
Hannah: Would you prefer we challenge the standards like we’ve done in the past…nonverbally?
Eugene: No, I’m tired of that approach too… but Hannah, what you did the other day…
don’t you think you might have gone too far?
Hannah: Maybe a little. I don’t know Gene I’m so fucking tired of pretending!
Eugene: I’m tired of pretending too. I’d like to be a real teacher again.
Zoe: But they’ll arrest you and you’ll lose your job.
Jack: Gene, don’t do that to us. You’re the only teacher at the school who’s not
completely full of shit.
Eugene: So, keep pretending to (mockingly) embrace the standards?!
Hannah: (Attempting to change the conversation by reading from a book) Hey guys,
check out what Dewey writes, “Writer, composer of music, sculptor, or painter can
retrace, during the process of production, what they have previously done. When it is not
satisfactory in the undergoing or perceptual phase of experience, they can to some degree
start afresh. This retracing is not readily accomplished in the case of architecture—which
is perhaps one reason why there are so many ugly buildings.”
Jack: (Chuckling) Well, that explains our school.
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Zoe: Inside and out. And that goes for their so called (in a mocking tone) educational
program of personalized learning that ensures success for every student.
Mark: I’d like to see our educational program (making air quotes) retraced.
Jack: I’d like to see it flushed down the toilet, but fat chance of that happening.
Eugene: (his mood improving) As long as we’re here…
Hannah: (To Eugene) I’m right there with you brother! It’s my turn to lead our
discussion.
Eugene: Go for it!
Zoe: Hold on a second! (She darts offstage and quickly returns with a box of donuts)
Hannah: Alright, I would like to revisit (she sees the donuts at this point, grabs one,
lustily bites into it and turns to Zoe) Thanks baby! (Turns to the group, with a mouthful
of donut) the New Deal’s effect on the building of the welfare state.
Mark: (Without missing a beat makes fun of Hannah talking with her mouth full by
speaking as if his mouth is full) FDR didn’t go far enough!
Zoe: (Ignoring Mark’s joke and focusing the discussion) What makes you say that?
Mark: (Getting serious) Remember that time he closed the banks during the Bank
Holiday? When they reopened they were only slightly improved. So much of what made
them prone to failure still remained. Roosevelt should have nationalized the banks!
Hannah: There’s no way the business interests in Congress would have allowed that. No
way!
Jack: FDR said it himself. He was saving capitalism from itself so it could continue. Not
paving the way for a socialist economy, despite what Father Coughlin was saying on the
radio.
Zoe: Fucking anti-Semite!
Mark and Jack (Simultaneously) He was anti-Semitic?
Zoe: (getting angry at Jack and Mark) Of course he was anti-Semitic; you know he was…
we’ve had this discussion before…just like that motherfucker Ford. Don’t you remember,
he bought that newspaper, the Dearborn Gazette for the sole purpose of spreading his
bullshit!?
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Eugene: (Bemused) Americans loved Henry Ford.
Zoe: (angry) Most Americans couldn’t find their own assholes with a GPS and a
flashlight!
Hannah: (determined) Americans can exhibit real intelligence if they want to. Have you
ever read the commentaries on a sports article? It’s filled with nuance and complexity as
well as a deep historical knowledge of the subject. It’s goddamn analysis! But as soon as
the topic turns to politics or religion, or art, or anything with an intellectual bent,
Americans are ignorant… and proud of their ignorance. Like that anti-Semite Henry
Ford.
Jack: (To Zoe) Well if he was an anti-Semite, (interrupting himself) wait a minute I
thought you were an atheist? And I’m not saying he wasn’t, it didn’t matter to most folks.
All they cared about was getting a car that they could afford. (To Hannah) I thought you
wanted to talk about the welfare state!
Mark: (To Zoe) Independent.
Hannah: I do want to talk about the welfare state. It’s Zoe’s fault. (Hannah playfully
sticks out her tongue at Zoe) She sidetracked us with all that anti-Semite stuff.
Zoe: Sorry guys. I didn’t mean to (in a mocking tone) get us off task. Oh, (To Jack) and
fuckwad, I can be an atheist and Jewish!
Jack: (Sardonically) And a lesbian! Don’t forget that part!
Mark: (To Zoe) Independent.
Zoe: (To Jack) I’m not even going to respond to that. (Addressing the group) But what if
I’m not off task?
Mark: (To Zoe) Independent.
Zoe: Isn’t it conceivable that those in power exploit ethnic or religious conflict, or intraclass conflict, as a diversion (emphasis on the word diversion) from any discussions on
class conflict and their underlying causes?
Jack: Don’t forget sexual orientation! (Zoe is glaring at Jack and then turns to Mark)
Mark: (To Zoe) Independent.
Zoe: (furious at Mark) What are you going on about?!
Mark: It’s the Dearborn Independent. You called it the Gazette.
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Zoe: (sardonically) I stand corrected comrade.
Mark: (To Zoe) Nice… it doesn’t take you long to reference Marx.
Zoe: (her anger subsides) I think he was right! Don’t you think people would be more
receptive to a discussion on class if they weren’t so preoccupied with so called
differences over race or religion? (Zoe glares at Jack waiting for him to say sexual
orientation one more time stopping him just as he was about to say it) And also if they
weren’t so fucking stupid!
(Hannah looks at Zoe in a way that implies that Zoe really doesn’t mean what she just
said. Zoe looks at Hannah in a way that suggests that she does. Over the years Eugene
and the other members of the quintet have mastered the ability to communicate nonverbally)
Eugene: (Calmly, but also chuckling) Do you think the Left could have gotten further
during the mid-twentieth century…I mean, do you think they could have made some real
progress toward a socialist state, if Americans had overcome their racial or religious
differences…or religious allegiances?
Mark: I think, if they could, (pause for three beats) maybe FDR could have nationalized
the banks? Maybe he could have convinced them…all those fireside chats! That it was in
their best interests. You know…long term economic health and all of that. But
still…FDR was no socialist.
Hannah: (coming around) I see what you guys are saying. But look! All those white men
in power have always been adept at controlling the masses by manipulating the racial
tensions within classes, or between ethnic groups or those with different religious beliefs.
Zoe: (speaking at the same time Hannah says the word beliefs) Like the motherfucking
rich did to the non-slaveholding majority in the antebellum South. How else could they
have convinced a poor white majority to support a small group of wealthy elites unless
they used racial conflict and feelings of white supremacy as a goddamn smokescreen
against recognition of class conflict!?
Jack: (relentless) Or sexual orientation.
Zoe: (subtle eye roll)
Hannah (continuing) …FDR never could have convinced them to accept the
nationalization of the banks because he never wanted the nationalization of the banks.
Don’t you remember how he treated Upton Sinclair when he ran for office in California?
And! And! And! … the people were too preoccupied with racial tensions as Blacks, and
other minority groups, were starting to step up their efforts as they fought for their civil
rights.
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Jack: (Finally getting serious) Zoe, Hannah, I hear what you’re saying, but I also think
that people are afraid. Afraid of not having what they need… (Realizing something) oh
and insecure about not getting what they think they need (emphasis on the word
insecure), you know, the basics, because they have no faith that anyone other than
themselves is going to go to bat for them…to help them, and that’s (lingers on the word
that’s) why they get greedy and place their hopes on a system that promises them riches!
It’s greed and all the stuff that makes people greedy, in addition to what you’ve been
saying about race and religion (turns to Zoe and Hannah) and sexual orientation … that
explains why people are willing to support a small ruling elite. They stupidly think that
one day they could be rich too. They have no idea the game is rigged against them.
Zoe: Maybe… Jack you may have something there but I also think it’s far more
complicated than greed.
Mark: Horatio Alger is alive and well… Cool…. Hey, we better get going, church is
letting out.
Eugene: Okay, I’ll see you guys tomorrow.
(Eugene exits. The rest of the Quintet follow suit)
Scene Three: L’inquiétude
(Monday afternoon. It’s the last period of the day. Eugene is at the front of the classroom.
Class has been in session for six minutes. Six minutes, thirty seconds remain)
Student 3: Mr. Debs?
Eugene: Yes, Ronald.
Student 3: I have a question about standard 34.6a regarding the spread of American
civilization during the Spanish American War.
Eugene: Of course.
Student 3: What flaws were in the Philippine people?
Eugene: Flaws? What do you mean?
Student 3: The Philippine terrorists fought against the brave American soldiers for almost
three years.
Eugene: Yes, that’s right.
Student 3: What was wrong with them?
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Eugene: (Raising an eyebrow that is only noticed by the other members of the quintet)
Well, I suppose that some of them lacked a decent education.
Student 3: Because their school system lacked the proper moral certainties.
Eugene: No, I don’t think we could truly say that.
Student 4: They lacked the rugged individualism that so many brave Americans
possessed, especially the politicians who supported the war and the soldiers who fought
so bravely.
Student 5: Were they suffering because they hadn’t fully embraced free market
capitalism?
Student 8: Did they not understand all the benefits that would come their way when they
received the extension of democracy from America?
Student 9: Maybe they didn’t understand manifest destiny?
Student 10: We helped them capture the terrorist, Emilio Ackwinalo, led by the brave
American, General Funston.
Eugene: (trying to stay calm) Aguinaldo.
Student 10: (confused) what?
Eugene: His name is Emilio A-gui-nal-do.
Student 10: Yes, the terrorist.
Eugene: (Displaying some anger, but speaking softly) He wasn’t a terrorist and there
wasn’t anything wrong with them…
Student 7: (Interrupting on the word them) But Mr. Debs why would the Filipino people
fight against us…we were trying to help them?
Eugene: (remembering to frame his position within a question) Is it conceivable that
some of what we were doing was not helpful?
Students 1-38 (unison monotone) That’s impossible. Everything the United States of
America does or has ever done is helpful to others.
Eugene: Everything?
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(Zoe and Hannah look at Eugene and their message is clear. They want him to stop his
line of reasoning immediately)
Eugene: (pauses and stares at the portraits of the Koch brothers, Ronald Reagan, Richard
Nixon, Pat Robertson and the Olsen Twins. His mood becomes determined) ….After
centuries of being colonized by the Spanish, the Filipino people were unwilling to let
another strong military power dictate to them! And moreover, it’s inaccurate to call their
leader, Emilio Aguinaldo, a terrorist. He was willing to die to help his people break free
of colonial rule…any (emphasis on the word any) colonial rule!
Student 3: (Confused yet without emotion)) Mr. Debs are you sure you’re right? None of
what you said is in our textbook or contained in any of the standards.
(Mark, Hannah, Jack and Zoe are scared. They have yet to hear Eugene explain what
really happened to the rest of the class and fear what might happen to him)
Students 1, 2, 4-38: (In unison and without emotion) Mr. Debs, our book states that the
childlike people of the Philippines welcomed American civilization because America
possessed the finest technology, military, economic system, political system and religion.
A few criminals fought against America’s military but were quickly subdued by a
superior and righteous force. Christian nations have always fought on the right side of
history.
Zoe: No they haven’t.
Eugene: (To Zoe) Don’t…
Students 1-38 (In unison) I don’t understand.
Zoe: Christian nations haven’t always fought on the right side of history.
Eugene: (pleading) Please Zoe!
Zoe: During the Crusades, Christian warriors from Europe killed virtually everyone they
encountered in their so called quest (emphasis on the word quest) to reclaim the Holy
land from the Muslims… even other Christians.
Hannah: She’s right. In the wake of the Protestant Reformation, thousands of hatchet
wielding French Catholics, Christians, (emphasis on the word Christians) killed almost
ten thousand Protestants simply because they viewed their take on Christianity as
blasphemous.
Jack: You can’t tell me that their murderous activities placed them on the right side of
history.
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Mark: Don’t even get me started on the Inquisitions, or forcing Galileo to recant his
scientific discoveries that proved that the sun, not the earth, is the center of the solar
system….and putting him under house arrest!
Hannah: Or that Republican congressional nonsense of the early twenty-first century that
ignored science because of pure greed, their worship of the wealthy, and their blind
adherence to a corrupted and distorted interpretation of an ancient faith. Our hostile
climate is a direct consequence of their willful ignorance!
Zoe: (Determined and sarcastic) Or Operation American Freedom, when the United
States preemptively (emphasis on preemptively) used nuclear weapons- neutron bombsbecause god told them to do it, killing all of the people of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, Jordan,
Nigeria, Venezuela, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, but leaving the oil refineries intact.
(The other students in the class are confused regarding the information they are hearing
from the quintet. At that moment three cyborg assistant principals and two security
drones burst into the classroom)
Mr. Charles 1: (Barking) Mr. Debs, you have lost control of the classroom environment!!
Mr. Charles 2: (Barking) You have broken the morality clause!!
Mr. Charles 3: (Barking) Your lack of professionalism will hurt your weekly formative
evaluation! Your daily summative evaluation! Your hourly comprehensive evaluation,
your quarterly TKES evaluation. Your mid-term summative eval…..
Eugene: (Interrupting Mr. Charles 3) Will you please just shut the fuck up!!!
Mr. Charles 1-3 (In unison) You are guilty of moral turpitude!
Drones 1 and 2: (robotic) Students 39, 40, 41, 42 (Zoe, Hannah, Mark and Jack) Put your
hands behind your head and get on the ground! Now!
Zoe: I can’t get on the ground, you fucking moron…patriotic… perspective… produced
…piece of shit! We’re still leashed!
(Drone1 pushes a button on his belt that releases Zoe, Jack, Hannah and Mark from their
leashes. All of them place their hands behind their heads and get to their knees. The
security drones then taser them until they pass out.)
(Mr. Charles 1-3 taser Eugene as he is about to charge the security drones to protect his
students. As he falls to the ground restraints are placed on his hands and ankles. The
cyborgs then proceed to beat him with clubs despite the fact that he is already
unconscious. The other students show no emotion as Eugene, Mark, Hannah, Jack and
Zoe are tasered, and Eugene is beaten.)
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Mr. Charles 1: (barking) Students, there are three minutes left in class. Take out your
school supplied bibles and read Psalm 137:9, or 1 Timothy 2:12, or Jeremiah 19:9, or 1
Peter 2:18, or Kings 2:23-24, or Leviticus 18:22. (The remaining students instantly
comply)
Scene Four: Life is But a Dream…Shboom
(Eugene awakens in a privately run for profit prison in the infirmary, in what was once
the federal penitentiary in Ashland, Kentucky. There are forty seven other
patients/prisoners in the room, many of whom are in pain or discomfit, since pain
medication, or daily attention from the doctors and nurses, is not an option in this facility
(designed to house no more than twenty patients). As a result of his injuries he drifts in
and out of consciousness, and while this occurs he dreams of events both real and
imagined…sometimes the two are mixed and it is hard to distinguish one from the other.
The audience experiences these dreams in a series of flashbacks)
(First flashback, Eugene is in the first year of his teaching career. He is seated in an office
in front of an administrator’s desk. She is explaining the results of Eugene’s
observation.)
Administrator: (cheerful yet without empathy) As you can see I had to cite you for lack of
proficiency at the beginning of your lesson because you failed to frame your learning
objective within an essential question on your lesson plans.
Eugene: But with all due respect, wasn’t it clear from my opening that the focus of that
lesson was the transcendentalists and their connection to nineteenth century utopian
movements?
Administrator: No. It was not clear.
Eugene: It was not clear?
Administrator: It was not clear.
Eugene: Did you see the quotation projected on the board by Emerson in reference to his
views on slavery?
Administrator: I saw the quotation.
Eugene: And the primary source packet that I handed out, containing works by Thoreau,
Emerson, Whitman, Melville, Poe, and Hawthorne?
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Administrator: I saw the primary source packet. But I could not give you credit for using
that in your lesson since you failed to get the Media Specialist’s signature prior to making
copies of those primary sources.
Eugene: (incredulous) So, even though I helped my students place in proper historical
context several seemingly unrelated primary sources I get credit for none of that because
I failed to get a signature on the copyright rules form.
Administrator: (smiling) That’s exactly right. And remember I had no idea what your
lesson was about because you failed to frame that lesson on your lesson plans within an
essential question.
Eugene: (Almost at his wits end) Let me understand this.
Administrator: (cheerful) Of course.
Eugene: I failed to meet any of the teaching proficiencies.
Administrator: That’s exactly right.
Eugene: Because I failed to frame my learning objective within an essential question and
because I neglected to get the Media Specialist to sign off that I turned in a form stating
that I understood copyright law as it pertains to materials used in the classroom.
Administrator: That’s exactly right.
Eugene: But Dr. Froggybottom, you sat through a fifty seven minute class where my
students analyzed eight or so primary source documents… analyzed them while
referencing a ton of outside information…all appropriate… and eventually came to
correctly conclude that the transcendentalists were a contrarian expression of nineteenth
century utopianism.
Administrator: Yes, I saw that but I didn’t understand what I saw.
Eugene: But why?
Administrator: (exceedingly cheerful) Because you failed to frame your learning
objective within an essential question.
(Flashback two: Eugene is seated on a stool at the front of his classroom. The room is
filled with parents who may sign their child up to take his class in US history. It is still,
very early in his teaching career.)
Eugene: One of the central focuses of the class is historiography. It’s the study of
different historical perspectives on a similar topic.
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Parent one: Mr. Dobs?
Eugene: (politely) Debs
Parent one: What?
Eugene: (politely) My last name is Debs.
Parent one: (insistent) My son said it was Dobs, look he sent me this text just now.
Eugene: The text does say Dobs, but my name is Debs.
Parent one: Are you sure? My son is really good at history.
Eugene: I’m sure he is, but my last name is Debs (attempting a joke) I got it from my
father.
Parent one: (angry) I never had a father! Are you making fun of me?
Eugene: (attempting to diffuse the situation) No, of course not…
Parent two: (interrupting) I have a question!
Eugene: Yes, what would you like to know?
Parent two: I heard you got divorced.
Eugene: Well, yes, but why don’t we focus on the syllabus and the reading list for this
class.
Parent three: I heard you got divorced too!
Parent two: See! I’m not crazy! I knew this guy got divorced. Why’d you get divorced?
Parent three: Yeah, I wanna know that too!
Parent one: Is that why you changed your name to Dobs… from the shame of your
divorce?
Parent four: I want to ask a question about politics?
Eugene: (relieved) Of course, what would you like to know?
Parent four: (serious) What are your personal political beliefs? You know what I mean?
Are you one of those liberals…one of those gay marriage, abortion promoting, welfare
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supporting, pre-marital sex loving, civil rights marching, white male hating, Birkenstock
wearing, Prius driving, tree hugging, guns rights limiting, feminist, liberals?
Eugene: (sensing trouble) I don’t think my personal beliefs are relevant …and in any case
they have no bearing on the class. My primary job is to give your children a solid
foundation in US history and experience in different types of historical thinking.
Parent two: Is that why you got divorced? Cause of your (mocking tone) practice of premarital sex? Or is it because you like men? Oh… that’s so disgusting! Just thinking about
men having sex with other men makes me want to beat the ever living crap out of
them…praise Jesus!
Parent one: Probably why he changed his name from Dobs. He’s got something to hide.
Parent five: Hey, did you know he’s the only social studies teacher not to coach a sport?
Parents 6-25 (In unison) Why don’t you coach a sport? You got something against
sports?
Eugene: No, I love sports, although I prefer those with less violent contact…so as to
reduce the risk for concussions and other serious injury.
Parent one: Is that why you coach the chess club?
Parents 6-25 (In unison) The chess club!? Chess ain’t a sport. You know who plays
chess? Jews!
Parent two: And atheists!
Parent five: (sincerely confused) I thought Jews are atheists?
Parent three: Jews and atheists…I don’t like the sound of that.
(The third flashback never happened. Eugene is walking toward a school that seems
familiar, but very different from what he has experienced in his life as a teacher. On his
way from the parking lot to the school building he passes scores of students engaged in a
variety of activities: dozens are tending a garden, while others are harvesting vegetables
or recording information on a tablet. As he continues walking he passes a large group of
students who appear to be playing a game that combines dance, singing, and throwing a
Frisbee. Further on he passes a group of students sitting under a tree. They’re talking and
eating while making reference to passages of a book they hold in their hands. As he
walks he appears to be gliding over the grounds of the school: Eugene passes wellmanicured gardens, growing herbs, fruits, and vegetables; he glides past a dairy farm, and
a barn raising, except the builders are not Amish, but a combination of students, teachers,
and community volunteers. He continues his glide and enters the main entrance to the
school. To his left, a small group of students and teachers are playing an assortment of
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instruments, acoustic and electronic. The music is familiar and strange at the same time.
To his right is one of the school’s offices (decentralization is the norm). Eugene enters,
waves and says hi to three secretaries: (all of whom hold doctorates and when they see
him, greet him with enthusiasm) Wil, Jason, and Debbie. They are busy performing some
of the logistics of the school’s operation and are discussing an upcoming interview)
Eugene: Hi guys! What’s up?
Debbie: (handing forms to several teachers and responding to Eugene) Hi Gene! We’re
getting ready to interview a couple of candidates to teach the A.P. Calculus II class.
Eugene: (innocently) Isn’t that kind of thing handled by the administration.
Wil: (bemused, but laughing his comment off as no big deal and handing a teacher a
package that had recently arrived) Gene… we haven’t had administrators for some
time…that job is shared between the teachers and us.
Jason: (thinking back and confirming on a laptop an academic meet between this school
and a rival in a couple of weeks, and handing a student a small plant grown in the
hydroponic lab) I think it’s been a good twenty years or so since administrators worked in
schools.
Debbie: (thinking back and handing the cook in charge of this week’s menu a new lemon
zester he had ordered for a new recipe, while also helping a young child with a difficult
knot she is practicing for her Eagle Scout Badge, and lastly nodding in approval to a
student and her novel solution to a physics problem) I can’t remember when it
happened…but at some point a small group of very smart folk were able to argue that
administrators at the school –in fact bureaucracy in general at the county, state, and
federal level- were too concerned with public relations, fundraising or educational issues
that had become politicized. Their numbers have been drastically reduced since most of
their activities had become counterproductive to sound pedagogy. Today, all
administrators must demonstrate to students, teachers, and parents their educational
value. Only then can they retain their jobs.
Eugene: (matter of fact) Makes sense to me.
Wil: (passing a brochure to the German teacher, a calendar of events to parent volunteers,
and consoling one of the younger students whose pet fish died the night before) Exactly.
One of the grandchildren of the Italian director Federico Fellini wrote a seminal book on
curriculum theory based in part on the film his granddad made called Orchestra
Rehearsal.
Debbie: (Performing CPR on the overweight pastor of the local church while editing a
peer reviewed essay for a highly respected curriculum journal) Great film! The orchestra
did away with the conductor since they figured he was unnecessary to the creation of
music.
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Wil: (Creating art out of found objects and learning Swahili from a computer program)
And usually a pain in the ass as well!
(Everyone laughs)
Jason: (Removing a planters wart from the librarian’s foot while demonstrating to the
biology class the proper way to hold a scalpel) Yeah, I love that film! Anyway, his
grandson wrote this really convincing book on curriculum theory that took the message
of his grandfather’s film to its logical conclusion: it put forth the proposition that skilled
teachers and students, like skilled musicians who know how and what to play, know what
needs to be done to truly create an environment where each can learn. So, in the same
way in which an orchestra can perform well without a conductor, schools can work just
fine without administration as it was once practiced.
Debbie: (Putting the finishing touches on an equation that proves cold fusion while
helping a very young student with his head covering.) Yeah, he wrote that with enough
experience at ensemble work, the chaos that once plagued collaboration from the bottom
up could be minimized, if not eliminated.
Wil: (Performing reverse circumcisions on a group of very grateful boys…painlessly
while demonstrating to a group of fashion minded students the correct way to wear a
salwar kameez and a sherwani) Gene, you might recall the curriculum program on
creative collaboration from the bottom up that was first piloted in Finland, back in 2026.
Eugene: Ya know I think I do remember that. Didn’t they pick Finland because of the
way in which their culture privileges intellectual rigor? And the way they treat their
teachers.
Jason: (Taking a perfect loaf of bread out of an oven, putting a few more strokes of
acrylic paint on his abstract of the sun, and answering a parent’s question over the phone)
It definitely wasn’t for their pickled fish! (Gene and Jason laugh)
Wil: (Handing a student a slide rule, and adding to his drawing of a less expensive
version of a particle accelerator) Yeah that’s right Gene. And as you might remember,
they chose well. After Finland the movement spread to the other Scandinavian countries,
Europe, Asia, Canada, Latin America, Africa, Australia and finally the United States.
Debbie: (Tasting what appears to be the perfect dry rub, and solving James Madison’s
problem of sovereignty, in ways that Madison himself overlooked) The U.S. held out
because of the lobbying efforts of wealthy corporations and the rest of the one percent
who feared, and rightly so, that a program that demonstrates the error of top down
administration would destroy the ethos that essentially justifies the existence of the one
percent.
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Jason: (Adjusting the lamp shade so their work area has the perfect amount of light and
reconciling quantum physics with Einstein’s Theory of Relativity) Eventually, even the
people of the United States understood the folly of administration from the top down,
especially in education.
Debbie: (Solving, with non-toxic chemicals, pest control for the school’s gardens, and
perfecting her internal combustion engine that runs on hydrogen) Exactly!
Wil: (Completing Schubert’s Unfinished Symphony and handing a tissue to a young boy
in the first grade) Anyway Gene, as long as you’re hear you might as well grab those
boxes…the books you ordered last week came in.
Eugene: (excited) Cool! It’s that anthology of what was considered Black radical poetry
from the 1960’s. Pretty tame stuff for today, but it scared the shit out of white people
during that time period.
Jason: (Convincing a small group of elderly visitors to the school why the Confederate
flag is a symbol of hate and making the perfect samosa) Nice Gene, that sounds
fascinating. If you have any extra copies, I would love to read that poetry! Hey, make
sure you stop by the culinary arts room….they made a chicken mole for lunch today!
Eugene: Thanks guys! I will. Oh, and I’ll check if there are any extra copies of the poetry
anthology. (he exits)
Scene Five: Authenticity
(Eugene emerges from his dreams in considerable pain. One of the patient/inmates, in the
next bed, notices his pain and offers him a couple of pills. He swallows them and within a
few minutes is feeling a lot better)
Eugene: Thanks.
J.P. Altgeld: You’re welcome. (Looks him straight in the eye and puts out his hand) John.
Eugene: (Gingerly) Gene. Why are you in here, you seem okay?
J.P. Altgeld: I’ve got locomotor ataxia…it means I have trouble keeping my balance. And
I’m prone to fevers. I usually work in the infirmary… today and probably for the next
few days I’m a patient.
Eugene: That’s why you had pain pills. But aren’t the authorities strict with their supply?
J.P. Altgeld: Oh they’re strict, but fortunately they can’t count.
Eugene: You can always count on their ineptitude.
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J.P. Altgeld: Indeed.
Eugene: (hesitant) Can I ask what got you locked up?
J.P. Altgeld: Sure. Let’s see… (as if reading a grocery list) protesting the use of child
labor, revealing the chemicals used in fracking, disclosing the profits made by privately
run prisons in the fish farm industry, releasing the internal emails of the coal mining
industry that proved the work environment unsafe… .Stuff like that..(Pause) I don’t want
to be in prison for my beliefs and my actions, but I have to.
Eugene: What… they didn’t charge you with kidnapping the Lindbergh baby?!
J. P. Altgeld: (Laughs) You?
Eugene: I was teaching non-standardized U.S. history.
J.P. Altgeld: (as if making a small discovery) So… you’re the teacher.
Eugene: Yes. You know about me?
J.P. Altgeld: (quickly concerned) Hold on a minute (pauses for about 30 seconds while
subtly gazing in the direction of a small dome attached to the ceiling), Okay, we can talk
again.
Eugene: (confused) What was that?
J.P. Altgeld: See the camera dome?
Eugene: I see it. I have (corrects himself) had one in what used to be my classroom.
J.P. Altgeld: Its color slightly changes when it turns on and off…When it’s safe and not
safe to speak.
Eugene: (Eugene thinks back to the dome in his former classroom) Of course. How did
you know I’m a teacher?
J.P. Altgeld: I’ve made some allies with a couple of the guards and one of the nurses.
Eugene: I was taken in with four of my students. Do you know anything about them?
J. P. Altgeld: The two boys are here… in general population. The girls were taken to the
women’s prison, about ten miles from here. I don’t know anything about the condition of
the girls, but the boys are okay.
Eugene: I tried to stop them.
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J.P. Altgeld: What do you mean?
Eugene: I tried to stop them from speaking the truth about U.S. history. We got so good
at hiding what we felt…and knew (emphasis on knew). ..I guess we just snapped.
J.P. Altgeld: It happens…don’t be so hard on yourselves. How could anyone with a soul
and a brain not lose control?
Eugene: I feel terrible…I feel responsible…
J.P. Altgeld: (Interrupting on the word responsible, but with compassion) Stop. You were
one of the few healthy people in an otherwise broken system. Most folks had been so
manipulated by hate and fear and deprivation, that they contributed to and were part of a
grand delusional narrative… (pauses again, this time Gene needs no explanation as to
why) somehow you and your students were able to rise above that and see things for what
they really are.
Eugene: (depressed) But look where its gotten us. We’re locked up, and seen as
criminals!
(At that moment a nurse walks in wheeling a tray of medical supplies. Gene freezes, but
John looks at him and signals that she’s okay)
Nurse Jones: (calm with assurance) Good afternoon. How are my boys?
Alex: (determined) Feeling strong Mother!
Nurse Jones: Really, the black and blues on your face tell me a different story!?
J. P. Altgeld: (to Gene) That’s Alex, our resident revolutionary.
(Gene and Alex look at each other. Alex is in a bed, on the other side of Gene. Alex puts
out his hand. Gene takes it)
Alex: Alexander Berkman.
Eugene: Eugene Debs…Gene.
Alex: Good to meet you. You look worried.
Eugene: Well… yeah…my students and I have been Tasered, I’ve been beaten…and now
we’re locked up.
Alex: Prison isn’t the worst place for a person who thinks.
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Nurse Jones: (To Gene) Let me take a look at that eye. (She gently examines Gene’s right
eye) Yeah, boy…the drones and assministrators did a number on you. How’s your
vision?
Eugene: It’s okay.
Nurse Jones: How many fingers am I holding up? (She holds up three)
Eugene: (Joking) twenty one.
Nurse Jones: Good!
(Nurse Jones turns to Alex)
Nurse Jones: How’s my boychik? For real.
Alex: (smiles) Always ready to (they all pause for about thirty seconds)…..give it to the
man!
Nurse Jones: (sighs) Looks to me like this time they gave it to you!
Alex: Perhaps. I’ll get them back.

(Nurse Jones smiles and wheels her cart to attend to the other inmates/patients. Alex turns
to Gene)
Alex: (To Gene and pointing to his face) The guards, at least most of them, are on the
Koch Industry payroll. Occasionally, they use my face as a prison piñata.
Eugene: Why?
Alex: A few years back I tried to kill the number two man for Koch Industries.
Eugene: Why?
Alex: Old school civil disobedience never worked for me. It might’ve worked for Gandhi
and King, it wasn’t working for me.
Eugene: What’d you do?
Alex: I barged into the office of Henry Frick, with my knife and gun, with the sole
intention to kill him.
Eugene: I take it things didn’t work out as planned?
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Alex: No it didn’t. Turns out he’s one tough son of a bitch. And he had guards helping
him.
Eugene: And what if you were successful? What would you have achieved?
J.P. Altgeld: That’s the question isn’t it?
Alex: Always the political scientist.
J. P. Altgeld: Always the violent revolutionary.
Alex: You think politics is the solution?!
J.P. Altgeld: Long term…yes (they pause) you think the death of the guy you tried to kill
would have changed anything? Huh?! Somebody else would’ve moved into that guy’s
job before the corpse grew cold. It’s not enough to kill the top dog. You have to kill the
ethos that supports the idea of a top dog.
Nurse Jones: (Making her way back towards Gene, John, and Alex) What’s wrong with a
little bit of both? Huh?
Alex: Politics and violence. Ahhh…I don’t know…maybe?
Eugene: A little rebellion now and then…
Nurse Jones: That’s Jefferson isn’t it?
Eugene: Yes, in a letter to Madison after Shay’s Rebellion.
J. P. Altgeld: I remember that. So Jefferson was an advocate of violence? I thought he
was a pacifist?
Eugene: I don’t think he ever meant to support the violence. In that letter to Madison he
condemns the uprising.
Nurse Jones: Then why say a little rebellion now and then?
Eugene: Probably, to temper the response to Shay and the like. Too forceful would have,
for Jefferson, felt like the heavy handed response of an oppressive monarchy.
Alex: But wasn’t the government unable to muster a forceful response, in the first place?
Weren’t they still under the Article of Confederation?
Eugene: You remember your U.S. history.
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Nurse Jones: Then you’ll also remember (everyone pauses) … that an army was raised
with private funds to put down the rebellions…. To protect the moneyed interests.
Sounds familiar doesn’t it?
J. P. Altgeld: That it does Mother…that it does.
Alex: It would seem that your country’s claim of a government by the people is a little
weak.
Nurse Jones: Oh it’s by the people…but only some of the people.
Eugene: True…. (Gene pauses to reflect) this feels good.
Alex: What feels good?
Eugene: Our discussion…it’s honest and everyone’s listening and contributing...it’s
refreshing.
J.P. Altgeld: Gene…you did that.
Eugene: Did what?
J.P. Altgeld: Asked good questions. Listened…moved the discussion along.
Nurse Jones: Isn’t that what you do? You are a teacher aren’t you?
Eugene: Not for a very long time.
Nurse Jones: You can change that.
Eugene: How?
Nurse Jones: Look around you. You’re in a building with people who have the time to
listen and a willingness to learn….what really happened…not the bullshit they teach in
the schools.
J.P. Altgeld: The stuff we need to learn.
Alex: The stuff we have to learn!
Eugene: (Not completely convinced) Okay…..
J.P. Altgeld: You can do what you do here…in the prison classrooms.
Eugene: How’s that?
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J.P. Altgeld: (matter of fact) The authorities only care about the profits they make by
exploiting prison labor. They let some of the inmates take or teach classes. You could
teach history. I can help.
Eugene: With what materials? I don’t have any of my books.
Alex: Smart doesn’t come from books! It comes from making the right decisions right
now!
Eugene: Yeah…maybe…but an informed person can make better decisions. Books help.
I cannot live without books (Eugene realizes he just quoted Jefferson without effort. He
wonders for a moment where that thought came from and returns his focus to the
discussion).
J.P. Altgeld: (turns to Gene as if offering him a solution to his problem) When the
schools became standardized, they shipped their books off to the various landfills…but
get this…they were full, so they dumped them at the prisons figuring most prisoners were
illiterate so what’s the harm in leaving potentially revolutionary materials in their hands.
(Pause)
Alex: Except we’re not illiterate…some of the guys on death row are better legal scholars
than those momzas on the Supreme Fucking Court!
J.P. Altgeld: (to Gene) If I can help you get a class or two to teach, would you do it?
Eugene: (mood brightens) Absolutely.
Scene Six: Anschauung
(A few months have passed since Eugene’s time in the prison infirmary. True to his
word, J.P. Altgeld was able to get Eugene out of working in the prison fish farm, mostly
because there were plenty of people for that, since it paid ten cents more per day than any
of the other prison jobs, and no one likes to teach. Eugene is inside a small prison room
reallocated as a classroom. The class has been in session for two weeks. It takes place
daily, Monday through Friday and lasts for approximately two to three hours. Eugene has
been given permission to extend class for as much as one extra hour, for a total of four
possible hours of class per day, if extra time is needed. The classroom is small, but not
cramped. Light is provided by several lamps placed throughout the room and from the
window that allows the afternoon sun to shine through, although the bars outside the
window are a not so subtle reminder of their imprisonment. There is an old fashioned
chalkboard on one wall and about fifteen or so student desks that integrate chair and
writing surface, plus some assorted chairs scattered about. To his delight the room is
filled with boxes of books and vinyl records of all sorts, discarded because of their
perceived lack of value. There is also a record player, tube amplification and speakers.
Eugene was told he could teach whatever he likes regarding history, although, given his
knowledge of U.S. history, odds are that the class will largely focus on U.S. history,
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unless one or more of the students bring up a legitimate request for a shift in focus. If
that’s the case, all bets are off. He is not required to turn in lesson plans, write essential
questions on the board, turn in a syllabus, post the standards on the wall, have his
students take any tests that are not of his or his students’ design, keep a log of parental
contact, participate in “professional learning opportunities,” go to faculty meetings,
attend parent conferences, enforce dress codes, coach a sport, attend open house, preplanning, post-planning, collaborative planning-unless the collaboration is between him
and the students in the class- participate in honors night, graduation ceremonies, or any of
the other tasks or rituals typically required of teachers. Any inmate that qualifies can
attend as long as space remains which for this first class is twenty students, and they meet
the qualifications. There are a few requirements: the student/inmate must agree to stay in
the class for its length-one semester; the student/inmate must be willing to listen and
respond honestly to the information being presented in the class and complete all agreed
upon outside assignments; and the student/inmate must not have engaged in violence,
unless it was in self-defense. The prison authorities have not installed a camera in the
ceiling. Instead, they keep two guards outside of the classroom who spend most of their
time watching on their tablets the contemporary equivalent of Roman chariot races and
gladiator games, instead of paying attention to the goings on of a history class. In fact,
much of what has transpired over the last two weeks has given them little cause to be
concerned.)
(The following inmates are part of Eugene’s first class)
Galileo
Martin Luther King Jr.
Lenny Bruce
Dalton Trumbo
H.J. Rosenthal
(Returning characters)
J. P. Altgeld
Alexander Berkman
Mark
Jack
(It is Monday, week three of Eugene’s history class. During the first two weeks of class
several topics emerged out of the class discussions and assigned readings. On the
previous Friday, the class agreed to more fully investigate one of them: Is violence
justifiable to achieve a political goal? Class has already been in session a couple of hours.
Eugene plays a record. Lenny, Martin, Mark, Jack and Alex are nodding their heads to
the music. The other students seem unaffected)
Lenny: Hey Gene, that’s some pretty hip shit we’re listening to. These cats swing like a
motherfucker. Who is that?
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Eugene: A British group called the Clash. This album is called Sandinista.
Mark: (remembering) Great record!
Galileo: (probing) Gene, why are we listening to this music? What is its connection to our
study of whether or not violence is justifiable to pursue a political goal?
Eugene: (smiling) Great question. Would anyone care to answer it?
H.J. Rosenthal: The group, The Clash, recorded this triple album in 1980 to highlight the
cause of the Sandinistas and to point out the continued hypocrisy of the United States’
foreign policy, especially during the Cold War years.
Galileo: That is an unsatisfactory response to my question.
H.J. Rosenthal: Hold on. I’m not done.
Galileo: My apologies. Please continue.
H.J. Rosenthal: For years the United States had been backing criminal, corrupt, regimes
simply because of their anti-Soviet stance.
Mark: That’s right. There was the CIA led coup that helped the Shah of Iran come to
power in 1954.
Jack: And Pinochet in Chile in 1973.
Mark: And Diem in South Vietnam in the early 1960’s.
H.J. Rosenthal: By 1980, Nicaragua was just one more example of the United States’
government either supporting a dictator like Somoza who routinely tortured and
perpetrated unspeakable crimes against his people, or trying to unseat someone like
Ortega, who was democratically elected, because of his alliance with the Soviets.
Galileo: You still haven’t adequately addressed our query.
H.J. Rosenthal: (angry) Hold on a minute. I’m not done.
Galileo: Again, my apologies.
H.J. Rosenthal: Anyway…my argument is this: If the Reagan administration can
exchange arms for hostages and use the proceeds to fund the Contras of Nicaragua, then I
can sell a shitload of cocaine and use the money to fund the Frente Sandinista de
Liberación Nacional.
Alex: I agree. A democratic regime should be allowed to defend itself from tyranny.
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Dalton Trumbo: From within or without.
Galileo: (Sarcastic) The quiet man speaks!
(Dalton Trumbo slowly flips off Galileo who replies back to him first with his right hand,
then quickly switches to his left when he realizes the missing finger of his right hand)
Martin Luther King Jr.: But doesn’t violence beget further violence?
Jack: From what I’ve read historically…yes. But what’s a legitimate response…turning
the other cheek? I don’t think so.
Mark: Consider how many fewer people might have died if the United States responded
to Hitler in 1937 instead of 1941.
Lenny (to MLK): You gonna tell me with a straight face you never wanted to hit Bull
Connor?
Martin Luther King Jr.: I didn’t want to hit him. It would not have been a Christian
response.
Lenny: (sarcastically): But schtupping other women while you were married…that’s a
Christian response!?
Eugene: Let’s stay focused on the question.
Lenny: (to MLK) Sorry man. (to H.J.) Hey brother…you still got any blow?
H.J. Rosenthal: Funny.
Eugene: Gentlemen…please.
J.P. Altgeld: What if we look at this from another angle? (everyone listens) What if all
Nation States made a concerted effort to reduce and eventually remove the underlying
causes of war?
Mark: I see what you’re getting at. If England and France didn’t demand such absurdly
huge reparations from Germany following WW I, then perhaps the conditions don’t exist
for the election of Hitler in 1933.
Jack: Let’s go back even further…before WW I…before Germany’s militarization,
which, it could be argued, was a legitimate response to Great Britain’s control of
international trade.
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Galileo: What if! What if! People are too fickle and unpredictable! I’d rather deal with
particles and light waves.
Mark: (To Galileo) And too easily manipulated! When I think back to the students in our
class, just sitting there while Jack, Zoe, Hannah, Gene, and I were getting Tasered and
beaten…all I’m saying is if anyone, living or droid, comes at me or my friends in a
violent way…I’m kicking some ass…sorry Martin.
Martin Luther King Jr.: That’s okay son.
Lenny: I’m kicking ass too!
Alex: With what… your obscene words (emphasis on obscene words)!? We’re talking
about real violence…physical (emphasis on the word physical) violence. You think you
can do that?
Lenny: (unconvincingly) Yes.
Alex: Bullshit! You’ll do what you always do…retreat into sex and narcotics.
Lenny: Hey, don’t knock sex and narcotics…it’s a great way to spend an afternoon...or a
few days…months… (trails off).
Dalton: Let’s not be so hard on the guy…
Lenny: Thanks Spartacus!
Eugene: Let’s not lose focus on the original question. We’re talking about violence as an
appropriate response to achieve a political goal…not a street brawl.
Mark: What about the US response to Japan during WW II? Was that violence justified?
Eugene: Good question Mark!
J.P. Altgeld: Perhaps our question should be reframed?
Eugene: How so?
J.P. Altgeld: Perhaps we should concede that for humans pacifism is a pipe dream? It’s
inherent to our species to be violent…on any scale.
Galileo: That’s logical
J.P. Altgeld: Perhaps the better question should be whether or not violence that is a
proportional response (emphasis on the word proportional) to an attack is ethically
justified.
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Alex: Hey…boychik, the Japanese bombed you first! As far as I’m concerned they don’t
deserve a proportional response.
Jack: The Japanese military (emphasis on the word military) bombed us.
Mark: And yet we destroyed and killed anywhere from forty to eighty percent of the
civilian population as we firebombed Japan…and this was before we dropped atomic
bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki!
Jack: Proportionality should be the goal if a nation wants to behave ethically.
Martin: I suppose a reduction in violence is preferable to unmitigated violence. But my
faith in God and my commitment to my church compels me to seek a non-violent
solution.
Galileo: (mumbling) Commitment to your church?! It must be very different from my
church.
Martin: You’re welcome to pray with me.
Galileo: No thanks Martin.
Eugene: Good work everyone. See you tomorrow.
Lenny: Wait. Do we have time to hear the other side of that record?
Eugene: Sure Lenny. Why don’t you flip it over.
(As the music of the Clash plays the lights fade on Eugene and his students, downstage
left. Downstage right, the lights come up on Hannah and Zoe surrounded by several
women in a classroom setting.)
Hannah: Whose turn is it to lead the discussion?
Zoe (confidently) Mine.
Emma Goldman: I have a question…
(End scene. The lights fade as the music of the Clash gets louder)
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“…The past should be altered by the present as much as the present is directed by the
past.” From “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” by T.S. Elliot (2007)
“You can’t improvise on nothing man; you’ve gotta improvise on something.” Charles
Mingus

CHAPTER 6
Improvisation, Institutions and Standards
While it might be convenient to think of an improvisational activity as either
resisting or re-enforcing the “standards” of an institution like public education or popular
music, it would be more accurate to state that an improvisational activity is intimately
tied to that institution, and can neither completely resist or adequately re-enforce the
standards which make up that institution. Moreover, it is inaccurate to describe an
improvisational activity as existing “outside” of an institution or institutions. Still, I will
at times add to the confusion by referring to “that spontaneous act” and the well-learned
“standard” as if both are autonomous and separate from one another. All improvisationsmusical, theatrical, and conversational, for example- are composed of the raw material
that flows to and from (and lies in between and perhaps at times in a metaphysical space)
the dominant and subordinate culture(s)- the former feeding off the latter in a mostly
parasitic relationship. If this improvisational activity is to be transformative of a standard
or standards (the goal of all who call and /or practice a radical pedagogy) the participants
must be attentive to the dialogical nature of this activity, but more importantly willing
and able to make a decision that, at least for a time, resembles a just and perhaps difficult
choice. And within the field of improvisation all of this must happen “spontaneously” or
be the result of a “spontaneous” act. For these things to happen, the people involved
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must hone a developing relational intelligence since what they are engaged in is a battle
of sorts. In my use of relational intelligence, I am not referring to this term in a narrow
sense; for example, in the way a corporate CEO might wish his employees behaved so
that they maximize profits by working more efficiently. Instead, to borrow a term from
Curriculum scholar Marla Morris, I would like to “tease out” additional ways of looking
at relational intelligence, for it is in this way that I can analyze the interaction between
improvisation and institutions as well as the nature of improvisational activity, since the
latter has significant impact on the former. I find the expression to “tease out” so
appropriate for this discussion since it mirrors a significant part of the activity, which
occurs between the best improvisers in any field. Indeed, a musician plays a series of
notes in such a way as to solicit (tease out) a unique response from her fellow players
(seemingly perfect for that moment) that would not have been played had those initial
notes never been heard; or a skilled teacher, so attuned to her students and their moment,
who is able to coax out of her students a response that is both honest and furthers their
inquiry. To help me in this task are an assortment of Curriculum writers/practitioners,
jazz musicians/ writers, those who write about and/or perform improvisational comedy,
and some from “traditional” theatre. I am also inspired, and perhaps “inspirited” (thank
you Ted Aoki (2005)!), to fashion an argument from a wide assortment of sources
because of my background in improvisational theatre, my time in the classroom, and my
study of Curriculum. For now, I will examine the relational intelligence found in the
classroom, jazz and improvisational theatre and analyze the extent to which
improvisation influences various institutional standards. At times, I will go beyond the
confines of improvisation in jazz, education, and theatre and touch upon topics that are
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important to music, education, and theatre in general. In other words, I will draw upon
the work of some writers and practitioners of music, education, and theatre because much
of what is important to their field are also relevant to my discussion of improvisation and
institutions.
Relational Intelligence
As I have mentioned, the notion of relational intelligence needs to be “teased out”
so that we can look beyond the limited interactions of students and teachers who are
shackled within an environment and ontology that is largely performative, in the sense
that Lyotard (1984) argued. It is, therefore, useful to consider Buber’s (1958) statement
that, “All real living is meeting,” from his book, I and Thou (p. 11). Buber’s notion of
meeting can be (and should be) interpreted in many ways: one such way is in the meeting
of two people, perhaps for the first time. Each brings with her a unique set of experiences
and expectations. And while the meeting is “improvised” it is also scripted. This script is
the product of societal norms and the only way that this pre-written script gets changed is
if both of these folks are willing to drop or alter these norms (read standards) as they
become aware, respond to, and embrace the differences of the Other, assuming of course
that there are differences. More often than not a very limited meeting takes place that
simply reinforces the standards they both share. Sometimes a more expanded meeting
occurs, the kind that Buber had in mind with his notion of meeting. This was the case
with Christopher Uhl (2010), a professor of environmental science at Penn State who
writes about “acknowledging what is real” (p. 105), in the classroom so genuine inquiry
can take place. Like the best jazz players, teachers, and theatrical improvisers Uhl is in
pursuit of genuine inquiry, which therefore means he is in pursuit and makes use of
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surprise -the type of surprise that comes from the cognitive and embodied responses of
his students in the classroom. For many it is useful to discuss these terms as if they are
separate and have no impact upon the other. I would suggest that the cognitive and
embodied are intertwined- each refreshing the other. I would also suggest that the
cognitive response is rarely ever free from embodied experience in the first place. While
there are essays to be read and concepts to be absorbed, professor Uhl’s goals are openended. He understands the pedagogical negligence involved in the narrow minded task of
“covering the material” as he asks rhetorically, “…What if we gave ourselves permission
to stay right in the present moment and trust that when our turn comes what we say will
be compelling because we will speak our present-moment-truth (and not some rehearsed
script)” (p. 107)? Uhl acknowledges the risks involved in allowing the embodied
experiences from himself and his students to influence the process of inquiry, yet for him
the risks are outweighed by the rewards of a more thorough inquiry, or in other words a
more complete and honest meeting as suggested by Buber. For Uhl, the “present-moment
truth” also meant honestly confronting his students when they were unprepared for class.
He shared his displeasure with the students in his freshman seminar who were unprepared
and required from them a meaningful explanation or a heads up if the weekly assigned
reading was not to be completed. In this context Uhl writes that, “For the first time in the
semester, I began to see who has been in the room” (p. 107). Indeed, what is important
for Uhl is that he and the students in the room honestly confront the collection of essays
on environmental science with their hopes, fears, prejudices, lack of attentiveness-all of
it. With his insistence on seeing the students in this fashion Uhl is demonstrating the
inadequacy of a pedagogy, which views the students as irrelevant to the inquiry process.
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For him, the material and the study of environmental science are enriched when an honest
intellectual inquiry occurs by the student’s careful reading of the “material”, their
responses (cognitive and embodied), and the discussions that follow. In fact to see the
students as irrelevant to the learning process is to miss the point entirely.
In his study entitled, Influencing Pedagogy Through the Creative Practices of
Youth, Leif Gustavson (Hill, Vasudevan, 2008,) goes much further than Professor Uhl
when he argues that an effective pedagogy should come from the creative work students
do outside of the school. He focuses on one of his students, Gil, who is a turntablist. Gil
reminds me of what Rancière (2009) refers to as the, “voice of a people to come” (p. 57).
Indeed, Rancière writes that, “…The artistic voice of the people is the voice of a people
to come. The people to come is the impossible people which, at one and the same time,
would be the divided people of protest and the collective harmony of a people in tune
with the very breath of nature, be it a chaotic or a ‘chaosmatic’ nature” (p. 57). It’s
worth noting that Gustavson has an extraordinary relationship with Gil! Employing
composition, improvisation and many hours of study and play, Gil’s play reminds me of
the improvisational jazz performer as he samples various sounds from a wide assortment
of records. Despite their different mediums, both Gil (through sampling) and the jazz
musician (by quoting, and I am thinking specifically about the album by Sonny Rollins,
Way Out West, (1957) in which Rollins subverts the notion of the white heroic cowboy.
He does this in two ways: first, the album cover ironically shows Rollins in 1950’s
cowboy garb, at a time when Westerns dominated the television and “silver screen.”
Second, in his masterful transformation of the insipid cowboy tune, I’m an Old
Cowhand) reach back into a multitude of sounds with specific meanings and through
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their common aesthetic transform those meanings as they play and perform. Indeed,
Gustavson (2008) writes,
Later, I asked the two seniors and Gil, “Why are the samples that you pick so
interesting when you take them out of context?” This came up while Gil spun the
soundtrack to Raiders of the Lost Ark. While experimenting with various voices
and sounds on the album, Gil found the sound of the gunshot. Through scratching
the sound, he transformed the gunshot into something different-a drum beat.
Through the improvisational freedom of reappropriating this sound, Gil took a
dominant discourse (gunshot as violent act) and invested it with his own particular
inflection (gunshot as rhythm) (p. 89).
The discovery by professor Uhl of the importance of being attentive to one’s
students in the classroom as they are thinking and reacting to the class as it happens, and
Gustavson’s pedagogical insights gleaned by closely working with his students and their
work are a central feature of William Ayers’ eloquent book, Teaching Toward Freedom
(2004). In it he writes:
The teacher takes a step out from behind the desk, away from the lectern, off the
pedestal, and perhaps off the cliff. There is a feeling of vertigo as the teacher
looks with new eyes, as the familiar is made strange. There is risk and there is
fear-hard work, this never ending attentiveness, this improvisation- but there is
satisfaction as well. She frees herself from the terror of teaching. She no longer
has to pretend to be a god, all knowing, all powerful, beneficent one minute,
punishing the next. She can shed the hypocrisy and phoniness of the teacher pose
and begin to face herself as she really is. She can discover her students as they
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really are, too, and recognize that there is always more to know in all directions.
Who in the world are they (p. 43)?
It is the attentiveness of the teacher to her students, and the attentiveness of the
students to each other, their material, their teacher, and themselves, that contribute to a
successful improvisation, and thus, a successful class. The other contributing factors to a
successful improvisation are the genuine pursuit of surprise and the willingness to accept
an ontology (even if that ontology remains unnamed and uninterrogated) that goes
beyond the cognitive and the linear. When all of these elements are in full swing (and I
am referring to the kind of swing that is in most good jazz) improvisation does have the
ability to transform standards that need to be discarded, fleshed out, or simply polished.
Because within the tension of that dialectical improvisational moment is an opportunity
for what Habermas and Adorno have referred to as pragmatic action. Perhaps the best
description of this action comes from William Pinar (1994) who writes, “…Pragmatic
action cannot be frozen into principles and concepts composed before such action, and
assumed to be legitimated locally and empirically. Pragmatic action is born only in the
arena of action, and to the extent one enters this arena with static principles of how to
behave, one deforms the situation…” (p. 118). Once Professor Uhl realized the
importance of seeing his students for who they really are at that moment, and move
beyond the need to cover the material, (and while we’re on the subject, besides the
hypocrisy inherent in the proclamation that one can “cover the material”, wouldn’t it
make more sense to lose that expression and un-cover it, expose it, stir it up!?) he was
better able to engage in the pragmatic action described by Pinar and embrace what Aoki
(2005) has described as a “curriculum -as-lived-experience” (p. 160). Uhl was willing to
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let go of specific goals that in an earlier time would have been non-negotiable, because he
was willing and able to honestly “meet” his students, moving beyond what Aoki (2005)
has described as “curriculum -as-plan,” and trust that their present moment of truth,
composed of a changing continuum of standards and spontaneous creation, would be
enough to guide his class toward a meaningful inquiry.
Vox Populi, Vox Dei?
(The Voice of the People is the Voice of God?)

Improvisation that approaches the pragmatic action referred to by Pinar, and
demonstrated by Uhl and Gustavson, would seem to be at its best when it can occur
within an environment that has already decided that it would accept a certain degree of
playfulness. Still, there isn’t a recipe that would let someone construct such an
environment. There isn’t a schematic diagram that could show this ideal environment so
that it may be replicated ad infinitum despite the proclamations of many in and out of
education that claim to have the winning formula. But for the improv player, and
improvisation in general, the environment is crucial for a good performance or rehearsal.
In speaking of environment and rehearsal (and by the way it’s all a rehearsal), British
theatrical director Peter Brook (1996) has said that:
The quality of the work done in any rehearsal comes entirely from the creativity
of the working climate-and creativity cannot be brought into being by
explanations. The language of rehearsals is like life itself: it uses words, but also
silences, stimuli, parody, laughter, unhappiness, despair, frankness and
concealment, activity and slowness, clarity and chaos. Brecht recognized this and
in his last years he surprised his associates by saying that the theatre must be
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naïve. With this word he was not reneging his life’s work: he was pointing out
that the action of putting together a play is always a form of playing, that
watching a play is playing (p. 77).
Indeed, good improvisation, akin to the creativity mentioned by Brook (and the
play desired by Brecht), and as of yet undefined, can and should emerge from an
environment that allows things to happen. A place that is open to and informed by chance
and occasionally filled with the pregnant moment. But this moment must be noticed. This
is a very special place; one cannot simply will this type of place into being. Instead, the
environment that Brook or anyone for that matter concerned with creative justice is
referring to comes into being on its own. The best that a creative type can do is simply
notice when the time is right to take a stand, or make a choice, based on their
attentiveness to that environment. In other words this environment can’t be forced –it
must be noticed. The talent or lack of talent is in the quality of that stand or choice and
the timing of those decisions. The attentive teacher knows this, as does the talented
musician or actor. This is not to say that this is the only way that good improvisation can
occur-it can also emerge out of a hostile and decidedly un-playful environment, but more
on that later. The point I would like to make now is that even when the climate is right,
or one thinks that the climate is right, good improvisation- the kind that furthers inquiry,
works against reification, promotes consideration of the Other, interrogates standards,
and promotes the process of creation- doesn’t happen. For now, I would like to explore
some of these situations in order to further our analysis of improvisation and its ability to
transform institutions.
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For many who practiced, performed, and trusted improv from its modern
inception at the University of Chicago in the 1950’s, and especially in the 1960’s and
1970’s, there was always the belief that this work would uncover a greater truth or a
series of greater truths. Despite this belief, much of the joy experienced by the players
and audience was derived from the tension that came from their playing with power
structures-the have-nots giving it to the haves, so to speak, since few truths were being
uncovered. But this was a joy without merit, since there was never any intention to
disrupt those power structures. In reality these improvisations were nothing more than the
boss showing everyone what a good sport he was by taking a “pie to the face.”
Boundaries may have been blurred in this play with power structures, but the rules that
justified those power structures remained intact. Again, I turn to Rancière (2009) who
writes, “…It often leads to a different form of stultification, which uses the blurring of
boundaries and the confusion of roles to enhance the effect of the performance without
questioning its principles” (p. 21). In other words, the power structures could never be
disrupted since the logic that created them remained. There are many reasons why
improvisation failed to achieve the type of social justice that should have undermined the
institutions of patriarchy, racism, sexual oppression, and class conflict, for example,
called for by many who desired it in the fifties and sixties. Ultimately, professional
improv’s failure comes down to two things: its commercial success and eventual
commodification, and ironically its central tenet of trusting the group mind. Never deny.
Commodification separated the audience and performers by narrowing the audience’s
role, which only allowed for spectatorship, and the performer’s role, reduced to
entertainer. The relational intelligence that could have developed between these two
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groups never happened because it wasn’t given a chance. The group mind that was being
trusted was in most cases heterosexual, white, bourgeois, and male. In her wellresearched examination of improvisational theatre from the 1950’s through the rest of the
century, Amy Seham (2001) was one of those people who hoped that improvisation could
be both revelatory and revolutionary. She writes:
…Why not assume that improv would reflect the power dynamics of society as a
whole? In part, because the powerful rhetoric of improv insists on process, mutual
support, and individual liberation. In part, because so many intelligent, passionate, and
sincere players believe in that rhetoric. In part, because women and people of color have
historically found a voice through improvisational modes of cultural expression-including
feminist theatre and jazz- but to the notable exclusion of improv (p. xviii).
Mainstream improv was unable to serve as a revolutionary force in contrast to
jazz and feminist theatre, for reasons already mentioned, and also because the good of the
group was sacrificed for the good of the star. The star was there to score and he did that
by making people laugh- quickly and often. Importantly, Bakhtin’s love of Rabelais’
world and the transformative power of laughter that world possessed was not to be found
on the stage of Second City, for example, or in its audience. Moreover, the truth that so
many comedians, and lovers of comedians, see as an integral part of all jokes that work
was not the truth of marginalized groups. Instead, it was the sentiment of a dominant
group that felt threatened by something new. The laughter that was demanded by this
audience reflected, supported, and nurtured a largely conservative view. Improv
squandered its opportunity to speak truth to power by embracing the nostalgic funny. In
other words, they used humor to reify traditional, norms regarding gender relations, and
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heteronormativity, for example. Why did this happen? The reasons are many: Funny
men got shows on television and some, film careers. And it happened because their
audience wasn’t necessarily white and male exclusively, but the sentiments that audience
espoused and expected certainly were. The laughter that was sought and created in this
environment usually came from a straight white male’s back pocket instead of the Other.
It lacked spontaneity. In his book on laughter, Henri Bergson (2005) wrote that it is”… a
social gesture that singles out and represses a special kind of absentmindedness in men
and in events” (p.43). This suggests that laughter was used as a type of check. A way to
ensure that everyone was on the same page regarding what was funny and what wasn’t
funny. It was a laughter Brecht would have hated since it repressed the naïve in favor of
the standard norm of funny. This was no time for innovation. Instead, the group mind of
the actors and audience were calling the shots. An undeveloped and untapped group
mind, which was nurtured by a popular culture they were either unwilling or unable to
interrogate, and a “free market” that turned art into a commodity, chose to play it safe.
Some might argue they were financially forced, or perhaps seduced, to play it safe. Still,
they blew it. All that intense immediacy that was there for the improv artist to consider:
the desire to play, the entire “there” that is contained in a live event had been squandered.
We might have appeared hip and knowing (I should know, I was part of that experience)
but in reality we could have used a more humbling experience. We could have allowed
for more play, taken more risks, fallen on our faces more often. Perhaps the audience
could have allowed some experimentation, if only they had experienced some of the joy
that comes from a successful experiment. We could have allowed for more naiveté-the
kind sought by Brecht. But as crowds started to form and cash registers started to ca-
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ching, the audience reverted to their role of consumer and the players turned their craft
and sporadic art into product. The voice of the people isn’t always wise, yet their
adoration can be habit forming.
As improv evolved, especially during the eighties- when stand-up comedy
was exploding, as was ticket sales- improv theatres around the country now contained
their improvisational activities, within a faux competition. There would be teams, judges,
scoring, timing, winners and losers. A sports minded public (used to their role of
spectator) easily accepted the format, as did the improv troupes that appreciated the
income and the minimization of risk: If improv has transformative capabilities, partially
derived from experimentation, very little of that was in evidence during this time period.
It was commonly accepted by the players/producers that audiences didn’t want to be
challenged nor be privy to the process of creation that sometimes appears within a
spontaneous act. We were told that audiences wanted to be entertained (as if that
statement alone was enough). Since entertainment is a subjective term, open to many
different interpretations, it was ironic that the variety of entertainment was being
decreased rather than increased. The audiences seemed to want to be shortchanged in this
regard and we delivered!
Things might have been different. In the beginning of the improv movement in
the 1950’s an improv piece had been developed known as the “Harold.” It was essentially
a group scene, which evolved slowly. Some “Harolds” could last for an hour, sometimes
much longer. This scene incorporated many diverse and seemingly unrelated elements,
some of which were suggested spontaneously by the audience while the players
introduced others. All of these elements had to be justified in some way that was organic
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to the nascent scene. At times a natural humor emerged from the scenes but the humor
was never forced or pre-written. One of the challenges of the “Harold” was to make a
suggestion seem right by working it in to the scene even if the suggestion seemed
“wrong.” It didn’t matter; you had to make it “right.” The Harold forced you to not write
the scene in your head before its creation. This game is the closest we would come to
improvisation and a prime example of the pragmatic action described earlier by Pinar.
Moreover, the players and the audience had to really pay attention. When everything
clicked it was an amazing sight to behold and be a part of. Mediocre television star and
alumnus of Second City in Chicago Jim Belushi (younger brother of tragic comedian
John) maintained that he enjoyed a good “Harold” better than sex. Assuming his sex life
was adequate his statement gives us a glimpse into the improvisational and seemingly
magical qualities of the Harold. While it was common for the players and audience to, at
times, react in awe while the Harold was unfolding, especially if the scene was going
well, it was more often the case that the scene evolved into chaos and the audience felt
shortchanged. When the Harold was working it was in part a result of the highly honed
improvisational skills of the player’s and the attentiveness they displayed toward their ongoing scene that was also is some ways a suggestion for a scene to come. It is perhaps the
tensionality between the scene and the scene to come that gave the scene its vibrancy and
eliminated the “pedagogical stance,” which inculcates passivity in the spectator as it
paradoxically attempts to do the opposite. Also, it was a function of the observational
and participatory skills honed by an audience who let go of their cloak of passive
spectatorship and fulfilled their dialogical responsibilities as viewer. In this way the
Harold served the same function as the sculpture of the UN playground I discussed earlier
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in chapter 3 by Noguchi and described by Appelbaum (2012).

It’s hard to fully know

why the Harold was perceived as magical. One possible explanation could be that the
players and audience found themselves having fun as they took part in the joy of creation.
For example, even when the scenes were not particularly funny, they were immensely
rewarding to watch and take part in since so much of the joy of the scene was in its
unfolding. I’ve mentioned this joy in an earlier chapter with my discussion of the German
term funktionslust. We thought we had found another path to creation. In reality, we had
built upon a creative environment similar to the one described earlier by British director
Peter Brook (2008) and Appelbaum (2012, 2013). We had participated in that dialogical
encounter I referred to earlier by William Pinar (1994, 2006) and an opportunity to
possibly create pragmatic action, although in retrospect I think the Harold was less
pragmatic and more theoretical. Eventually two camps emerged: One that saw the beauty
in the Harold as it evolved and another that resented the alleged formlessness, length,
experimentation and sporadic humor. Although there was an audience for the Harold it
was small in comparison to the growing audiences who wanted to laugh, and laugh often.
During an era of Cold War, Vietnam, race riots and minority rights, for example, the last
thing a white Christian public wanted was a pipeline to greater truths (since that issue had
apparently already been settled). Instead, the ‘silent majority’ got a balm that soothed the
souls of those who argued for the destruction of the Welfare State, and a mass theology
that gave permission to personal gain at the expense of one’s neighbor: Adorno’s (1978)
earlier dismissal of jazz was for similar reasons: He saw jazz not as a dialectical
encounter, but as a pleasing diversion to the real struggle. As improv troupes morphed
into ComedySportz or Improv Olympics, (two large companies who emphasized the
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competition between teams of players) the creative process and environment (always
intimately connected) became further constrained. Now, entertainment became the race to
the punch line. A scene couldn’t go for more than thirty seconds, sometimes less time,
before the players felt an urgency to get to a punch line, any punch line. Often times this
need to get to the punch line was at the expense of the group work that at one time was
Improv’s reason for being. All of us wanted to be that guy who got to the funny first,
even if that meant stepping on someone’s toes to get there. During this time period, when
the funny promoted gender and ethnic norms (to name but a few standards), a small
group of players felt the need to rebel. Although they were unable to use improvisation to
challenge these norms while being working members of these “improvisational sports
teams” many left and formed their own groups. These new groups looked very different.
They tended to be all female or all African American. Some formed more specifically
arranged groups, based on sexual orientation or class. One of the more successful groups
came out of the Chicago improv scene in the early nineties. They were an all female
group and called themselves, “Jane.” As part of this group’s performances,
…actors sometimes began a scene in one gender, only to be endowed in mid-gesture as
another…The Janes reveled in these moments of incongruity…The key is not to reject
the seeming error in proper gender performance, but to incorporate it as an integral part
of the character in process. These are the moments when improvisation can interrupt the
constant repetition of gender norms (Seham, 2001, p. 73).
Improv may have been integral to Jane’s successful challenge of gender norms, as
Seham maintains, or this group’s success at challenging gender norms could be the result
of Jane’s initial decision to form an all female group in the first place. In other words,
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since the members of Jane, and their audience, had experienced the group mind of the
heterosexual, white, male, improv’s alleged ability to challenge these norms might
instead reflect a decision that had been made earlier, rather than one which emerged as a
direct result of participating in or viewing an improvisational scene. The issue is whether
or not Jane and the audience’s laughter and overall enjoyment of Jane’s performances
were the byproducts of a catharsis of sorts, a validation of pre-existing sentiment, or the
result of improv’s transformative abilities. One may never know for sure. Seham (2001)
writes that “…Jane member Jennifer Bills suggests that it is more fun for an audience to
see a man lower his status to play a woman than to see a woman play a man…”(p. 71).
An audience that has this kind of fun is an audience that retains an adherence to a
conservative gender norm -just imagine the audience that enjoyed the “antics” of “Uncle
Milty” as he donned yet another dress during his reign of television in the 1950’s, or the
current cross dressing of Adam Sandler and my point will be clear. I would argue that
the bulk of the audiences that enjoyed performances by Jane had already made up their
minds regarding outdated gender norms and what Jane cast members created on stage
was simply a validation of the audience’s sentiment, not the consequence of their
transformation as the result of watching or participating in an improv scene.
The Arena of Action
If improvisation isn’t a weapon for justice in a free society, if
improvisation is unable to transform or undermine some or all of a society’s standards,
why is it sometimes feared as a threat to authority in one that is mostly closed? This was
one of the questions examined by anthropologist Laurie Frederik Meer (2007) who
analyzed and took part in a type of theatre that had developed in Cuba called Playback
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Theatre. As Meer explains Playback theatre had its roots in the larger Pan-Latin theatre
developed or informed, in part, by “radical” pedagogues, such as Paulo Freire (2008) and
Augusto Boal (2000) in the 1960’s and 1970’s: “…it was reminiscent of other types of
people’s theatre, theatre of social action, or consciousness raising theatre around the
world…” (Meer, 2007, p.107). The Cuban authorities had allowed Playback Theatre’s
creation since it seemed to fit in well with Cuba’s claims of revolutionary art and
collective action. The actors who participated in Playback Theatre did so because it
seemed to offer
… a sense of psychological liberation from a society hyper-saturated with politics and
political ideology, and in this way the movement is a radical art-radical in its ability to
transcend society’s orthodoxy. In Cuba, the words and ideas of Marx, Lenin, Castro, and
more recently, Hugo Chavez and Eva Morales hover in the air like a constant mist,
absorbed by tired bones and minds aching for some sense of beauty and cultural
transcendence…” (Meer, 2007, p. 110).

At the heart of Playback Theatre are individual stories, re-told through group
improvisations. Importantly, the new stories, which emerged from these improvisations,
had to be submitted to the state for approval before they could be re-told (performed) for
an audience. All of the actors receive their salaries from the state so they had to abide by
this rule. Meer writes that, “…Group improvisation is often used during the creative
process of playwriting and production…improvisations are never seen in public
(emphasis mine)…” (p. 115). The improvisations of these Cuban actors were feared
despite the fact that since the Castro revolution, the general Cuban population, along with
the intelligentsia, had developed a type of self-censorship that monitored and controlled
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anti-government speak. But within the state imposed and self-guided censorship the
clever had found room to maneuver and possibly subvert. At the very least they had
found a space to linger within an overweening orthodoxy (and an under whelming
economy), clearly different in content yet similar to the severity of restrictions faced by
the players in my previous discussion of the American improv scene. In contrast to the
American improv players who succumbed to commodification, white reign,
heteronormativity, and ego, the participants of Playback Theatre were able to use
improvisation, in conjunction with the collective action claimed by the state, to tell
authentic stories. These stories, as Meer discovered, while seemingly not changing
Cuba’s political structure, economy, or ethos, did provide a degree of catharsis for many
of the participants (players and audience). It is likely that many Cubans would have
gladly traded this catharsis for an improvement in infrastructure, living conditions,
consumer items and food. It is understandable that the Cuban’s experience in playback
Theatre was cathartic, yet it is unclear if their experience was only cathartic. Perhaps we
might gain some insight from a neo-Marxist perspective as it examines culture. In this
context Henry Giroux (1983) writes that they, “…demonstrate that the mechanisms of
social and cultural reproduction are never complete and are always faced with partially
realized elements of opposition…a dialectical model of domination that offers valuable
alternatives…” (p. 100). Perhaps the Cubans were able to engage in the previously
mentioned dialogical encounter suggested by Pinar when they combined the “partially
realized” state sanctioned goal of collective action, with the element of surprise which is
an important component of improvisation, when they created their stories for Playback
Theatre. Indeed, the Cuban participants of Playback Theatre benefited from the
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solidarity, which was partially promoted by state ideology, their own inherent needs, and
the central tenet of improvisation, when they produced authentic works of theatre that
incorporated the use of improv. The authenticity of their stories was additionally
bolstered by an unpredictability, which often comes from good improv. Ironically, a
rigid pseudo Marxist environment was less restrictive than the “free” capitalist society
encountered by the mainstream improv players in America. The latter could not move
beyond the needs of the marketplace to produce works similar in authenticity to those
created by Playback Theatre or the previously mentioned “Harold.” The Cuban players
had taken part in a dialogical struggle between the legitimate needs of the group and the
hollow claims of the state. Remarkably, these players were able to satisfy the authorities
and some of their needs. To be sure, not an easy task! Poverty, state heavy handedness,
and the “partially realized elements of opposition” of the state’s mechanisms of control,
and the Cuban people’s desire for a better life, allowed the Cuban actors to hone their
skills in creating subtle (and sometimes not so subtle) ways to psychologically and
politically deceive the state. It was their time walking this tightrope of contradictions in
conjunction with an incomplete state mechanism that gave the Cubans their cathartic
experience and a critical perspective that comes from dialectical experience. In other
words, while it might be easy for a state censor to remove part or all of an “antirevolutionary” word, phrase, or speech from a script, it would be harder to cut out a
nuanced raised eyebrow; an ironic physical gesture, or carefully placed silence from an
attentive player or audience member during a performance. Out of necessity some
Cubans became adept at experimentation and the subtleties of subversion. Importantly, it
was the expectation of experimentation, which supported their successful improvisations.
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Improvisation alone was not the cause of the Cuban’s transformations, yet importantly, it
was the Cuban’s experience in experimentation- a literal fight for survival- that predisposed them to creating actual improvisation, in contrast to the limited type displayed
on the stages of America’s myriad improv clubs. No such struggle took place on the
American stage since those players and audiences, for the most part, had accepted the
capitalist state and its concomitant standards as legitimate, and having no hollow claims.
It is for all of these reasons, in addition to the one suggested by Giroux, that the
participants of Playback Theatre were able to create for themselves a place to linger…to
be more human. If the neo-Marxists are right (and I think they are) and the mechanisms
of reproduction are incomplete, then, these incomplete mechanisms and the dialogical
struggle that followed are some of the reasons for the “partially realized” success of
Playback Theatre to create catharsis and possibly more. It remains to be seen whether or
not the Cuban’s success of subversion within a theatrical context can foreshadow or
contribute to subversion within a political or economic context. Ironically, the largely
white performers of the American improv scene, during the 1950’s through the 1980’s,
were more artistically constrained by the economic success, or expectation of success, of
a white middle class, and the norms they embraced. They had less of an incentive to
explore and subvert the “partially realized” and “realized” elements of a capitalist society
that were in opposition to what should have been their actual goals. In other words, there
was seemingly less to struggle against which might explain why players and audiences
were less willing to experiment, seek and make use of surprise and truly improvise.
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“Disciplined Fantasy”
Like the Cubans of Playback Theatre who were able to use and develop a
critical perspective partially because of their awareness of the hollow claims of the state,
Duke Ellington’s status as an outsider because of racism, pre-disposed him toward
creating and nurturing an equally potent critical perspective When musicians, actors,
teachers, and students, for example, have the opportunity to engage in improvisation,
their improvisations are better if they are pre-disposed in viewing some or all of what is
being offered to them for consideration with a critical eye. They gain experience and use
experience to help them develop what Henry Giroux terms a “critical stance.” (1983)
Such a stance is central to his goal of a “dialectical pedagogy,” (1983) similar to the
dialogical encounter suggested earlier by Pinar. For Giroux, “…at the heart of the
dialectic is a human agent who is never merely a passive being removed from the
historical arena, but instead is an acting subject, who with qualitatively different levels of
reasoning and action, appropriates and penetrates the reality in which he or she lives…”
(p. 15). Improvisation alone is insufficient as a means of challenging a standard or a
group of standards. This was certainly the case of the comedic improvisation of my
earlier discussion. To be sure Ellington’s wealth and celebrity status gave him partial
entry into a dominant white society, yet, as he and his musicians were forced to endure
Jim Crow, Ellington was continuously reminded of his outsider status. This condition
gave him both a reason and a vantage point that enabled Ellington to criticize the norms
of his day. Thus, when he and his fellow musicians would improvise they were more
willing to interrogate the musical standards that had come before- and infuse them with
their unique life experiences- than the previously mentioned comedic improvisations of
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the American scene. In this way their improvisations and compositions were filled with
more risk taking, and the impact these improvisations had on the musicians and Ellington
would encourage even further risks in their music. For example, when Duke Ellington’s
mother died he went into seclusion, removing himself from his hectic schedule of touring
and writing music, and severely limiting his interaction with his friends. Months later,
when he emerged from his self-imposed exile, he gave his musicians a new score to
record. It was called “Reminiscing in Tempo” and was roughly twelve minutes in lengtha long jazz song for its day to record- comprising four sides of the recording medium of
the time. The writer James Baldwin, upon hearing the recorded piece, called it a
“disciplined fantasy.” While I’m not completely sure what Baldwin meant I would like to
think the gifted writer picked up on the dialectical nature of Ellington’s music as well as
its beauty and rhythm, although I am not suggesting that dialectics and beauty are
mutually exclusive, far from it! The band and his score were mournful but not maudlin.
Ellington’s genius allowed him to acknowledge his grief-which was immense- yet
compose a score (analytical and embodied) so transcendent as to abstractly suggest a
musical future yet to come-both ours and his- while turning his present moment truth into
art and further bolstering Buber’s claim of “meeting.” In other words Ellington’s grief
(his present moment truth) “met” his musical expertise; His band “met” a new
challenging score, which also allowed for improvisation. Much of the score’s beauty and
vitality comes from the improvisations of Ellington’s carefully selected musicians. His
talent as a composer (although in jazz perhaps group composition would be more
accurate) was in part due to his ability to choose the right musicians and “tease out” of
them their best work. He understood the need for rigidity and lack of rigidity. He
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understood the importance of the creative environment previously mentioned by Brook.
And it is within Ellington’s musical framework that his musician’s improvisations were
encouraged, expected, and fully realized.
I re-tell this anecdote, fairly well known among jazz lovers, because not
only is it an example of the pragmatic action sought by Pinar, but because it contains
much of what has inspired many who find in jazz not only great music but a way out of
an immutable culture. For example, curriculum scholar Ted Aoki (2005), in his
conversations with jazz trumpeter Bobby Shew, was able to extrapolate Shew’s approach
to his instrument and his music and apply that way of thinking and being to his study and
practice of Curriculum . As Aoki sought the additional advice of an ice skater and visual
artist (Brian Orson and Elysia Drywan), with Shew’s help he had come, “…to better
understand the generative although ambiguous, ambivalent space between this or that,
between planned curriculum and live(d) curriculum …” (p. 421-422). Like the
talented theatrical improv player or teacher who makes the best use of her moment, these
two men and woman validated for Aoki what he perhaps knew to be true of a live(d)
curriculum , even as far back as his classroom experience as a young teacher in the
1940’s. A “planned curriculum ” – the currently preferred method for most “experts” in
the field of education- is a curriculum that is already dead in the water. In contrast, a
live(d) curriculum , is filled with the possibility of a transformative experience for its
participants and the content they are seriously playing with, since the standards and the
urgency of creating something wonderful right away (by making use of and being
impacted by improvisation) often stimulate and fertilize one another. Through his
conversations with a visual artist, jazz musician, and ice skater, all of whom incorporate
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some improvisation in their art, Aoki was able to move beyond the limited educational
world that strictly adheres to standards, lesson plans, learning objectives and the like.
Perhaps the practitioners of “educational leadership” would be surprised to learn that
these standards and practices are not abandoned but potentially improved. When improv
works it is because its practitioners have mastered the standards while incorporating some
of what life has thrown their way-the good and the bad- in order to “meet” the standards,
interrogate them, and revise according to their present moment truth. In other words, the
desire to create something new forces one to interrogate a standard or a series of
standards with a focus and ferocity that improves it without negating a part or whole of a
standard which works. Ellington was a well-respected musician, composer, and
bandleader, making a good living during the nation’s worst depression. He could have
churned out an endless string of swing numbers (the popular music of his day), no
different from the ones that initially garnered him praise and respect and the public would
have eagerly consumed them. But had he done that he would have been artistically and
personally dishonest. His work would have lacked authenticity. Ellington was willing to
risk losing much of his fan base by recording works like Reminiscing in Tempo but did it
anyway. Baldwin’s label of “disciplined fantasy” was high praise since the hardest thing
for most improvisational artists to do, who are going outside the normal framework, is to
produce a work of balance, grace, (and in the case of jazz), swing, while merging many
seemingly disparate elements-both old and new- in an attempt to create something
wonderful right away. It is for these reasons perhaps that scholars like Aoki find in jazz
music, and the musicians who play it, an actual and metaphorical model of being, and it
is this way of being that is potentially useful to the Curriculum scholar or student.
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Indeed, it is ironic that many of those who routinely criticize jazz for its formlessness or
ahistorical nature; for its patent disregard for tradition (read: standard) would perhaps be
surprised to learn that the majority of jazz musicians, rather than ignoring all of that
which came before them musically, hold the standards to such a high regard that they are
continuously willing to interrogate them and subject them to constant reinterpretation. I
would argue that this type of adherence and devotion to the standards is preferable to the
blind devotion practiced by so many. One does not need to look far to find musicians or
“educators” willing to demonstrate their blind devotion to the standards. A weekend in
Biloxi, Branson, or Vegas will easily demonstrate this fact; or any class within the current
field known as “educational leadership.” Indeed, those who promote standards without
subjecting them to the type of scrutiny and analysis common to most jazz musicians, and
improvisational artists, do them a disservice, as they take whatever was vital and
appropriate for the time and render them impotent. Formal and informal conversations
with jazz musicians of the last half-century support this view. For example British
musician and author, Derek Bailey (1993) writes:
…The repertoire of a jazzman such as Dexter Gordon or Lee Konitz, for instance,
contains probably a fairly small number of different ‘songs’. But they will provide an
adequate working context, perhaps for a lifetime. Within these boundaries there is a
continuous process of renewal in which old material is re-shaped and adjusted,
sometimes rejected, and new material introduced. ‘If I do an hour show, if I’m extremely
fertile, there will be about fifteen minutes of pure ad-lib. But on an average, it’s about
four or five minutes. But the fact that I’ve created it in ad-lib seems to give it a complete
feeling of free form’ (p. 48-49).
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Toward the end of this passage Bailey is quoting the great alto saxophonist Lee
Konitz, who speaks for many jazz players as he discusses improv and its ability to refresh
a standard tune while retaining some or most of what made that standard great in the first
place. In Paul Berliner’s mammoth study of jazz, (1994) he interviews scores of great
musicians many of whom echo this sentiment. For example, Herbie Hancock, the great
pianist of Miles Davis's 1960s quintet recalls:
What I was trying to do and what I feel they were trying to do was to combine –
take these influences that were happening to all of us at the time and amalgamate
them, personalize them in such a way that when people were hearing us, they
were hearing the avant-garde, on one hand, and they were hearing the history of
jazz that led up to it on the other hand – because Miles was that history. He was
that link. We were sort of walking a tightrope with the kind of experimenting we
were doing in music, not total experimentation, but we used to call it controlled
freedom (p. 341).
Davis, like Ellington, could have rested on his laurels after releasing his seminal
Kind of Blue (1959), the bestselling jazz record in history, in the early sixties. Instead, he
continuously pushed himself and expected the highest level of artistic creativity from his
band mates, all of whom held a tenuous but respectful connection with the past, while
searching for a possible musical future to come. Hancock’s description of this time as
“controlled freedom” mirrors Baldwin’s assessment of Ellington’s piece mentioned
earlier as “disciplined fantasy.” These musicians intuitively understand the importance of
Pinar’s “dialogical encounter” and Giroux’s “dialectical pedagogy.” Thus, despite what
some people think they hear when they listen to jazz, this is not music where anything
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goes. Indeed, the majority of great jazz musicians are required to master a rich, deep, oral
and written tradition- a tradition that at times is comprised of an amalgamation of
standard tunes. The issue is how they incorporate that tradition in a very demanding,
ambiguous, present moment that beckons the attentive musician to discover something
new through improvisation: The music that emerges may be only partially improvised
and contain elements from the musician’s “bag of tricks,” licks and phrases within the
idiom that have worked in the past. The point I wish to stress, and the point that is
repeated by countless musicians, is that even when the musician creates a small amount
of improvisation, relative to the length of the standard song, most of them feel that the
piece as a whole is enhanced as a result of that improvisation. Whether or not this
enhancement results in transcendence is debatable. Still, the musician is given an
opportunity to dwell in what Aoki (2005) has termed as a “generative” and “ambiguous
space.” No guarantees but certainly the potential for transformative work.
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Afterthoughts
I have shown how improvisation alone, without an environment called for by
Brook and a participant(s) with a critical stance as described by Giroux, is incapable of
transforming a standard or a series of standards. Since I have experience as an
improviser, and work as a high school history teacher, it is only natural to reflect on those
times when I “teased out” my student’s reactions to the material by consciously avoiding
the rigidly defined roles of “teacher” and “student”. Instead, I made an attempt to “meet”
my students in the way in which I think Buber originally intended. These “meetings”
inspired by the writings of Aoki and Ayers were experienced infrequently perhaps
because the majority of my students had been so conditioned to adhere to the rules and
behaviors as created by our institution and peer groups. Initially, my deviations from the
norm of lecturer and “expert” were misunderstood and the student’s reactions would
often be uncomfortable laughter, silence, or bemusement. In time, we were able to use
and participate in our present moment truth as a means for further inquiry. At no time did
I observe the students questions or comments approach anything that would have led me
to believe that they were capable of interrogating our subject to such an extent that the
consequence of that action would be a transformation on an ontological level. I also
spoke with students in five honors English classes, so that I might inquire about their
feelings (interesting that I didn’t use the term thoughts) regarding improvisation in the
classroom. I selected this particular English class to speak with because their teacher
routinely uses a few improvisational games in her class once a week (Monday is improv
day). It should be pointed out that she is the only teacher to use improvisational games in
the classroom at our school on a regular basis. According to this teacher, the way in
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which she uses improv in the class is by acting out vocabulary words and terminology so
that we can ‘see’ words. On vocab [sic] day, I give a pre-assessment. We discuss words
and then do different types of improv with them. At class end, students go back to
assessment and fill in what they have learned. The students are required to learn eight
words to keep doing improv.
In this manner she uses improv as a reward and the students clearly view their
time doing improv as a fun break from the routine of “school,” although one student
acknowledged that doing improv, “ helps me remember my vocabulary forever; it is also
easier for me to learn. Once I do my improv, that’s all I do for my test. It reinforces state
standards because we are learning the vocab set out by state.” None of the English class
participants that I spoke with stated that using improv in the classroom critiqued let alone
transformed the standards. Instead, everyone I talked to agreed that improvisation in the
classroom made learning “fun,” “more efficient,” and improved long-term memory. In
conversations with the teacher she said that at no time did she recall any student
questioning the list of state mandated vocabulary or commenting that the list is too
narrowly focused, incomplete, or ill conceived. Instead, these students simply accept the
state standard as legitimate and therefore important to know. In some ways they are
reminiscent of the American improv scene I previously described and are therefore a
reminder to me and others that are concerned with social justice and in favor of a radical
pedagogy, that improv alone is insufficient as a weapon for meaningful change.
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CHAPTER 7
BRILLIANT MISTAKES AND SERIOUS PLAY: BEYOND PERFORMATIVITY
AND A COOKBOOK CURRICULUM
There is a sign on the wall of the guidance counselor’s office at the school where I
teach that reads, “Begin with the end in mind.” The author of this ubiquitous directive is
Stephen R. Covey (1989) and this quote comes from his hugely popular book, The 7
Habits of Highly Effective People. Covey’s directive and the school’s blind endorsement
are symptomatic of a larger problem facing schools, and the teachers and students who
are attempting their way toward a wider education within the confines of these
institutions. From a theoretical perspective, part of the problem is due to a
misunderstanding of scientific knowledge, empiricism, and the impact this misreading
has on the production and acceptance of more general meta-narratives. Instead of viewing
scientific knowledge as mutable, local, and the product of an arbitrary consensus that is
tainted by commodification (Lyotard, 1984) (Rouse, 1987), or informed by local needs
(Blake, et al, 1998) it is viewed as neutral, value free, factual, and immutable (Britzman,
2003). Teachers, administrators, and students are unknowingly (and partially knowingly)
suffering within and perpetuating a performative culture (informed by this metanarrative) that values an efficient way of learning an uninterrogated standard- imposed
and legitimated from an external authority -that is understood as immutable and thus
permanent. If critical thinking, spontaneity, improvisation, and creativity are brought up
as valuable to one’s education, it is usually only if they can be used as an effective way to
learn “standards” that have become entrenched and enshrined. As criticism of this
problem has grown, viable theoretical solutions have been stuck in an epistemological
morass which fluctuates between an unsatisfying relativism, Zen- koan, or an over
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simplistic positivist empiricism, the latter of which is nurtured through a series of
dominant discourses which are based on the already mentioned, misunderstood scientific
model. Practical solutions have fared somewhat better yet still; most classrooms and the
activity within succumb to the momentum of the times: A performative system that
values efficiency, clear objectives, and easy assessment is the unfortunate norm. It is
appealing to politicians, teachers and administrators who wish to demonstrate progress
toward learning objectives and a convenient, albeit illusory, means of accountability. In
this chapter I discuss good teaching, improvisation, and performativity. I discuss the
largely negative aspects of performativity that have been brought to our attention by
Lyotard, (1984), Cherryholmes (1988) and others. And I examine the possibility of
agency which emerges out of an alternative version of performativity that come from
scholars such as Judith Butler (2007) J. Hillis Miller (2007), Karen Barad (2003), and
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (2003) and in conjunction with those who have written about
improvisation within jazz and dramaturgical settings, in my attempt to promote a richer
experience in the classroom.
We may inhabit a postmodern/poststructural/posthuman world but the forces that
propel the “professional inertia” (Cherryholmes, 1988, p. 31) responsible for so much of
what takes place in our schools can be traced back to the model of success that was first
suggested by Frederick Winslow Taylor as he sought to maximize production in factories
by eliminating all wasted motions from the workers. Simply extrapolate Taylor’s
paradigm as education policy makers have done and apply it to our schools and a
fundamental problem emerges: Teachers and students are encouraged to take a nonaporetic stance regarding learning objectives, since there seems to be no sense wasting
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any time asking whether or not the standards being taught are worth knowing, for
example, or expending any energy speculating on what isn’t being promoted and why this
is so. I teach a class created by the College Board called Advanced Placement in United
States History. The College Board created this class in part to serve as an educational
bulwark against the Soviet Union during the early years of the Cold War. They view their
product (at $91 per test given to roughly 340,000 students worldwide every year it is
indeed a product) as the “gold standard” of survey classes in United States History. But
the class is flawed: In their attempt to cover the history of the United States from the time
of the end of the last Ice Age to the present day, they have been forced to leave out much
of what has happened. The scope is wide yet the depth remains shallow. One might
argue that this is the result of historiography (which can explain the emphasis on some
subjects and the omission of others); or the nature of all survey classes, however, I would
argue that much of what the College Board has created is the result of a performative
approach that generally accepts a standard narrative. Within this narrow context, power
only flows from the top down. Indeed, a large portion of our time is spent examining the
strengths and weaknesses of political leaders, or the impact of large scale traumatic
events, such as war. Perhaps this is why our study of the Gilded Age is heavy with
information about the Captains of Industry (Robber Barons) and light on the everyday
life of the factory worker? But product and process, both intimately connected, are
equally flawed! Indeed, when most teachers and administrators look for a method of
teaching, and student learning, (usually, mistakenly understood as separate from one
another) they often revert to Bloom’s taxonomy. And when they describe this taxonomy
it is with such high regard one would think they have discovered the secret path to all
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knowledge, not an arbitrary, albeit comprehensive for its time, way of learning about a
subject. Product and process have been corrupted by an inaccurate epistemology, itself a
product of our performative culture. As Cherryholmes has argued in her seminal book,
Power and Criticism (1988) schools are operating with certainty regarding a
“transcendental signifier” that in actuality doesn’t exist and are thus being guided by a
meta-narrative which is incomplete, misleading, and most incriminating, unable to
produce a real education. He cites many examples of the performative culture which have
given rise to this practice as he writes how a
Vulgar pragmatism results when efficiency is pursued in the absence of criticism,
when actions are privileged over thought, when practice is valued and theory
disparaged, when practice is divorced from theory (as if that were possible) for
the sake of making things work ‘better.’…this is the thrust of educational reform
proposals that place increasing reliance upon testing in assessing educational
outcomes. Standardized achievement tests thereby become the standard against
which student, teacher, school, and system performance is evaluated. The task is
to raise test scores. Efficiency is the underlying issue (p. 152).

The administrators who run the school, like middle managers from a Sinclair
Lewis (1922) novel, revel in small percentage gains made each year on a litany of
standardized tests. At one point Newsweek magazine placed our school in the top one
hundred schools in the country (emphasis mine) based on the number of students enrolled
(again emphasis mine) in Advanced Placement courses. From my perspective we are
deluding ourselves if we think we have created a great school. Unfortunately, I seem to
be in the minority. When asked on surveys, the majority of teachers and students
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maintain that our school is a “great place to learn” and they “feel supported by the
learning environment.” These naïve sentiments are echoed across the pond as reported by
Anne Storey (2007) who teaches at the Open University in the UK. Her article is on an
important cultural shift that has taken place within the teaching profession in England.
Alarmingly, many new teachers are entering the field from a background of mid level
managerial positions, outside of the world of education. Although they are being pushed
out of their old professions because of changes within the economy, their placement as
teachers is being promoted as a coup for education since their “skills” as managers are
seen as directly applicable to and desirable in the classroom. Like the United States,
England is placing emphasis on “…defining and ‘managing’ the performance of
teachers” (Storey, 2007, p. 253). In many respects hiring people who have spent the
majority of their professional lives dealing with targets, objectives, and assessments
makes them an easier group to manage, and train to become teachers, especially since
this managing and training is done with a language they are already familiar with and
accepting of: performativity. It should therefore come as no surprise that when asked to
reflect on their performance as a student teacher in the classroom one student reported
that, “The targets of the sections were clear and the objectives met. My mentor supported
me to ensure that they passed off smoothly. I afterwards evaluated these teaching
experiences with my mentor and the feedback was mainly positive-with ideas about
things I could improve for the next lesson” (Storey, 2007 p. 262). While Storey
acknowledges (by reiterating Foucault’s explication of power) that the type of control
exhibited through these new teachers is problematic since “…control has become
internalized and more insidious” (p. 268), she maintains that
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the findings of this study challenge the more pessimistic versions of the
performativity critique. The Associates were at relative ease with targets and with
evaluations of their performance. At the same time they expressed a strong value
commitment to creativity in their lessons and had aspirations for a rounded
education for their pupils. They do not appear to have become reduced to
‘commoditized’ actants (p. 268).
While it is true that the participants in the program of teacher training analyzed by
Storey claim that, “…it was relational skills and creative ways to engage with pupils that
featured in the data as paramount for these embryonic teachers” (p. 267) significantly,
none of those creative ways went beyond figuring out seemingly innovative ways to help
the students engage with the material so as to “master” the content. None of their creative
energy examined why specific content was on the educational menu or if that content
could be at all reinterpreted. Indeed, one of these creative approaches was to use a
PowerPoint presentation (sarcastic emphasis mine) to “teach” the students about
American minimalist composers while another teacher created an, “…’electrical circuit
of bodies with pupils representing the electrons…I realized how much the pupils enjoyed
this kind of activity and how much they learned from it. I accept that this is not possible
for all lessons…but it fired the children’s enthusiasm’” (p. 267). Unfortunately, the
experiences described by Storey seem to be the norm when creativity in the classroom is
discussed. It is noteworthy that the teachers in Storey’s essay made no attempt to
question the selection of the content, its veracity, or its use at this particular stage of
development, and it is here where the “definition” of teacher and “teaching” is revealed
and “defined:” Teachers teach by passing along pre-packaged lessons with little or no
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attempt made at questioning either the choice of content, developmental or historical
relevance, or any flaws within the content itself. Creative approaches are limited to the
process of engaging the students so that they can first swallow whole, and then
regurgitate the material, and nothing more. Indeed, as was the case with their lesson on
American musical minimalism, there appeared to be no attempt to place this type of
music within an historical or musical context; or one that was relevant or directly flowing
from the experiences of the students. The lesson on electrons seemed to suffer from a
similar disconnect. The “fun” had by the students as they were pretending to be electrons
was mostly due to the non-traditional approach of conveying the information along what
is still an assembly line of limited, controlled, knowledge distribution. This fun is a far
cry from the serious play I discuss. The performative culture which values efficiency and
controlled access to information hasn’t got time or the ethical will to give students a more
complete education since that would require doing more than paying lip-service to a
student’s personalized education. Unfortunately at my school, when administrators
discuss personalized education they are referring to a student using a computer program
called “Edgeinuity” (the “clever” juxtaposition of education and ingenuity), a marginally
interactive program that force-feeds and assesses the content at a student’s pace until the
content is “mastered” when a passing grade is achieved on a common assessment. In
many ways it is nothing more than an alternative type of panoptican (observing both
student and teacher) since a record is made which captures the time spent on the program
by both teacher and student, and, equally insidious, a way of controlling what information
is dispensed to the student.
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Of course, it’s not as if we haven’t been warned or given a better alternative to
what exists on the current educational plate. In the School and Society (2001) John
Dewey explained long ago to those concerned with education, as the industrial paradigm
was just being applied to public schools, of the importance of placing experience above
performative needs when he wrote:
The question of the relation of the school to the child’s life is at bottom simply
this: Shall we ignore this native setting and tendency, dealing, not with the living
child at all, but with the dead image we have erected, or shall we give it play and
satisfaction? If we once believe in life and in the life of the child, then will all the
occupations and uses spoken of, then will all history and science, become
instruments of appeal and materials of culture to his imagination, and through that
to the richness and orderliness of his life. Where we now see only the outward
doing and the outward product, there, behind all visible results, is the
readjustment of mental attitude, the enlarged and sympathetic vision, the sense of
growing power, and the willing ability to identify both insight and capacity with
the interests of the world and man…When nature and society can live in the
schoolroom, when the forms and tools of learning are subordinated to the
substance of experience, then shall there be an opportunity for this identification,
and culture shall be the democratic password (p. 39).
There are, of course, many in education, especially those who have written in the
wake of the reconceptualization, (none, unfortunately at the national or state level who
make policy), who have taken Dewey’s warnings and advice seriously as they suggest
ways to counteract some of the negative performative aspects within education, and
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privilege the “substance of experience.” Carol Wild (2011) is the Course Director of the
MA Art Practice and Education courses at Birmingham City University in the UK. She is
aware of what is not being taught when performative efficiency is privileged at the
expense of the student’s experience. Wild borrows one of Foucault’s suggestions and has
created in her classrooms “heterotopias… a place that represents, contests and reverses
culture by allowing difference…spaces which contradict the other spaces that we
occupy…” (p. 424). Wild seems to imply that art education, in contrast to so-called more
academic courses like Science or English, lends itself to the creation of these
heterotopias, however I think the case could be made that many academic disciplines
could create similar heterotopias. The sacred place she has created to contest our
performative culture is an art gallery. Wild maintains that the art student’s experience of
touring the art in a gallery, unplanned and ambiguous, unencumbered by the din of
assessable data, and writing about one’s experience after the fact, can create “…moments
that cannot be planned for in advance but are recognized with hindsight…” (p. 430). She
further maintains that the learning, which emerges from these narrative reflections on
those moments, is substantially more valuable than one that might be the product of a
planned objective and its accompanying common assessment. Perhaps one of the reasons
why Wild’s heterotopia produced a more valuable learning experience is because the
sacred space that was created was an incomplete space, similar to the incomplete set
design described by British theatrical director Peter Brook in The Empty Space (2008).
Instead of rows of chairs arranged in straight lines, with an authority figure positioned
behind a podium dispensing information like a flight attendant passing out stale peanuts,
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Brook’s “incomplete design” forces the participant to engage with her environment,
impacting eventually the play itself as well as the participant. As Brook has explained:
what is necessary… is an incomplete design; a design that has clarity without
rigidity; one that could be called ‘open’ as against ‘shut.’ This is the essence of
theatrical thinking: a true theatre designer will think of his designs as being all the
time in motion, in action, in relation to what the actor brings to a scene as it
unfolds. In other words, unlike the easel painter, in two dimensions, or the
sculptor in three, the designer thinks in terms of the fourth dimension, the passage
of time (p. 101-102).
Brooks’ actors, similar in concept to the living child referred to by Dewey, were
able to create a more vibrant theatrical production because the substance of each actor’s
experience was allowed to contribute to an incomplete set design that in turn created a
more realistic, lively production. Instead of forcing each actor to learn her lines, hit her
mark and be done with it, each actor was able to bring to the set something that was
uniquely theirs in time, that is to say as the rehearsals evolved and the scenes unfolded,
and then add that information to the design of the set, and consequently the play itself.
What might be achieved if classrooms, and the students and teacher within, could evolve
in a similar fashion? Imagine how much overall learning could be enhanced if standards
and learning objectives were viewed with the same clarity and lack of rigidity as Brook
afforded his actors, their set, and ultimately the play. Students and teachers are rarely
given the opportunity to engage with the material and one another in the classroom this
thoroughly, and without the encouraged passivity that passes for education these days. As
Wild’s art students experienced the gallery, and reflected on that experience within the
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gallery (also an incomplete design but with “clarity”), they were able to view the art on
display with a gaze that combined the art skills they were being taught and the ambiguous
substance of their experiences up to that point, in real time. It makes sense that Wild
views what occurred in this space as preferable to one that treats them as if they were all
the same, passively learning (an oxymoron to be sure) a variety of art techniques from
her, since what was eventually gained by the students far surpassed that which they
would have learned under the current performative model which values efficiency of
learning an uninterrogated standard. The very real creative participation of the actors and
students, (in contrast to the “creative” method of teaching previously mentioned by
Storey) (2007), and their concomitant impact on theory and practice, contributed to a
wider, fluid, deeper, education of the art students and a more vibrant theatre, in contrast
to the few times a limited, controlled, creativity is allowed in the classroom, because the
unanticipated intelligent responses of the students and actors were encouraged –given
time to emerge- and incorporated in both cases. These responses enhanced the
“standards” the students encountered because they were able to alter those standards as
they saw fit, in real time. This approach to education is a preferable alternative to a
destructive pedagogy, which treats the students as passive, inanimate objects, instead of
one in which both students and the material can benefit as both evolve.
The limited, deformed, experience afforded most teachers and students in the UK
and the U.S.A. and other “developed” nations is in contrast to what Julie White (2006), a
faculty member of the University of Melbourne, is attempting to achieve in her classes
which train future primary and secondary school teachers. White (2006) acknowledges
that, “… Australian school systems are increasingly subjected to performative
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requirements in the form of political control and bureaucratic imperative…” (p. 438).
Despite this constrictive environment, White has built upon the work of N.K. Denzin,
Deborah Britzman (2006) and others and suggests a different version of performativity
that contains within it the opportunity for agency. White tells us that, “…Denzin
distinguishes between performativity as the ‘doing’ and performance as the ‘done’ (p.
437). Consequently, she has developed an approach to teacher training which focuses on
the “doing,” that on the surface might seem unusual: Rather than a typical teacher
training program which would require the students to create a weeks’ worth of lesson
plans, (filled with objectives, references to standards, common, formative, and
summative assessments) for example, she had her students create an operatic aria,
complete with narrative story, singing, and choreography. White knows that the finished
product will be rough since none of the participants come to the program with expertise
in any of those skills. For her, this is beside the point. White is less concerned with the
finished product because she argues that pedagogy is advanced when the doing is
privileged above the done. Citing Britzman’s writings on teaching (2006) she argues that
important pedagogical information and insights are potentially realized from the
collaborative struggle by the participants as they negotiate the unknown. White
maintains: “…The learning involved in becoming a teacher is a complex combination of
the theoretical, the practical, the personal and the political. Coming to terms with
dichotomies of the emotional and the intellectual, power and powerlessness, knowledge
and ignorance, as well as an overriding concern with subjectivity characterizes emergent
teachers…” (p. 439). Indeed, their struggle to create a reasonable facsimile of an operatic
aria put them well beyond their comfort zones, forcing them to collaborate (a struggle in
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itself) as they strained, and thus perhaps experienced many of the characteristics White
cites as important to “emergent teachers.” In other words, she could have told them
something similar to this information using the traditional transfer method of dispensing
information. Importantly, White knows that the pedagogical impact will be more
powerful if the participants struggle to come to these conclusions, (changed themselves
because of the participants activity) on their own. Equally important in her iteration of
performativity is her hope that her study will impact other education courses so that they
will come to know that the, “…process of collaborative creation being valued more
highly if not equally to the end point products…” (p. 449), will in the end create a
pedagogy less controlled by bureaucratic necessity, efficiency, alleged accountability,
sacred standards and more in line with her creative interpretation of performativity, that
in effect becomes a type of praxis. This newfound pedagogy will be found to better serve
the honest needs of students and teachers: That is to say, one that cares more about the
educational growth of students without sacrificing the clarity of content.
Performativity, Paralogy, and Serious Play
Those who expectedly find fault within the controlled, constrained,
content of a performative culture might gain some solace in Lyotard’s (1984) idea of
scientific paralogy, since it contains a destabilizing element in its pursuit of scientific
truths. Under this scenario boundaries would be more fluid and thus standards would not
appear as immutable as formerly thought since an objective truth(s) would be continually
nurtured, critiqued, and improved. Consequently, pedagogy could be improved within
this performative approach since mutable standards would encourage a more attentive,
open-ended approach to education, perhaps akin to that described and desired by Dewey
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(2001) as he discussed the “living child.” But as Joseph Rouse (1987) has reminded us in
his book, Knowledge and Power, the artifacts that are the products of scientific
investigations, as well as the impetus behind those investigations, come not from a place
of general objectivity but are instead specific to the unique conditions of a broadly
understood laboratory and what is done locally. And in Ball (2003) and Meng (2009)
the authors argue that Lyotard’s version of paralogy is revealed as less destabilizing and
more conservative as previously thought since the social paralogy (itself manipulated by
corporate interests), which informs and controls the scientific investigation, can
undermine scientific paralogy’s ability to subvert. Thus, if science is to contribute to a
more realistic and truthful epistemology, which in turn can contribute to a healthier
educational practice, then people who are scientifically literate must reconsider the ways
in which they view and use the processes and products of scientific investigations. In
other words the products and processes of science cannot be viewed in isolation. Instead,
they must be viewed as part of a powerful social fabric so that the influence of that fabric
can be understood. For only then does social paralogy have a chance to ask the important
questions and begin investigating what was previously thought as unimportant. It is
important to note, however, that none of this is possible without minimizing the mostly
negative effects of commodification and fact denial (making this a seemingly daunting
task) as the driving force behind or preventing, scientific investigations. In Knowledge
and Power, Joseph Rouse (1987) offers a nuanced and intelligent perspective on
scientific understanding that I would argue contributes to a more accurate ontology and
will suggest an analysis of scientific practice that reveals the local, existential
character of the understanding it produces. Scientific knowledge is first and
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foremost knowing one’s way about in the laboratory (or clinic, field site, etc.).
Such knowledge is of course transferable outside the laboratory into a variety of
situations. But this transfer is not to be understood in terms of the instantiation of
universally valid knowledge claims in different particular settings by applying
bridge principles and plugging in particular local values for theoretical variables.
It must be understood in terms of the adaptation of one local knowledge to create
another. We go from one local knowledge to another rather than from universal
theories to their particular instantiations (p. 73).
Karen Barad (2003), a feminist theorist most closely associated with her theory of
“agential realism,” acknowledges Rouse’s influence on her writings, and interestingly
adapts Bohr’s work in quantum physics to describe an epistemology that she claims
avoids the misunderstandings of scientific product and process previously mentioned, and
the pitfalls of representationalism (closely related to the former and the dominant
discourse informing and being informed by our standards) seen in both scientific realism
and social constructivism. Moreover, regarding performativity, she critiques the
Austinian idea (and by extension Butler’s) that to say something is to do something, not
because she seemingly disagrees with Austin or Butler on a fundamental level, but rather,
because she wishes to end the privileging of words over materiality as either explication
or agents of change. For Barad, matter matters at least as much as doing things with
words (although the tensionality between matter and words is important a detailed
analysis is beyond the scope of this chapter). She offers a unique epistemology, and thus
an interesting version of performativity, that might shed some light on why the previously
mentioned sacred space of Wild’s (2011) heterotopia, or Brook’s (2008) vibrant theatre,
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or White’s (2006) “opera” were able to contribute to a more honest, fuller, experience in
the art classroom, theatre, and teacher training, respectively. For a better understanding of
Barad’s (2003) take on performativity we must first look at her argument regarding
materiality and its impact on theory and practice. Barad writes that:

This relational ontology is the basis for my post humanist performative account of
the production of material bodies. This account refuses the representationalist
fixation on ‘words’ and ‘things’ and the problematic of their relationality,
advocating instead a causal relationship between specific exclusionary practices
embodied as specific material configurations of the world (her emphasis)…This
causal relationship between the apparatuses of bodily production and the
phenomena produced is one of ‘agential intra-action (p. 814).
For Barad, words should be understood in the same manner that Rouse
understood the products and processes of scientific investigations. That is to say, words
are local, fluid, imbued with meanings by non-verbal cues, and the consequence of
consensus. Words, separate from their relationship to the local environment, cannot be
broadly interpreted and applied, since they do not represent an objective truth, with
universal applications. Instead, they must be locally interpreted, seen as intertwined and
better-imagined describing phenomena, which are, “…dynamic topological
reconfigurings/entanglements/relationalities/(re)articulations…” (p. 818). This
fascinating and complex iteration of performativity offers no easy theoretical or practical
response to agency. Indeed, Barad writes that, “…Agency is not an attribute but the
ongoing reconfigurings of the world…” (p. 818). In other words, agency isn’t something
we do at will; instead, agency is what we notice can be done if our skills at attentiveness
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to the moment have been honed. Thus, in the context of Barad’s complex take on
performativity, the art student’s experiences in Wild’s “heterotopia” must be explained in
ways which go far beyond art students touring a gallery, as if they were all empty
canvases waiting to be brushed by paint from the same palette. On any given day these
students bring with them a varied and sometimes contradictory set of emotions and
physical manifestations all of which interact with a changing environment: There is the
young male, torn between his love of art, and his father’s plea for him to learn a more
“practical” skill who cites this conflict as the cause for his acid reflux; the middle aged
woman, whose suspicious husband doesn’t completely understand his wife’s need to
grow, never mind the expense of tuition, which neither of them can afford; the couple,
who only get to see each other at school since both of them are married but not to each
other; a young male, talented painter and photographer, who wants to be “out” but is
waiting for the right moment. Indeed, each student is different. And their response to the
art on display will fall somewhere between the constraints, which are partially formed by
Wild’s (2011) selection of artwork, the timing of that selection, and the student’s depth of
knowledge of that art. But their spontaneous responses to those constraints are also
possibly made up of their emotional and physical state, and things as yet undiscovered.
Still, the art students were transformed in varying degrees by their experience in that
gallery because Wild gave them the time and space to take it in, to just be, and honestly
react. I would argue that this honest and more thorough transformation is pedagogically
preferable to the performative model currently in fashion and criticized by Lyotard
(1984), Cherryholmes (1988), Aoki (2005) and Pinar (1994, 2006), for example. It was
wise of Wild to let her students view the art in the gallery without any preconceived
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assignment. And it was wise of her to allow for their unanticipated responses, those little
improvisations that can happen with the moment when allowed. For it is these
improvisations that privilege the substance of a student’s experience over the superficial
tools of education, the instrumentalism exposed by Heidegger (1977) and criticized by
Aoki (2005), which will perhaps create the possibility of a better education. Lastly, it
was wise of her to allow the students to reflect on their experiences and for her to
evaluate those reflections. Within all of this activity, planned and unplanned, lies the
possibility of agency and by that I mean learning on the part of the student; and the
careful nurturing and critiquing of an important body of knowledge by student and
teacher. Barad’s (2003) optimistic argument is attractive for many reasons but perhaps
the two most compelling reasons are that it holds out the possibility of acquiring and
contributing to knowledge that is an objective truth, albeit one that is local and intratwined, rather than universal; and it suggests the possibility of agency, despite the
proclamations of some who see agency as foreclosed. If understood and applied, this
would vastly improve pedagogy, including the writing of standards, but more
importantly, the process and products which are informed, but not determined, by these
standards. Thus, within this ontological framework “standards” would be more fluid and
required to evolve, since they would be informed by analyses of phenomena that are
relational within local time and space. Indeed, Barad writes:
Matter plays an active, indeed agential, role in its iterative materialization, but this
is not the only reason that the space of agency is much larger than that postulated
in many other critical social theories. Intra-actions always entail particular
exclusions, and exclusions foreclose any possibility of determinism, providing the
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condition of an open future. Therefore, intra-actions are constraining but not
determining. That is, intra-activity is neither a matter of strict determinism nor
unconstrained freedom. The future is radically open at every turn. This open sense
of futurity does not depend on the clash or collision of cultural demands; rather, it
is inherent in the nature of intra-activity—even when apparatuses are primarily
reinforcing, agency is not foreclosed (p. 826).
Barad’s take on this “open sense of futurity” would seem to find agency in the
most dire of circumstances, where art and hegemony live, Adorno (1978) (2002), Jay
(1973), Benzer (2011). Good news indeed for our performative culture! Still, it makes
more sense that an “open future” would be more assured if there were less of the
constraining performativity currently in vogue: paradoxical scientific illiteracy, limited
access to information, instrumentalism, managing teachers, managing students, and
ultimately no time for the students and teacher to just be, in what Aoki (2005) poetically
describes as, “…indwelling in the Zone of Between…” (p. 163).
I suggest that the previously mentioned “heterotopia,” borrowed and adapted by
art instructor Carol Wild (2011) from Foucault, is a good example of the “iterative
materialization,” which helps compose the “intra-actions” described by Barad, and that it
allows for greater agency on the part of the students, since there are less educational
constraints. Indeed, Wild ( 2011) was able to place a non-determining constraint on the
experience of the art students through her selection of the art that was displayed similar to
the constraint placed by a professor’s well chosen book list: Clarity without rigidity.
Importantly, by affording her students the opportunity to apply their experiences, skills,
knowledge, (their gaze), in real time, in a defined but not defining space, and reflect on
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them later (without the typical leading questions favored by instrumental pedagogy), she
was better able to nudge her students to be more attentive to their moment(s) as they
experienced it. To be sure there was no guarantee that what would follow from those
moments would be nuggets of insight. Indeed, pedagogical exercises such as these always
bring with them the element of risk. But where’s the serious fun if there’s no risk?
Without risk there can be no growth. Thus, by giving her students the opportunity to play
in this very serious manner, they were forced to be attentive and open (or, as open as they
could be given their “baggage”), and with that attentiveness and openness the chance to
be creative and participate in the type of performativity favored by those who care about
learning and adding to real knowledge: Performativity need not be limiting or controlling
to the point where agency is forestalled and learning stopped. It can be an opportunity for
the students to take part in a creative relationship with any subject, but for that to occur
they must be immersed in the doing, instead of being treated like an empty vessel being
filled with information that is already dead on arrival, immutable. Barad’s (2003) take on
agency seems to imply that it is always a possibility no matter what the educational
environment. While I would agree that agency can and does occur in spite of bureaucratic
heavy handedness and hegemonic forces, students and knowledge in general would be
better off dwelling in an environment, like Wild’s (2011) heterotopia or Brook’s (2008)
vibrant theatre. Ironically, Barad’s (2003) argument should appeal to empiricists
concerned with accountability and accurate measurement of the educational progress of
students and schools in general. Indeed, given both the late physicist, Niels Bohr’s
(analyzed in Barad, 2003) and Barad’s arguments, it appears that schools are making at
least two mistakes when they assess student achievement and teacher performance with
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standardized testing instruments: The first is in looking at the test instrument and the
student as independent, objective, entities. The second mistake (related to the first) is in
ignoring the influence of the test on the student and thus misinterpreting the results of
that test. It is both sad and ironic that the very instruments chosen for measurement and
accountability do neither. For educators the question is how Barad’s theory of “agential
realism” can change the day-to-day interaction between students, teachers,
administrators, and the instruments used, and perhaps discarded, in evaluating the
education students receive. And, it must be noted, that bureaucrats, who demand
centralized control and participants, (teachers, students, administrators) used to their
passive roles, would balk at her theory and consequent practice, since when applied it
would demand more immediate and instant attention, and a willingness to critique and
confront what they think to be true.
For Karen Barad (2003), Bohr’s and Rouse’s explication of the products,
processes, and motivations behind science provided her with a novel way to discuss
performativity that at least privileges materiality as much, if not more, as it privileges the
impact of doing things with words. In contrast, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s, Touching
Feeling (2003) implicitly dares us (a periperformative) to reinvestigate the power of
words in her discussions of the performative and what she calls the “periperformative,”
words or phrases, she argues, which allude to performative speech acts, that because of
their unique characteristics, have the ability to affect agency greater than a performative
by itself. As an example, Sedgwick (2003) offers the well-known performative
utterance, “I dare you!” and two common words spoken at the end of a marriage
ceremony, “I do” (p. 70), and analyzes its impact. Sedgwick acknowledges the relative
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strength of these performative speech acts to either maintain or challenge the status quo,
yet she argues that the more nuanced periperformative responses such as, “…I won’t take
you up on it. Who are you to dare me? Who cares what you dare me to do?…tend to have
a high threshold of initiative…” (p. 70). In other words, she argues that the
periperformative has a greater ability to buck conventional thought. The thing that gives
the periperformative this ability is its connection to a past and future to come, and its
location in space. The periperformative, while acknowledging its connection to a past and
future, occupies a “metaphorics of space” (p. 68), in other words, it is in the
neighborhood of the performative. Additionally it is also grounded in history (the
impetus behind Sedgwick’s analysis is the crime of American slavery) and it is therefore
because of this fascinating connection that the periperformative seems to have the ability
to move about in a linear and non-linear fashion, thereby giving the periperformative a
greater degree of agency. While her book is focused on literary analysis (Eliot, and
Dickens for example), or political speech (Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address) the
implications for pedagogy are tremendous. Consider the following fictional exchange:
TEACHER: (Upset with the lack of effort of her students) I dare you to actually
read tonight’s entire assignment! Most of you seem to have the ability to do what’s
necessary to be successful in this class yet for some unknown reason, refuse to do the
work! (Body language of the teacher suggests disgust/frustration)
STUDENT 1: (smart, yet seemingly lazy) I can’t tonight, I’ve got a date with
Halo III. (A popular video game. Some of the students laugh)
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TEACHER: (Raises voice) Go ahead… make jokes! I don’t care…I’ve already
got degrees and a job. Enjoy your time as a greeter at Wal-Mart. Hey… some of you
might want to practice this phrase…in fact everyone repeat after me, “You want fries
with that?” (Most of the students are collectively rolling their eyes, others have tuned the
teacher out)
STUDENT 2 (Usually quiet but now visibly angry) Why should we care what you
dare us to do? Why don’t you ever ask us what we want to do? (Some of the students are
nodding their heads in approval)
TEACHER: (at her wits end) You know what… forget it. I’m done! I want
everyone to take out their textbooks, turn to page 497 and read it until the end of the
chapter. If you have time before the bell rings answer the questions at the end of the
chapter. If not, it’s for homework.
STUDENT 1 (Still in wise guy mode) You actually gonna grade it this time?
TEACHER: (angry) That’s enough…get to work!
The teacher’s performative of “I dare you…,” might have been an improvised
response, but it was one that had been used often enough so that any force that might
have motivated the students to work harder had been diminished. Indeed, many
improvisational responses are phrases frequently used and suggest a lack of novelty
rather than a fresh approach to what is usually an ongoing problem. It would have taken
an extraordinary improvisational response from the teacher to shift the mood of that class.
In order to be effective, the teacher’s improvisational response needed to include at least
an acknowledgement of what, if any, they as a class had accomplished in addition to the
time(s) that were wasted. In other words the teacher needed to admit something to the
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students that they intuitively understood about the class, even if they were incapable of
articulating their concerns. Instead, in this exchange, it was a student who suggested
initiative, in the honest periperformative uttered by student 2, when she said, “Why
should we care what you dare us to do? Why don’t you ever ask us what we want to do?”
This student’s response to her teacher’s performative attempted to push the class in a
different direction. It is also an example of serious play in that the student risked being
disciplined as she openly confronted the teacher. Unfortunately, this teacher seemed more
concerned with respect for her authority than she was with a way to genuinely motivate
her students to work harder and interact with the material content of the class. Discipline
had lost its more important meaning of to teach. Instead, recognition of authority
appeared to be not only the means but also the end in our fictive, yet often repeated,
exchange. Indeed, the teacher was continuing with a performative approach that
privileges control from a central authority and a non-aporetic stance on the part of the
students. Ironically, like “Chinese handcuffs” that tighten as one pulls harder to escape,
the teacher’s performative of, “I dare you,” simply caused the students to retreat further
into the space of disengagement and unfortunately contributed less to the lived world of
teacher and student.
In our current performative culture, students who are grade conscious tend to do
the assignment without questioning its importance or relevance. Ironically, the class that
was briefly dramatized was better poised to further inquiry because they had an aporetic
stance regarding what was put on their educational plate. Unfortunately, they chose to
completely shut down and thus any gains they might have had as students, and any
changes to the curriculum were forestalled. I would argue that neither the class of
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“teacher pleasers” nor the class that refused to do their work is pedagogically desirable.
Instead, I suggest that good teaching would include the following elements, however it is
important to note that these suggestions do not constitute a method: spontaneous and
reflective input from the students regarding their course of study (developmentally
appropriate); second, an attentive teacher aware of the power or lack of power of various
performatives and Sedgwick’s (2003) periperformatives; and lastly, time spent by
students and teacher on “dwelling in the zone of between” (Aoki, 2005, p. 161).
Performatives and periperformatives work because of the context in which
they are generated and received. I would argue that Sedgwick’s periperformative might
be more effective because of its ability to seemingly play with time, in the sense that
there is more to focus on than simply the thing that came before. To play with time is to
reach back in the past, or anticipate a future as a response to a wholly demand from a
present moment. To play with time is to change the tempo, which in turn, can change the
tone of the response to a present demand: past, present and future to come, remain
somewhat open, depending on the response of the participant. A performative of this
nature is similar to Derrida’s idea of the performative writes scholar and lifelong friend of
Derrida, J. Hillis Miller (2007, 2009). In his essay, Performativity as Performance/
Performativity as Speech Act: Derrida’s Special Theory of Performativity, J. Hillis
Miller (2007) takes issue with the variety of definitions surrounding what has become a
somewhat large and contentious field of performativity studies. He argues,”… that it
would be a catastrophe to blur different meanings of ‘performativity’…” (p. 220). And
while the thrust of his essay is, not surprisingly, on the centrality of literary analysis as a
way to end the confusion surrounding different versions of performativity, I would argue
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that Miller’s essay contains valuable insights for the student and teacher concerned with
good teaching. Indeed, he promotes what he maintains is the most accurate version of
performativity by discussing Derrida’s take on George Eliot’s Daniel Deronda. In this
manner he is able to critique Austin and Butler’s work on performativity, place Derrida
as the intermediary between Austin and Butler, and critique those who misunderstand
their work. His bone of contention with Butler is that she, “…invented a new and
immensely influential theory called performativity, that is, the notion that gender is not
inherent but is engendered by disciplinary pressures that coerce us into performing, that
is, behaving, in a way society assumes is appropriate for a certain gender…” (p. 224). In
other words, his criticism is on the privileging of social construct theory at the expense of
the things that make us innately what we are, or what others term as materiality. Indeed,
in a brief but I suspect sarcastic jab Miller writes, “Blessings on you Wikipedia and on
you too, Judith Butler!…” (p. 224), as a way to demonstrate that one cannot do all things
with just any words, since those blessings would have to be conferred upon them by a
god that may or may not exist; or be inclined to bestow blessings. Of course, it might
seem unfair to extrapolate a version of performativity that was designed for gender
studies and adapt it for literary analysis. Miller seems less at odds with Austin. Clearly,
Miller prefers Derrida’s take on performativity as seen by Derrida’s own analysis on
Eliot’s Daniel Deronda. For in both Derrida’s and Miller’s analysis of Eliot’s novel is
Miller’s criticism of Austin’s performativity and support for the Derridean version.
Regarding that novel Miller writes:
Daniel Deronda is a performance, or reading it is a performance, like performing
a Mozart sonata, or, in this case, since the novel is long, complex and echt
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Victorian like performing a Liszt piano concerto. Daniel Deronda is also an
extended performative utterance of a peculiar kind. It generates a virtual literary
reality that can be ‘accessed’ only by way of the performative efficacy of the
words on the page as I read them. Those words call or conjure into existence, like
specters in broad daylight, Gwendolen, Daniel, all the other characters, their
‘worlds,’ and all that they do and say (p. 235).
Miller seems to imply that the ability or lack of ability of a performative utterance
to bring about a change that Derrida would liken to “…an absolute rupture between the
present and the past…” (Miller, 2007, p. 231), and bring about a desired future yet to
come hinges on the performance that serves as the context for that performative
utterance. Indeed, it was the strength of Eliot’s novel that insured that her character
Daniel could organically, yet surprisingly, follow the demand made of him by Mordecai.
Without that context Mordecai’s demand would have fallen flat, much like the demand
made by the ineffective teacher previously dramatized by me earlier in this chapter. Had
that teacher created a different context (a series of classes as an extended performance)
and then, uttered her performative, one that comes from an understanding of her students,
we might have seen a better outcome. In other words, we might have seen the students
respond to a demand, which came from a “wholly other,” with an educational leap
instead of authoritarian derision.
Despite the lack of consensus regarding the different versions of performativity,
what Miller (2007) praises in Derrida’s is seemingly what occurred in the previously
mentioned “heterotopia” of Wild’s (2011) art gallery, and the theatre created by Brook
(2008) as they both achieved success: One can view Wild’s (2011) sacred space of an art
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gallery as a performance and the demand made on the students coming from the art on
display in that gallery. The student’s effective improvisational response to that demand
(their serious play) was ensured by the strength of that performance (the carefully chosen
art on display) yet in no way was it guaranteed. Similarly, it was the clarity without
rigidity of Brooks’ (2008) rehearsals (the performance) which allowed his actors to
respond to his demand(s) (performative utterances) with an unexpected response which
created that “rupture in time” that in turn ushered in his play yet to come but desired.
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Chapter 8
CODA AS CURRICULUM
We dwell in tensionalities, and yet these tensionalities can go unnoticed or
perhaps misunderstood. Or simply avoided if the tension seems too great and resolution
out of reach. When this lack of attentiveness, misunderstanding, and avoidance comes to
its inevitable conclusion, we see mediocre results: For example, take the jazz performer
on, perhaps an off night. His turn to solo is fast approaching and yet his bandmate offers
up a less than interesting combination of notes. What Edward Sarath (2013) calls a jazz
referent. A referent can be made up of a “standard tune” or be “original.” Importantly, if
it’s a good referent, what Sarath would call a, “highly malleable referent” (p. 192), it is
because it contains ideas that are precise yet also ambiguous. But to return to my example
of our musicians and their off night, a bad referent is offered to a fellow player who in
turn responds with an uninteresting or perhaps clichéd response. In contrast, a “highly
malleable referent” is put out there to be picked up and responded to by the attentive
player. Instead of mediocrity we hear a purely spontaneous response that for Sarath
(2013) is the result of a resolved tensionality between the self and the Self. For Sarath,
the self is the individual self and the Self is what can, perhaps, best be described as the
collective consciousness. And, there is dialectical tension between the self and the Self.
Complicating matters even further is the tension within the self. In this case it is tension
between the person who exists with the person to come, an Other if you will. Sarath
(2013) argues that when all of these tensions are addressed and “resolved” the
improvisational player moves beyond “ordinary consciousness” (p. 181) and achieves,
“…an over-arching sense of an eternal present, where past and future connections are
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subordinate…” (p. 181). Sarath is distinguishing improvisation as different from
composition, even though he acknowledges that composition which is linear, for the most
part, and improvisation, which is non-linear for the most part, both can create paths to the
creation of something “transcendent” (p. 180). For Sarath (2013), what is important is,
The basic principal…that individual consciousness, or the personal self, is but a
facet of collective consciousness, which is the transcendent Self, and therefore all
human behavior manifests itself against, and is informed by, this transcendent
collective backdrop. If the collective field is permeated by stress, tendencies
toward outer stressful behavior are greater; if the field is more harmonious and
coherent, so will be thinking and action (p. 402).
Indeed, Sarath who is a believer in meditation would be surprised, perhaps, at the
ability of Chaplin, discussed in chapter 4, to overcome “outer stressful behavior” and
create something so beautiful and spontaneous. The distinction between Sarath’s (2013)
idea of the perfect improvisational situation with that of Seldes’ (1957) description of
Chaplin’s response to a stressful referent brings up an important point: improvisational
responses, the forces which provoke those responses, and the creativity contained within
those responses, are unpredictable. Sarath might seem to prefer a cooperative “collective
field” as the best environment for his “eternal present” and heightened consciousness.
But if this is true, why then, have others been able to use constraint to improvise? To be
sure improvisation is a skill that can be developed. It is therefore conceivable that, in my
earlier discussion of performing improvisation in front of a crowd of drunken Shriners in
chapter 4, had one or more members of our group had more talent, say approaching the
level of Chaplin, we might have been able to elicit a different response to our
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improvisations. On the other hand, it’s possible that no amount of talent could have
overcome the overweening distraction placed on the hundreds of Shriners by alcohol and
the prostitutes in their laps. In effect, these drunkards dwelled not in the tensionality
between our presentation and their collective consciousness, but rather their tensionality
was dissolved in their complete absorption into alcohol and sex. While it’s possible that
these “Ignoramuses” and their “schoolmaster” might have arrived at a Rancièrian
approachment, the “equality of intelligence” would at least have to wait until another
time: A sober and non-sexual time. Indeed, this notion of environment and the action
going on within that environment would appear to bolster the claims of Peter Brook
(2008) discussed in chapter 6. Brook’s rehearsals were similar to Sarath’s “referent” in
that in both the rehearsal space and the jazz referent the actor and performer, respectively,
were given something precise and something ambiguous. The tensionality between the
precise and ambiguous provoked the player to respond with something original, despite
the fact that their response might have contained something already done before. Indeed,
if we recall the Noguchi statue brought to our attention by Peter Appelbaum (2012) in
chapter 3, it could be said of that statue that it contained precision and ambiguity. In this
manner the statue serves as a potent referent albeit one that must be responded to by the
attentive observer; not passive but provoked into thought of a playground to come.
Similarly, as we saw in Miller’s (2007) description of two characters in an Elliot novel,
Mordecai and Daniel, that Mordecai’s performative utterance, his demand on a “wholly
other” was answered, and answered well because of the context of that performative
utterance.
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Context was crucial for the characters in my play in chapter 5. To be sure they
were able to dwell in tensionality as they tried to eke out an education within the
constraints of a dystopic future. Importantly, they were at their best when those
constraints were not there. You may recall that when they were learning on their own in
the abandoned warehouse in the scene entitled “woodshedding” (a term used by jazz
musicians when they practice in order to increase their technical skills or “chops”) they
had honest conversations regarding history. Ironically, even when they were in an actual
prison (in contrast to the prison of school) the characters were able to engage in an
authentic discussion, one in which improvisation was provoked and responded to
authentically. But importantly, as I hoped I demonstrated in the previous chapters, these
contexts, these environments, while important, vary: our Cuban improvisers who made
up “Playback Theatre,” brought to our attention by the anthropologist Meer (2007), most
certainly worked in an environment that encouraged self-censorship and yet they were
able to improvise honestly. My original conclusion was that the difficulties of Cuban life
predisposed them to improvisation. I still largely agree with that assessment, but I would
like to leave room for another one that is connected to the first. Perhaps we can think of
their life in Cuba as similar to the aforementioned jazz referent or the Noguchi statue. If
this is true then it’s not their predisposition that was the determining factor in their ability
to improvise. Instead, it was the Cuban people’s response to a request that was
ambiguous and precise; a response made all the more potent because of their
understanding of who they were, their self, and who they could be; that is to say the self
that dwells within the self: In other words the self to come.
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I found a similar dynamic in my discussion of Gil the “turntablist” brought to our
attention by his extraordinary teacher Leif Gustavson (2008) in chapter 6. Importantly,
Gustavson was able to take on William Ayer’s (2004) request to, “… become students of
our students” (p. 66). As he and Gil turned their teacher s-student relationship into
partnership, as allies they dwelled within a unique tensionality. This one pitted the
pedagogy that organically grew out of Gil’s practice of sampling and spinning against the
one they inherited. Indeed, what they inherited and what they were able to successfully
fight against was the pedagogy which promotes a passive stance in contrast to the one
that grew out of the very serious “play” of Gil and his associates and admirers.
Fortunately, neither Gustavson nor Gil succumbed to a passive stance or what I termed
earlier as a non-aporetic stance. It seems that Gustavson dwells in the space between
what Aoki (2005) has described as the “… ambiguous, ambivalent space between this or
that, between planned curriculum and live(d) curriculum …” (p. 421-422). To be sure
their live (d) curriculum was rich in the skills and ambiguous concepts that fill the work
of historians, fiction writers with a good amount of mathematical and technical, or
scientific, thinking. Indeed, what Gustavson found in Gil’s tremendous achievement is
reading in its broadest sense. Perhaps the best description of this “art” comes from De
Certeau (1984) who writes
Reading thus introduces an ‘art’ which is anything but passive. It resembles rather
that art whose theory was developed by medieval poets and romancers: an
innovation infiltrated into the text and even into the terms of a tradition.
Imbricated within the strategies of modernity …the procedures of contemporary
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consumption appear to constitute a subtle art of ‘renters’ who know how to
insinuate their countless differences into the dominant text (p. xxii).
Gustavson found in Gil someone who was able, in the Certeauean (1984) sense, to
“insinuate” his differences into the “dominant text.” Indeed, unlike Babbit or our white
improvisers, whom Certeau reduces to a largely “silent majority” (p. 96) from the
American comedy scene, Gil was able to overcome the marginality of a minority group
as he reappropriated the constraining order of place and circumstance. Of course it
remains to be seen whether or not his “insinuation” is enough to overcoming the stifling
aspects of the pedagogical stance both he and Gustavson are trying to overcome. And it
remains to be seen if those who learn from their example can overcome the problems of
representation and mimesis which were suggested by Rancière (2009) and Appelbaum
(2006, 2012, and 2013). Still, there is strength in what Gil, Gustavson, some of our jazz
musicians, and some of our improvisational actors achieved. Indeed, they all were willing
to dwell within a tensionality and engage with those tensionalities in such a way as to
give them a space to notice and mold their nascent moment of creation, guided by a
disciplined wandering, that has commanded my interest since the beginning of this study.
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